Sudanese Army Secures Key Victories and Advances Against RSF Militia

In a series of rapid developments, the Sudanese army and its allied forces have secured significant victories across the capital, Khartoum, which is on the brink of being fully liberated from the grip of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militias.

Led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, these militias have controlled much of Khartoum since the war erupted in April 2023.

However, after more than a year and a half of fierce back-and-forth clashes with the RSF militia, the Sudanese army has made notable advances in various areas of the capital, culminating in the liberation of Khartoum International Airport, which has been severely damaged by the ongoing fighting.

On 25 January 2025, the Sudanese army declared full control over the Jili refinery, located around 70 kilometers north of Khartoum, a site that had been under RSF militia control since the onset of the war.

The army also lifted the siege on its general headquarters in Khartoum, which had been blockaded by the RSF militia since the war began.

On the same day, the Sudanese military broke the RSF militia’s siege on the Signal Corps base in Khartoum North, a critical step towards securing full control of the capital.

The Final Phase

With the recapture of the general headquarters and Khartoum International Airport from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, the second phase of the Sudanese army’s field advancement plan is nearly complete. 

This phase has involved reclaiming strategic positions, setting the stage for the third phase.

The first phase of the operation was defensive, aimed at absorbing and containing RSF militia attacks while ensuring the army held its ground. 

The second phase saw the recovery of vital locations, and the third phase will focus on fully retaking the capital and eliminating Hemedti's forces, while curbing the insurgency in Darfur.

In a statement issued on 24 January 2025, the Sudanese army declared the successful completion of the second phase, following the merging of forces from the cities of Khartoum North (Bahri) and Omdurman with the units stationed at the general headquarters.

Sudanese sources confirm that the convergence of army forces with those from the capital’s three main districts—Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman—signals the imminent full liberation of the city and the defeat of the rebellion.

Fierce fighting in Khartoum with Hemedti’s forces is also seen as crucial to facilitating the return of government ministries to the capital, after many relocated to Port Sudan at the war's outset.

Local sources report that once the capital is fully secured, the next objective will be to push eastwards toward Nile regions still under RSF militia control.

On 26 January 2025, Malik Agar, Vice President of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, confirmed that the army had entered the third phase of its operations, described as "breaking the enemy’s backbone." He also stated that the war against the RSF militia was "coming to an end."

Agar further explained in an interview with Al Jazeera Mubasher that the war has unfolded in three stages, "The first was about absorbing the shock and holding the ground, a defensive phase to prevent the RSF [militia] from expanding. The second was offensive, where we secured several cities, and the third focused on taking full control of Khartoum and achieving a military resolution."

Sudanese army chief and head of the Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, stated that Sudan will soon be free of militia emphasizing that “There will be no negotiations with the terrorist rebel militia,” with those who supported the insurgency.

This was seen as an indirect reference to the political forces that have not supported the army in its current battle.

Speaking from the newly liberated general headquarters on 24 January, he declared, "The rebellion is nearing its end, and the armed forces are in their strongest position."

The Collapse of Hemedti’s Militias

The liberation of Khartoum International Airport by the Sudanese army and its allied forces, along with the breaking of the siege on the general headquarters, followed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s visit there after 21 months of blockade, marked the continuation of a series of successive victories over the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.

The army has consolidated its control over the Sennar state in southeastern Sudan and the city of Wad Madani, the capital of the Gezira state in central Sudan.

Strategic locations within Khartoum were also freed, with army units converging from multiple directions, paving the way for the full recapture of the capital.

Local sources close to the military told Al-Estiklal that Sudanese Armed Forces employed a strategy of encircling the RSF militia, dubbed "strategic encirclement," beginning with the Gezira state and moving through the Jili refinery in Khartoum.

This plan, they explained, aims not only to expel the RSF militia but to completely eliminate them, preventing their spread to other regions and forcing them into submission or destruction.

On 14 January, Burhan stated, "The war against the RSF [militia] will not cease until they are utterly defeated."

The RSF militia had taken control of most of Khartoum, with the exception of key military sites, including the general headquarters, the armored corps, the signal corps, the engineering corps, and the Karari area in Omdurman, along with other scattered military zones.

The RSF militia engaged in several battles to seize these positions but failed, instead managing to isolate them into separate enclaves throughout the months of conflict.

From the war’s outset, the Sudanese army relied on aerial supply drops to sustain its leadership at the general headquarters. 

Burhan remained besieged there for four months before managing to break out in August 2023, heading to Port Sudan.

The first significant link between army camps was established in February 2024, when forces from the Karari military zone reached the Signal Corps in southeastern Omdurman.

This was followed by the recovery of Bahri, with army units crossing the Halfaya Bridge connecting the northern parts of Bahri to northern Omdurman on 26 September 2024.

The army then advanced southwards towards the city center and the headquarters of the Signal Corps, ultimately retaking Wad Madani, the vital agricultural hub of Gezira state in central Sudan.

A portion of the recent victories can be attributed to the deteriorating state of Hemedti’s forces, which have suffered significant internal divisions, allowing the army to seize certain areas with minimal resistance.

The collapse and withdrawal of the RSF militia forces have unfolded in a manner reminiscent of the regime forces under Bashar al-Assad, according to Sudanese sources.

Sources confirmed to Al-Estiklal that the army and popular resistance forces were able to enter areas previously held by the RSF militia, after the militias fled in the face of successive strikes, their morale shattered by the desertion of their leaders.

The latest defection from the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia came from Hemedti’s advisor, Ayoub Osman Nahar, who announced his resignation on 24 January 2025 in protest against the continued targeting of civilians and indiscriminate shelling with drones and heavy artillery by RSF militia.

His resignation followed hours after the Sudanese army scored key victories in the capital Khartoum, including breaking the siege on the general headquarters and the Signal Corps.

A significant number of senior RSF militia commanders have defected, publicly declaring their allegiance to the Sudanese army. 

Among the most prominent was Abu Aqila Kikel, the RSF militia’s field commander in Gezira state, who switched sides in November 2024.

This wave of defections was preceded in October 2024 by the announcement of five members from the RSF militia advisory council, who also declared their break with Hemedti and their support for the Sudanese army.

They accused Hemedti of plotting to seize power, kill innocents, and take control of Sudan’s Red Sea coasts.

Another factor behind the military setbacks has been the collapse of the political opposition coalition backing Hemedti, made up of left-wing and liberal groups that had shared power with the military during the transitional period following the ousting of former president Omar al-Bashir.

Sources within the political bloc, which includes the "Change" and "Taqaddum" groups led by former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, confirmed to Sudan Tribune on 26 January 2025 that a rift had emerged within the Civilian Democratic Forces Coordination (Taqaddum) over disagreements regarding the formation of a "parallel government" that the RSF militia had planned to announce.

The sources further reported that the RSF militia had halted talks with political factions supporting it, aimed at forming a government in areas under their control, following the army’s victories in crucial fronts and the recapture of the general headquarters.

The Failure of the UAE's Plan

Another factor contributing to the RSF militia's setbacks is the failure of a plan reportedly being devised by the UAE, which sought to provide support to Hemedti through the militia forces of Libyan Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya. 

This support was to include mercenaries and weapons—plans that were ultimately thwarted by the Sudanese army.

It is rumored that the Egyptian military was involved in airstrikes against the mercenaries in eastern Libya, and that Egyptian head of the regime Abdel Fattah el-Sisi summoned Haftar on 18 January to protest his backing of Hemedti's forces, which have been hostile to Egypt.

Both the Sudanese army and The Wall Street Journal have confirmed that a battalion from Haftar’s forces, stationed in the Libyan city of Kufra near the Sudanese border, supplied the RSF militia with ammunition and mortars.

A report by the United Nations confirmed that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia have relied on military supply lines passing through several countries, including Libya.

The report revealed that allied forces have supported the RSF militia with military supplies from Libya, Chad, and South Sudan.

The Sudanese army has documented the escape of RSF militia fighters to Libyan cities under Khalifa Haftar’s control, following a counteroffensive by Libyan militia Forces aimed at rescuing the RSF militia fighters from their mounting defeats.

Libya’s Grand Mufti, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ghariani, has also confirmed Haftar’s involvement in backing the RSF militia, stating that the UAE rulers control the RSF militia general to meddle in Sudan’s affairs.

Due to these developments, two U.S. Congress members, Senator Chris Van Hollen and Representative Sara Jacobs, issued a statement on 24 January 2025, broadcast by Reuters, confirming their commitment to blocking arms sales to the UAE.

This announcement came after the two lawmakers concluded that the UAE was supplying weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in Sudan's civil war.

U.S. law requires congressional review of major arms deals, allowing senators to call for votes on rejection resolutions that could halt such sales.

In tandem with the army’s control of multiple cities and the imminent liberation of Khartoum, Malik Agar, the Vice President of the Sovereignty Council, announced that a new prime minister would soon be appointed, and a government formed until elections are held, following the return of civilians to their cities and homes.

A report by al-Mohagig news agency on 26 January 2025 highlighted expected amendments to the constitutional document, including the removal of all provisions related to the Forces of Freedom and Change and the RSF militia, both now seen as enemies of the Sudanese army and ousted from power.

The report emphasized that these changes were driven by the Sudanese army's field victories, with a new constitutional foundation set to be laid for post-war Sudan.

Legal expert Taj al-Din Banga explained that the withdrawal of the Forces of Freedom and Change from their partnership with the military in October 2021 created issues with ministerial appointments. 

The bloc had held a significant share of government positions, and as a result, the constitutional document that currently governs Sudan now requires amendments.