Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood, 80 Years of Tension with the Monarchy: Key Events, Latest Is Their Ban

Over the past 80 years, the relationship between Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood and the state has been marked by repeated turbulence, swings between periods of political harmony and moments of deep discord. The tension recently led to the government’s official ban on the party, calling it an “illegal entity” despite years of cooperation.

On April 23, 2025, Jordan’s Interior Minister Mazen al-Faraya outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood, branding it an unlicensed group and warning that any affiliation or promotion of its ideology now carries criminal penalties.

The move came just one week after Jordan’s intelligence agency claimed to have foiled a “subversive plot” by arresting a 16-member cell affiliated with the Brotherhood. Authorities accused the group of seeking to destabilize the country and incite disorder.

A Cooperative Beginning

Founded in 1945 by Sheikh Abdul Latif Abu Qura, the Muslim Brotherhood was initially registered as a charity in 1946. King Abdullah I personally attended its founding meeting, underscoring the close ties between the group and the regime at the time.

In 1953, the government upgraded its status to a “multi-functional Islamic group,” opening the door to political engagement. The Brotherhood began fielding official candidates in 1956, after running them as independents between 1951 and 1954.

The relationship remained largely cooperative through the 1950s and 1960s. Several Brotherhood figures held senior government roles and helped shape the national education curriculum. In 1970, prominent Brotherhood member Ishaq Farhan was appointed Minister of Education and Islamic Affairs. Later, Abdul Latif Arabiyat served as Secretary-General of the Education Ministry from 1982 to 1985.

The Brotherhood also expanded its influence in student unions and professional associations, eventually dominating them. In 1984, when parliamentary life resumed after a 14-year hiatus, the group won three of the eight available seats.

But tensions began to surface in 1985 during student protests at Yarmouk University, where Brotherhood-affiliated students rallied against tuition hikes. The demonstrations were violently suppressed by security forces, signaling a shift in the state’s stance.

Throughout the 1980s, internal divisions emerged within the Brotherhood over how to manage relations with the regime. Disagreements intensified over the Palestinian issue, and the group grew increasingly vocal in opposing government policies. Still, both sides managed to avoid open confrontation.

Despite its criticism, the Brotherhood did not challenge the regime’s legitimacy. In return, the regime allowed it to operate openly in mosques, charities, and civil society; a latitude that enabled the group to build a broad grassroots base, especially during the political opening of the late 1980s.

The Brotherhood’s political peak came in the 1989 elections, which underscored the growing appeal of Islamist movements in Jordan. Running under the banner “Islam is the Solution,” the Brotherhood won 22 of 80 parliamentary seats, while another four went to independent Islamists. The results were seen as a sweeping victory for Islamists and a resounding setback for nationalist and leftist factions.

Peace Deals 

The Arab-Israeli peace negotiations of 1991 marked a pivotal moment in the long and complex relationship between Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood and the regime; a turning point that many analysts, including former Youth Minister and writer Mohammad Abu Rumman, describe as the beginning of the rupture.

In his 2012 co-authored book The Islamic Solution in Jordan, written with Jordanian researcher Hassan Abu Hanieh, Abu Rumman said Islamist movements saw the peace agreements as a threat to the state’s identity. They mobilized public opposition to normalization and issued religious edicts prohibiting it.

In response, the Jordanian government began enacting political and legal measures aimed at curbing the Brotherhood’s growing influence. Chief among these was the introduction of the “one-vote law” in 1993, widely viewed as a deliberate attempt to shrink the Brotherhood’s parliamentary representation following its strong showing in the 1989 elections.

This was part of a broader strategy to contain the group’s reach in key societal arenas—particularly professional associations, universities, and mosques, which had long served as pillars of its grassroots power.

The shift signaled a restructuring of the state’s posture toward the Brotherhood: no longer a potential political partner, the group was increasingly treated as a force to be constrained within a national security framework that viewed it as a potential threat to political stability.

Despite the clampdown, the Brotherhood managed to win 17 seats in the 1993 elections but was unable to block the ratification of the Wadi Araba peace treaty with the Israeli Occupation; an agreement the group opposed alongside a number of independent MPs.

Although the Brotherhood took a clear stance against the peace accords and the Wadi Araba treaty, it refrained from direct confrontation with the regime. Instead, it opted for parliamentary dissent, voting against the treaty but refusing to resign en masse.

These developments unfolded within a broader regional and international context. The Wadi Araba treaty followed the Oslo Accords and reflected a shifting regional order. U.S. and Israeli pressure played a role in shaping Jordan’s security and political calculus, one that ultimately hardened the state’s approach toward Islamist movements.

In the aftermath, the state moved to restrict the Brotherhood’s influence in public institutions and university campuses. The group responded by boycotting the 1997 parliamentary elections. Tensions persisted until the death of King Hussein in 1999.

A Series of Political Shocks 

When King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999, he swiftly moved to expel the leadership of the Palestinian Resistance Movement (Hamas) from Jordan, signaling a strategic shift in the state's broader approach to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The expulsion sparked an internal crisis within the Brotherhood. Some of its leaders were accused of staying silent in the face of the decision, exposing early signs of division within the organization over whether to prioritize Jordanian domestic concerns or the Palestinian cause. The question of the Brotherhood’s relationship with Hamas became a source of growing organizational friction.

This rupture led to the emergence of a faction within the Brotherhood more closely aligned with Hamas, prompting internal restructuring and fueling tensions around the group's stance toward both the Jordanian state and the Palestinian Resistance Movement.

Tensions deepened in the early 2000s, when the Jordanian government dissolved parliament between 2001 and 2003, issuing more than 200 temporary laws in its absence. Among them were public assembly and association laws that the Brotherhood condemned as a rollback of political freedoms and a restriction on civic life.

The relationship further deteriorated in 2004, when the government proposed legislation to curtail the powers of professional syndicates, long considered strongholds of Islamist influence. The Brotherhood responded with sit-ins and strikes, eventually forcing the state to shelve the draft law.

A new flashpoint emerged in 2006 following Hamas’ electoral victory in the Palestinian legislative elections. Ahead of a planned visit by Mahmoud al-Zahar, the foreign minister of the Palestinian government led by Ismail Haniyeh at the time, Jordanian authorities announced on April 20 that they had uncovered a Hamas-linked cell plotting attacks inside the country.

The announcement triggered a sharp political rift. The Brotherhood cast doubt on the official narrative, which the government interpreted as siding with Hamas. In response, authorities seized control of the Islamic Center Charity Society, the Brotherhood’s key social and charitable arm.

Amid rising pressure and changes to electoral laws, the Brotherhood boycotted the 2007 municipal elections and reluctantly participated in the general elections, only to suffer a significant setback, winning just six seats.

A New Ban

During the wave of Arab Spring protests between 2011 and 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan called for sweeping constitutional reforms aimed at curbing the king’s powers to appoint and dissolve governments, empowering the elected parliament to form the executive branch, and either electing or abolishing the upper house.

In response, the group organized over a thousand demonstrations in 2011 alone, rejecting what it saw as cosmetic reforms and refusing to join the government-led National Dialogue Committee.

The regime responded with a series of government reshuffles, the creation of a Constitutional Court, and revisions to the electoral law. But the Brotherhood remained unconvinced, boycotting the 2013 parliamentary elections while continuing peaceful demonstrations, pointedly avoiding any calls to overthrow the regime.

In 2015, as internal fissures within the Brotherhood began to surface, the Jordanian government granted legal status to a splinter group—The Muslim Brotherhood Society—led by former General Guide Abdul Majid Thuneibat, effectively recognizing it as the official successor to the original organization.

This move was reinforced in 2020 by a court ruling that formally dissolved the original Brotherhood and transferred its assets to the newly recognized association. The Brotherhood, under growing state pressure, attempted to retain its political relevance by running through its licensed political arm, the Islamic Action Front, which secured only five seats in parliament.

However, after Operation al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023, the Brotherhood saw a sharp revival in public backing, leading widespread protests across Jordan denouncing the Israeli war crimes in Gaza.

Reflecting this renewed momentum, the Islamic Action Front scored a sweeping victory in parliamentary elections, winning 31 out of 138 seats, despite the Brotherhood’s continued legal jeopardy, including the official ban on the group and threats of prosecution against its members and sympathizers.