The New Election Law: Why It Signals the Death of Politics in Egypt

In a move that has sparked a storm of political controversy, Egypt’s parliamentary committee on constitutional and legislative affairs gave final approval on May 21, 2025, to a new election law put forward by pro-government parties.

Opposition groups from across the political spectrum have condemned the legislation, arguing that it effectively seals off the political arena in favor of the ruling regime, calling it a “formal death certificate for politics” in the country.

Parliament passed the new election law at the close of its legislative session, sealing the deal in a political landscape already tightly controlled by the regime.

As the chamber rushed through a vote on amendments designed to block the path of any genuine—or even token—opposition, many outside the hall saw the move not as a routine legal tweak but as yet another plunge into the political decay that has deepened since the 2013 military coup.

The Initial Approval of the Law

Under the guise of “legislative reform,” the parliamentary majority, led by the Future of the Nation Party—the regime’s most prominent political arm—redrew electoral districts to enforce a system of absolute closed lists, crafting a complex legal framework that preordains who can enter the political arena and who is shut out.

With stringent requirements on list composition and demographic allocations riddled with injustice, the new law deals a fatal blow to what little genuine competition remained in parliamentary life, effectively sealing off the political landscape through ballot boxes whose outcomes are already decided.

The amendments, which were finally approved by the parliamentary Legislative and Constitutional Affairs Committee and culminated in the new election law, underscore the ongoing exclusion of the public sphere through an electoral system designed to keep power firmly in control of the political landscape.

Described as a “mere formality for pre-agreed legislation,” the speaker of the Egyptian parliament, Hanafy Ali Gebaly, announced the approval of two new draft laws concerning parliamentary elections.

More than ten members signed the two laws, led by blocs loyal to the head of the regime, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime, including the Future of the Nation Party, the Republican People’s Party, Homeland Defenders, and several independents affiliated with the Youth Coordination of Parties.

The initiative was spearheaded from the outset by MP Abdel Hadi al-Qasabi, head of the parliamentary body for the Future of the Nation Party, at a time that left little room for genuine public debate or meaningful societal dialogue over the substance of the amendments.

A New Electoral Map

The new law is fundamentally based on a redrawing of electoral districts according to a population formula relying on data from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics and the National Elections Authority for 2025, alongside the creation of several new administrative centers following the 2020 reorganization.

Under the new distribution of parliamentary seats, 284 seats will be allocated to closed-list proportional representation across four constituencies; two with 40 seats each, and the other two with 102 seats each.

Meanwhile, in the Senate, 100 seats allocated to the closed-list system were also divided into four constituencies: two with 13 seats each, and two others with 37 seats each.

Although the authorities present these amendments as a “scientific and constitutional” response to demographic changes, opposition forces insist that at their core, the reforms merely reinforce the existing mechanisms that shut down political space.

What stands out in the bill’s provisions is not only the redrawing of constituencies but also the very nature of the candidate lists that every party or electoral alliance must adhere to.

The new law imposes fixed quotas within each closed list, mandating representation for Christians, workers and farmers, youth, people with disabilities, Egyptians living abroad, as well as a designated share for women.

For example, in the lists comprising 40 seats, there will be three Christians, two workers and farmers, two young candidates, one person with disabilities, one Egyptian from abroad, and at least 20 women.

Meanwhile, in the lists of 102 seats, the quotas rise to nine Christians, six workers and farmers, six youth representatives, three candidates with disabilities, three Egyptians abroad, and no fewer than 51 women.

The Shackles of Power

These complex shackles imposed by the new election law make forming candidate lists virtually impossible for opposition forces with limited political and organizational resources.

In contrast, the law grants pro-regime parties, backed by the state, security, and intelligence agencies, the exclusive ability to present complete lists that meet the convoluted requirements.

Al-Manssa noted on May 25 that political money will also play a decisive role in shaping the next parliament.

Voices within the opposition have warned that these amendments will only serve to unleash the influence of political money more than ever before.

Mohamed Torky, a member of the Conservative Party’s presidential council, told al-Manssa that the new bill kills competitiveness and shuts the door on small and medium opposition forces lacking the financial and organizational tools wielded by parties aligned with the regime.

Torky also highlighted that some constituencies with half a million voters were allocated just two seats, while less populous districts received four, perpetuating imbalances in representation and political injustice between different governorates.

“What is unfolding is a deliberate redrawing of the next parliament to be stamped in the image of the Future of the Nation party, with a limited presence of a small number of allied parties and no genuine independent opposition,” he added.

The Democratic Civil Movement, a coalition of opposition parties, had anticipated the move and on May 19 expressed deep frustration with the new electoral law, which combines a majoritarian system with closed-list proportional representation.

In a statement, the coalition criticized what it described as an “insistence on implementing a winner-takes-all system that wastes voters’ voices and denies them representation, alongside an expansion of constituencies that reinforces a monopoly mentality.”

In contrast, the authorities have framed the amendments as a legislative development grounded in changes to the country’s demographic and administrative realities.

The House of Representatives described the process as a “legislative movement that strengthens the legal framework of the electoral process based on precise scientific and constitutional principles.”

Ahmed Abdel Gawad, deputy head of the Future of the Nation party, praised the amendments, calling them “an advanced reform step that ensures fair representation among governorates and takes into account differences in population density.”

In remarks to the official local parliamentary website, Barlamani, he pointed to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics’ 2025 data as the scientific basis for seat distribution.

Yet behind these statements lies a clearer, deeper aim: to cement the executive’s grip in the hands of the head of the regime, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, through a politically subdued parliament that offers no real opposition and readily endorses the state’s agenda.

Outcomes of the National Dialogue

However, this is not the first time Egypt’s electoral laws have been reshaped to ensure the public sphere remains firmly under control.

Since the adoption of the 2014 constitution, following the 2013 military coup, parliamentary election laws have undergone multiple revisions.

All these amendments have resulted in legislatures devoid of any meaningful opposition, culminating in the 2015 and 2020 sessions with parliaments that were virtually opposition-free.

In May 2023, national dialogue sessions were launched in Cairo at the head of the regime el-Sisi’s invitation, accompanied by promises of a genuine political breakthrough, including reforms to the parliamentary election law as a key to revitalizing a political sphere long dried up.

However, the scene soon crystallized into two parallel tracks: the ruling parties, led by the Future of the Nation party, insisted on maintaining the current system, half the seats allocated through a closed-list system, the other half by individual candidacy.

In contrast, opposition parties put forward two proposals: one calling for a full proportional representation system to ensure broader inclusion of diverse political forces, and a compromise plan blending individual seats with both proportional and closed-list elements.

However, the smaller working groups failed to reach any genuine consensus, and by August 2023, the National Dialogue Steering Committee submitted three conflicting recommendations to the head of the regime el-Sisi, leaving the final decision firmly in his hands—an impasse that ultimately paved the way for the adoption of the new law.

The first recommendation called for maintaining the current system, with 50 percent of the seats in both the House of Representatives and the Senate elected through a closed-list system, and the remaining 50 percent through individual candidacies across four electoral districts nationwide.

The second recommendation proposed electing all members through a full proportional representation system across 15 nationwide districts.

The third suggested a hybrid model: 50 percent of members elected individually, 25 percent via the closed-list system, and the remaining 25 percent through proportional representation.

The Death of Politics 

In a statement to Al-Estiklal, journalist and former parliamentarian Mohamed Youssef argued that the heart of the crisis in the new law lies not merely in the distribution of seats or the design of constituencies, but in a broader system managed for years under el-Sisi’s rule.

He explained that its aim is to “transform parliament into a mono-voiced chamber, devoid of pluralism and entirely subordinate to the executive authority.”

“Globally, closed lists are assigned by parties to their internal coalitions based on competitive programmes; in Egypt, however, they are produced by a single political kitchen for a population denied the freedom of choice.”

“What we are witnessing is not a legislative amendment but a wholesale bulldozing of political parties and the entire political community, with the next parliament set to be a pale replica of the executive itself,” Youssef added.

“In all modern democracies, it is no longer acceptable to maintain closed quota systems that preemptively confiscate the will of voters, especially religious quotas that contradict the principle of political equality enshrined in constitutional texts.”

“The fundamental principle should be to allow free and open competition among all political factions without prior discrimination, leaving the ballot boxes to determine the true political balance.”

He elaborated on the deeper legal issue, saying, “What is happening today is the subjugation of the electoral system to inherited political rules that reproduce the logic of the pre-January 25 revolution constitution, which clearly enshrined pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power as pillars of political life.”

“But in practice, we are returning to the philosophy of one-party systems, much like in the 1950s and 1960s, when all legislative bodies were merely executive arms of the regime.”

“The insistence on the current form of the law reveals that the ruling philosophy in Egypt today rejects the idea of governance through parliamentary balances or political coalitions as practiced globally, where absolute majorities held by a single party are no longer the norm in any genuine democracy.”

“Broad coalitions have become essential for any government to achieve the constitutional quorum needed to form the executive authority and pass legislation, as we have seen in France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and other long-established parliamentary democracies,” Youssef continued.

“We are reviving a system of single-party dominance that strips the constitution of its meaning and extinguishes any hope for a mature political life,” he argued.

“If that is the case, then why impose further costs on holding elections and staging this political theatre? It would be simpler to transform the country into a mass state or a federation based on customary, consensual politics,” Youssef concluded.