Saudi-Egyptian Rift Explodes as Media Target Sisi and MBS: Tiran-Sanafir Dispute or Halted Saudi Aid?

Although relations between the Egyptian and Saudi regimes have been strained for years due to political and financial disputes, tensions have once again reached boiling point—this time through a coordinated media offensive led by loyalist commentators and pro-regime online networks in both countries.

But in a striking shift, the campaign has aimed at the very top, with both leaders coming under fire. 

In a particularly explosive turn, Saudi media figures have openly speculated about the end of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s rule in 2026—and even his potential imprisonment.

In response, pro-Sisi voices have fired back with an extraordinary public call for a palace coup against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—urging members of the royal family to sideline the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia. 

The call, a rare breach of regional decorum, comes despite years of generous support from Riyadh, including its early and enthusiastic backing of el-Sisi’s 2013 military takeover.

The sharp escalation has sparked speculation over the deeper causes of the rift. 

Some point to bin Salman’s decision to halt the once steady flow of financial aid—dubbed “rice for the general” in Gulf circles—amid growing perceptions that el-Sisi is a costly liability, demanding more than he delivers.

Others suggest the dispute may hinge on sensitive geopolitical shifts: Cairo’s apparent hesitation to finalize the transfer of the Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi control, reported U.S. ambitions to establish a military base on the strategic territory, or broader regional realignments as “Israel” and Saudi Arabia assert themselves as dominant powers in an increasingly multipolar Middle East.

Tug-of-War

Over the past five years, Egyptian-Saudi relations have been marked by a recurring cycle of tension, behind-the-scenes bargaining, and occasional confrontations—often playing out through coordinated online campaigns run by loyalist digital armies on both sides.

One of the most heated episodes came in 2023 when a volley of insults was traded between pro-regime journalists and activists from Cairo and Riyadh. 

The spat culminated in the deletion of an incendiary column by the editor-in-chief of Egypt’s state-owned al-Gomhuria newspaper, who described Saudis as “vile, barefoot nomads”—a slur that reignited bitter memories and underscored the fragility of the alliance.

In an attempt to defuse tensions following the war of words, head of the regime Abdel Fattah el-Sisi issued a conciliatory statement in February 2023, urging restraint, “It’s not right to insult our brothers—do not forget the goodwill between you.” 

Yet observers noted that such digital flare-ups rarely occur without the green light from above, with online loyalist networks on both sides widely seen as extensions of their respective regimes.

This time, however, the spark came from an unlikely source. Egypt’s embattled Transport Minister, Kamel el-Wazir—frequently the target of public anger over deadly infrastructure failures—appeared to take a veiled jab at Saudi Arabia. 

The minister has come under renewed fire after a horrific crash claimed the lives of 19 young women en route to harvest grapes for a mere 130 Egyptian pounds a day. 

Critics say such tragedies are a grim testament to a broken system—and el-Wazir’s remarks have only added fuel to a simmering regional row.

Boasting about Egypt’s road-building costs, Transport Minister Kamel el-Wazir declared smugly, “Go see how much road costs in Saudi Arabia—then compare it to what we spend.” 

The remark, widely seen as a pointed dig at Riyadh, sparked a torrent of mockery and scathing criticism from Saudi social media users.

The backlash gained momentum after Turki al-Sheikh—a close adviser to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—appeared to give his blessing with a barbed tweet mocking the Egyptian minister. 

With that, the online floodgates opened, turning a ministerial boast into yet another flashpoint in the fraying alliance between Cairo and Riyadh.

Al-Sheikh didn’t stop at expressing astonishment over the minister’s unsolicited jab at Saudi Arabia, its government, and its infrastructure projects. He went a step further—issuing a thinly veiled insult.

In a pointed tweet, the royal adviser deliberately misspelled the word “Impossible” as “i possible”—a not-so-subtle reference to a cringeworthy moment from a June 2023 conference, when Kamel el-Wazir coined the non-existent term “Impossible” in a sycophantic attempt to praise head of the regime el-Sisi for “achieving the impossible.” 

The jab hit home, reviving a wave of ridicule over el-Wazir’s linguistic blunder—and further straining an already brittle relationship between the two regimes.

Before the spat between Turki al-Sheikh and Minister el-Wazir unfolded, Saudi-born broadcaster Amr Adib launched a fierce on-air attack against the Egyptian transport minister on the Saudi-owned MBC Masr channel, following the tragic deaths of 19 young women.

But this latest bout of media crossfire has taken a more dangerous turn—striking not just ministers and mouthpieces, but the heads of state themselves. 

For the first time, the loyalist echo chambers on both sides turned their fire toward Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Mohammed bin Salman, a dramatic escalation that prompted urgent efforts from high-level figures in both regimes to bring the war of words to an abrupt halt.

Saudi journalist and regime insider Qenan al-Ghamdi didn’t mince his words. “The last June 30 celebration will be in 2026,” he wrote, “marking the end of el-Sisi’s rule—after which he and his intelligence operatives will find themselves in Tora Prison, unless he escapes in his lavish private jet.”

He went on to mock Egypt’s grandiose presidential palace in the new administrative capital—widely dubbed “the military’s capital”—predicting it would one day become a museum. 

“A new tourist attraction,” he scoffed, “for people to gawk at chandeliers that cost enough to support a million families for a year.”

What makes this attack particularly significant is that it did not come from the usual swarm of anonymous online accounts or digital loyalist networks. 

Instead, it was delivered by a prominent, state-aligned Saudi journalist—Qenan al-Ghamdi, former editor-in-chief of major outlets including al-Watan—marking a shift from isolated spats to what appears to be a more coordinated, top-level messaging strategy.

This change in tone was not lost on Egyptian commentators. Sameh Abu al-Aaryes, a figure with close ties to Egyptian intelligence, fired back at al-Ghamdi, warning that his remarks “represent the position of Mohammed bin Salman’s regime and amount to a direct threat to both el-Sisi and Egypt.”

State Authorities

Given the unthinkable nature of such direct insults targeting the heads of both regimes—delivered not by fringe online operatives but by official journalists—it is widely assumed that these attacks came with explicit approval from the intelligence services of both countries. 

The escalation, striking so personally at el-Sisi and bin Salman, was deemed too dangerous to ignore, prompting intervention from security apparatuses on both sides.

The crackdown came as the rhetoric began to penetrate official channels themselves. 

In what appeared to be a response to the Saudi journalist’s derision of Egyptian civilization and his assertion that “they represent a bankrupt regime on the brink of collapse,” Egypt’s foreign minister, Badr Abdel Ati, stepped in to quell the rising tensions.

According to statements circulated by pro-regime online networks, Badr Abdel Ati declared, “Countries without civilisation, without political history, and without military strength are attempting to lead the regional scene,” a clear reference to Saudi Arabia.

“This is unacceptable—both politically and morally. Egypt will not allow the reshaping of the region according to the whims of a transient power,” Ati added.

As a result, top-level orders were issued to both sides to prevent the dispute from escalating into an open confrontation. In response, journalist Qenan al-Ghamdi deleted his tweets threatening the end of Sisi’s rule and his imprisonment in Tora Prison.

Similarly, pro-regime online networks—and Sameh Abu Aaryes himself—scrubbed their posts calling on the Saudi royal family to stage a coup against Mohammed bin Salman and remove him from power.

To further ease tensions, a phone call took place on July 3, 2025, between Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati and his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan. 

During the conversation, both officials praised the strong bilateral ties and the fraternal, historic bonds that unite the two brotherly nations.

Egyptian journalist Hafez al-Mirazi pointed to underlying causes of the current sour relations between the regimes, highlighting financial disputes, regional realignments, and the contentious issue of the Tiran and Sanafir islands.

“Anyone following the comments on the anniversary of June 30/July 3, 2013, would be forgiven for thinking that Saudi Arabia was not the primary financier of Egypt’s counter-revolution—indeed, that it was Qatar’s ally, not the UAE’s, at that time,” Al-Mirazi said.

This is not the first time that media figures and loyalist networks from both countries have clashed with the tacit approval of their governments. 

In January 2023, a series of media battles erupted amid the broader financial dispute surrounding the Tiran and Sanafir islands.

One of the key players was Mohamed el-Baz, an influential media figure linked to Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate, who launched a live-streamed attack on Saudi Arabia via his Facebook page.

Meanwhile, Saudi writer Khaled al-Dakhil criticized the Egyptian military’s dominance over both politics and the economy, lamenting the absence of any viable political or economic alternative.

He mocked el-Sisi’s claim that “Egypt will only kneel to God,” asking pointedly: if Egypt refuses to bow to Gulf money, then why does el-Sisi keep demanding “Gulf rice”?

On February 3, 2023, Abdul Razzaq Tawfiq, editor-in-chief of the semi-official Egyptian newspaper al-Gomhuria, launched a vicious attack on the Gulf states. 

He used derogatory language, referring to them as “barefoot nomads who recently donned the finest clothes,” and labeled them “villains, scoundrels, and ungrateful beneficiaries.”

The article was swiftly deleted after sparking outrage and sharp Gulf backlash directed at Egypt.

The time Has Passed

One of the key sources of strain in Saudi-Egyptian relations is Riyadh’s growing frustration with el-Sisi’s relentless demands for support since his 2013 coup—despite having received billions of dollars in aid. 

This fatigue has led to the suspension of “rice handouts” and free support checks, shifting instead towards investments and the acquisition of Egyptian land as compensation.

Yet the Saudi stance towards the Egyptian regime remains clear: the era of open-ended checks is over. 

This was underscored in an analysis by the Washington-based Middle East Institute on July 2, 2025, which detailed the evolving dynamics of Egyptian-Saudi relations.

The American think tank stated that “Saudi Arabia will not allow Egypt to collapse financially or economically, given its geopolitical and demographic significance for Gulf stability. However, there will be no more open-ended checks.”

It noted that Riyadh “no longer injects funds directly into Egypt’s central bank,” citing remarks from the Saudi finance minister in 2023, who declared that the policy of unconditional support “has come to an end.”

The Middle East Institute’s analysis concluded that “if Egypt seeks support beyond minimal guarantees, it must rely on Saudi investments rather than aid.”

The institute explained that “the divergence in Saudi-Egyptian regional political stances began when Saudi Arabia and the UAE led a coalition against the Houthis in Yemen and called on Egypt to join.”

El-Sisi and the Egyptian military, however, were reluctant—haunted by the trauma of the Yemen War (1962–1964), during which some 10,000 Egyptian soldiers lost their lives out of the 70,000 deployed under the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime.

Tiran and Sanfir

There remains considerable ambiguity surrounding Egypt’s full transfer of the Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia, with Cairo reportedly delaying certain procedures despite American diplomatic interventions.

Analysts suggest that the postponement does not signal a reversal by Egypt—it has effectively sold and relinquished the islands to Riyadh since 2018. Rather, the delay appears to reflect Cairo’s desire to secure a higher price in exchange for the concession.

On December 21, 2022, the American news site Axios reported that Egypt had slowed or halted the implementation of the ownership transfer agreement, attributing the move to el-Sisi’s regime seeking to extract a greater payoff for the handover.

“Israel” is also keen to see Egypt expedite the transfer of the islands to Saudi Arabia, viewing the handover as crucial to advancing normalisation with the kingdom. 

Meanwhile, Washington is eager to leverage the islands as a strategic foothold for a military base in the region.

Before the recent Israeli and American strikes on Tehran, U.S. media outlets reported that Washington was considering establishing a military base on Saudi Arabia’s eastern Red Sea coast, directly opposite the Suez Canal. 

Speculation suggests that the base could be located on the Tiran and Sanafir islands themselves.

“We will not accept the presence of military bases belonging to non-littoral states on the Red Sea,” Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati declared. 

Just days earlier, on June 26, 2025, The New York Times published satellite images revealing that the United States had begun preparing the base, constructing ammunition depots and accommodation facilities for troops.

Cairo’s concerns—and its cooling ties with Riyadh—were further heightened by Washington’s decision to proceed with the base, coinciding with the failure of Saudi attempts to relocate their regional headquarters to the disputed Tiran and Sanafir islands, a move firmly rejected by Egypt.

Egypt has quietly expressed reservations towards Saudi Arabia’s strengthening of American military bases along the Red Sea, especially following announcements of the expansion of the U.S. facility on the Saudi coast.

The Washington-based Middle East Institute suggested in an analysis published on July 2, 2025, that “the prolonged delay in resolving the status of the islands has been a catalyst for the escalating tensions in Egyptian-Saudi relations, though it is not the sole factor.”

The islands continue to pose a significant obstacle. In May 2025, Egyptian lawyers filed a fresh lawsuit challenging the transfer of sovereignty over Tiran and Sanafir, underscoring the deep domestic divisions over the issue.

Talk of Washington’s ambitions to build a military base on the Tiran and Sanafir islands dates back to March 2017—months before el-Sisi regime formally agreed to hand the islands over to Saudi Arabia.

At the time, the Times of Israel reported leaked plans suggesting that Riyadh intended to grant the United States a military foothold on the islands to serve as a strategic chokehold against both Iran and Russia.

Increasing Pressure

Another key objective of the proposed base is to have the U.S. military secure the Suez Canal and prevent the passage of any “suspicious” vessels suspected of transporting weapons or military equipment to Gaza or Lebanon—particularly those originating from Iran, according to an Egyptian official speaking to Al-Estiklal  newspaper.

Egyptian political sources who spoke to Al-Estiklal described the request as an insult to the Egyptian military and a form of imposed protectorate.

The sources explained that Cairo’s anger stems from Saudi Arabia’s role in transforming the Red Sea from a delicate balance zone into a permanent arena of American influence—an approach fundamentally at odds with Egypt’s doctrine of safeguarding the Suez Canal and its maritime sovereignty.

Cairo views Saudi Arabia’s move as a response to what has been widely reported as Egypt’s procrastination in handing over official documents affirming Cairo’s recognition of Saudi sovereignty over the islands—following approvals from Sisi, parliament, and the constitutional court to cede Tiran and Sanafir.

According to European and Egyptian officials who spoke to the investigative site Mada Masr on April 30, 2025, “What the United States is seeking, in discussions with its regional allies, is a fundamental shift in the Red Sea security architecture—placing Washington at the forefront of monitoring this vital maritime corridor.”

Yet, the sources say, Egypt continues to resist mounting pressure from the US and its Gulf allies to comply with demands that risk further diminishing its regional standing.

When el-Sisi announced the transfer of the islands to Saudi Arabia in 2016, it was accompanied by a series of massive financial and economic agreements signed between the two countries in April that year.

These accords included nearly $22 billion in economic, financial, and oil aid—leading Egyptian analysts and commentators to speculate that the handover of the islands was part of a broader financial package.

However, el-Sisi’s heavy reliance on foreign aid has raised concerns among Saudi officials about the long-term sustainability of Egypt’s economy and the potential damage it could suffer if it remains dependent on external assistance.

In response, the Saudi government began shifting its support from grants and deposits to investments in Egyptian companies and state-owned enterprises—an approach that has sparked tensions between the two countries.

Since el-Sisi’s 2013 coup against the democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi, Gulf states have collectively provided Egypt with $92 billion, according to press reports.

Data published on the Saudi government’s official Aid Platform reveals that the kingdom has disbursed over $64 billion in aid to some 167 countries, the majority of which has been developmental assistance.

Competition for Leadership

One of the underlying sources of the unspoken rift is that while Egypt has been retreating into the sidelines—hampered by its waning influence and ineffectiveness in the Arab world—Saudi Arabia has been actively and assertively positioning itself as the region’s new power broker, even on the Palestinian issue.

The recent Saudi media attacks on el-Sisi came at a politically and economically sensitive moment, conveying a clear message: there is a concerted effort to reshape the regional order with Saudi Arabia playing a leading role, sidelining Cairo.

This dynamic was subtly noted by Israeli analyst Danny Zaken in a Israel Hayom article dated July 2, 2025—coinciding with growing signs of a potential ceasefire agreement in Gaza amid Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Washington.

He noted that this shift came thanks to a fundamental change in Saudi Arabia’s stance towards developments in the region, and Israel in particular.

According to Arab and American sources, Saudi Arabia is set to play a major role in the post-ceasefire negotiations aimed at ending the conflict.

The kingdom is reportedly seeking to tie the cessation of hostilities to broader arrangements addressing the future of the West Bank and the Palestinian cause, as well as the so-called “deal of the century” proposed by Trump—which envisions expanding the Abraham Accords to include additional countries, with Saudi Arabia at the forefront.

Zaken cited Israeli and American sources indicating that messages Riyadh is sending to “Israel”—via Washington—signal Saudi Arabia’s willingness to join ceasefire negotiations, provided “Israel” agrees to halt hostilities. 

These talks are expected to include comprehensive solutions, including frameworks for normalisation with Saudi Arabia.

This Saudi initiative comes as Cairo’s role in resolving the Palestinian issue continues to diminish.

According to Israeli and American reports, the United States no longer relies solely on mediation through Qatar and Egypt but has begun sending direct messages to Hamas.