The Mufti of Iraq Returns to Baghdad After 11 Years in Exile: But Why Now?

Amid fierce anger from much of Iraq’s Shia political establishment, particularly factions aligned with Iran, the country’s top Sunni cleric, Rafi al-Rifa’i, made a controversial return to Baghdad, marking his first appearance in the capital since the Islamic State’s brutal takeover of a third of Iraq’s territory in 2014.

Al-Rifa’i, who carries the title “Mufti of the Iraqi Republic,” is a prominent religious figure among Iraq’s Sunni community. His return signals not only a re-emergence onto the national stage, but also stirs old tensions. He was a vocal supporter of the mass protests that erupted across Sunni-majority provinces in 2013, demonstrations that lasted over a year and were driven by widespread anger over what many described as the sectarian policies of then-prime minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Grand Reception

On the red carpet, inside Baghdad airport’s VIP lounge, Iraq’s National Security Adviser, Qasim al-Araji, welcomed Mufti Rafi al-Rifa’i on October 8, 2025, before the Sunni cleric was escorted in a grand motorcade to the iconic Umm al-Tubul mosque in the west of the capital.

Although al-Rifa’i holds no official government post, the title “Mufti of the Iraqi Republic” is rooted in a religious lineage associated with Iraq’s Sufi tradition, a designation passed down before the U.S.-led invasion of 2003. Al-Rifa’i assumed the role in 2007, following the death of his predecessor, Sheikh Jamal Abdul Karim al-Dabban.

The official reception sparked outrage among Shia political factions, particularly those close to Iran, who launched a scathing attack on the Sunni cleric, labeling him an “extremist and an inciter against the political process and security forces.” Several legal cases were promptly revived or initiated against him.

Alaa al-Haidari, a member of the Shia “Coordination Framework,” claimed that Rafi al-Rifa’i’s return “threatens societal stability,” alleging that “the parties who facilitated his return are not acting in Iraq’s interest, but rather seeking to sow discord and chaos, serving foreign agendas that do not want to see Iraq stable.”

Asifa Abbas Qadir, a member of the “Huqooq” movement, the political wing of Kataib Hezbollah, said she had previously warned of attempts to clear al-Rifa’i’s name as part of a “suspicious political deal being carried out at the expense of the martyrs’ blood.”

On October 9, Dhia al Nasiri, a member of the State of Law Coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki, announced that he had filed a lawsuit with the Dhi Qar Court of Appeals against the mufti, accusing him of inciting sectarianism and of being responsible for violent events that left dozens dead or wounded.

In a related development, on October 13, Mustafa Sanad, another MP from the Coordination Framework, appeared in a video claiming that the family of former deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, had filed a lawsuit against al-Rifa’i, accusing him of defamation, incitement to murder, and fueling sedition.

In contrast, several Sunni political and religious figures welcomed al-Rifa’i’s return. Most notably, the Iraqi Fiqh Council, the country’s highest Sunni religious authority, dispatched a delegation to meet with the mufti and express its support for his return to Baghdad. 

According to a statement issued by the council on October 9, the two sides discussed ways to strengthen cooperation in addressing both religious and national issues.

No political deal

At the official level, National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji denied that al-Rifa’i’s return to Baghdad was part of any political deal, affirming that the mufti falls under the general amnesty law passed by the Iraqi parliament on January 21, 2025.

In a televised interview on October 12, al-Araji stated, “There is no political deal in al-Rifa’i’s case involving his return in exchange for closing certain files against him. He has legal representation, his lawyers appealed to the judiciary, and he was acquitted by the Iraqi courts,” adding that “al-Rifa’i returned to Baghdad naturally, and he is not a politician.”

“Objections to al-Rifa’i’s return are normal, and anyone has the right to file complaints with the judiciary if there are crimes,” stressing that “the government does not interfere in judicial decisions,” he noted.

Al-Araji emphasized that it is the government’s duty “to dismantle any group opposing the political system and reintegrate them as productive citizens working for the country, rather than leaving them scattered across other nations. These are the actions of a confident government.”

He also advised that “those trying to win votes through sectarian rhetoric should stop, because the Iraqi people are aware and will not vote for those who use divisive language, but rather based on the nature of their electoral programs.”

Commenting on the government’s move to facilitate al-Rifa’i’s return, political analyst Haider al-Musawi, who is close to the Coordination Framework, said that “the return of a man previously convicted on serious charges has sparked widespread controversy,” noting that “Tariq al-Hashimi, the former vice president who was also convicted on grave charges, has reportedly been invited to return as well.”

Speaking during a televised interview on October 9, al-Musawi addressed the government directly, asking, “What message is this actor trying to send to their base, especially with parliamentary elections set to take place next month, on November 11?”,  a pointed suggestion that the move carries clear political motives and electoral messaging.

At the end of May, prominent Sunni leader Tariq al-Hashimi said in a televised interview that the charges previously leveled against him were no longer valid, insisting that his case was purely political, not criminal. 

He expressed his desire to return to Baghdad, provided adequate protection is ensured, and his case is reopened before the judiciary.

In late December 2011, while still serving as vice president, al-Hashimi became the subject of an arrest warrant issued by Iraqi authorities following the detention of his bodyguards. 

State TV aired their confessions, alleging that al-Hashimi had overseen operations involving kidnappings, killings, and bombings in Baghdad, accusations he firmly rejected, describing them as a politically motivated campaign led by then-prime minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Concerns among Shia Factions

Commenting on the timing of al-Rifa’i’s return and the religious symbolism he holds for Iraq’s Sunni community, Iraqi affairs researcher Hamed al-Obaidi said that “the return of a figure with the weight of the mufti, who has openly accused Iran-backed factions of sectarian killings, undoubtedly carries political significance.”

Speaking to Al-Estiklal, al-Obaidi explained that “al-Rifa’i is not a political figure like Tariq al-Hashimi, so his return is unlikely to disrupt the parliamentary elections, whether on the Sunni front or among Shia factions, but it carries other dimensions tied to external developments.”

He pointed out that “regional shifts have led to a decline in Iran’s influence across the Middle East, raising concerns among Iraq’s Shia forces about potentially losing power. In this context, al-Rifa’i’s return serves as a reassurance to external actors that everyone, even dissenters, is now welcome.”

Al-Obaidi did not rule out the possibility that “al-Rifa’i’s return was coordinated between the Shia Coordination Framework and Iran, with the aim of preserving Shia dominance in Iraq. The criticism directed at him or the government may simply be a matter of role-playing.”

He added that “in the next phase, particularly after the parliamentary elections and the formation of a new government, we can expect the return of other political figures like Tariq al-Hashimi, former Nineveh governor Atheel al-Nujaifi, and others, as part of efforts to contain them and rehabilitate the image of the current Shia-led political system.”

Al-Nujaifi was pushed out after a vote of no confidence in parliament, following the fall of Nineveh province to the Islamic State, a collapse he denies responsibility for. He has repeatedly claimed that then-prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and senior security officials conspired to hand over the province, allowing ISIS to seize it on June 14, 2014.

After leaving office and settling abroad in 2014, al-Nujaifi was sentenced in absentia to three years in prison by Baghdad’s al-Rusafa court. 

He was banned from travel and had his assets frozen after being convicted on corruption charges. Prior to that, he had also faced an arrest warrant over allegations of “collaborating” with Turkiye.

In response, al-Nujaifi wrote in a Facebook post on January 25, 2018, that “the dominant and extremist forces in Baghdad learned nothing from the ISIS episode. Their policies have not changed despite new faces, and they continue to ignore the consequences of sectarian provocation that fuels extremist responses. Instead, they’ve pursued their legal campaign against me, to the furthest extent possible, in blatant disregard for the law.”