Takala Re-elected as Head of Libya’s High Council of State: Will It Resolve or Deepen the Crisis?

The recent elections for Libya’s High Council of State have reignited the country’s ongoing institutional crisis, particularly after the legitimacy of the vote was swiftly challenged in court.

Held on July 26, 2025, the controversial poll saw Mohamed Takala re-elected as president of the council for a third one-year term, an outcome that has only deepened the divisions plaguing Libya’s fragile political landscape.

In a live broadcast aired on the national channel, the High Council of State announced the re-election of Mohamed Takala as its president, securing 59 votes. 

His closest rival, Abdullah Jouan, received 14 votes, followed by Ali al-Sweih with 13, Naji Mukhtar with 8, and Suleiman Zubi with just one.

The council also held separate rounds to elect its vice presidents. Hassan Habib was chosen as first deputy with 49 votes, while Moussa Faraj secured the position of second deputy in a subsequent round, also with 49 votes.

Mohamed Takala was first elected president of the High Council of State, a consultative legislative body, on August 6, 2023, after narrowly defeating former council head Khaled Elmeshri with 67 votes to 62.

He was re-elected for a second term in November 2024, securing 55 votes at the time.

This marks the council’s tenth round of leadership elections. The term of the presidential office holders lasts one year, starting from the date of their election.

The UN mission

The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has welcomed the re-election of Mohamed Takala as president of the High Council of State, amid mounting tensions within the council over the leadership vote.

In a statement released in the early hours of Tuesday, July 29, the mission responded to the controversy surrounding Sunday’s session, saying the vote had taken place under “normal and transparent” conditions.

UNSMIL noted that the presence of two-thirds of the council’s members signaled a broad consensus, and a shared willingness to move past the divisions that had hampered the council’s ability to function effectively throughout 2024.

The UN mission also expressed hope that all members of the council would actively engage in breaking the political deadlock and advancing the political process.

It urged members to “fulfill their national duties and rise to the expectations of the Libyan people by supporting a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process facilitated by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.”

However, former president of the High Council of State, Khaled Elmeshri, sharply criticized the mission’s statement regarding Sunday’s session, which it described as “consensual”,  a characterization, he said, was both inaccurate and misleading.

In a Facebook post published on July 28, Elmeshri argued that the session lacked legal legitimacy and genuine consensus, pointing to the boycott by more than 45 members and what he called a blatant violation of the council’s internal rules.

Elmeshri voiced his astonishment at what he described as an unbalanced stance by the UN mission, firmly rejecting what he sees as its interference in an ongoing judicial dispute still under review by the competent Libyan authorities, of which, he said, the mission had been formally notified.

He called the statement an unjustified overstep and a direct intrusion into the independence of Libya’s judiciary, accusing the mission of siding with certain parties at the expense of others.

“This statement,” Elmeshri wrote, “is little more than an attempt to derail the Libyan-Libyan solution and monopolize the political track in a manner that contradicts the principles of neutrality and genuine support for national will.”

“The legitimacy of state institutions is not granted through external statements or international interventions, but is built on respect for the law, sound procedures, and the free will of the Libyan people,” Elmeshri added.

On that basis, he called on all parties, both domestic and international, to fully respect national sovereignty and refrain from any attempts to influence the course of justice or circumvent legal frameworks.

In a separate post on Sunday, Elmeshri announced that he had formally objected to and challenged the legality of the High Council of State’s leadership vote, citing a lack of quorum.

He described the elections as illegitimate, claiming that the required legal quorum was not met at the scheduled time of the session, with only 91 members in attendance.

Multifaceted Crisis

Since March 2022, Libya has been divided between two rival governments. The internationally and UN-recognized authority, the Government of National Unity led by Abdulhamid AlDabaiba, is based in the capital, Tripoli, and controls the entire western region.

In contrast, a second government appointed by the House of Representatives, headed by Osama Hamad and based in Benghazi, governs the east as well as oil-rich southern cities.

The existence of these two administrations has deepened Libya’s political crisis. 

Many Libyans hope the deadlock can be broken through long-overdue presidential and parliamentary elections, repeatedly delayed by disputes over electoral laws and which executive body should oversee the vote.

The roots of the deep crisis within the High Council of State trace back to the presidential election held in early August 2024, which saw Elmeshri narrowly defeat Takala by 69 votes to 68.

However, controversy soon erupted over the validity of one of the votes cast for Takala, after his name was reportedly written in the wrong place on the ballot paper, an irregularity deemed by some as vote tampering. Both sides subsequently turned to Libya’s judiciary to settle the dispute.

The legal process only complicated matters further, with conflicting rulings issued by different Libyan courts. 

While the Supreme Court’s decision, relied upon by Elmeshri to affirm his legitimacy, has been challenged by Takala and his team, who argue that it does not invalidate their own claim. 

Both camps have interpreted judicial rulings to support their positions throughout the protracted dispute.

In the weeks leading up to the most recent vote, intensive discussions took place among council members aimed at advancing the presidential election ahead of its usual annual schedule in August.

These talks culminated in an initiative led by four members, which garnered the support of 102 out of 142 council members to convene a new electoral session on July 22, 2025. 

The move was seen as a serious effort to close the persistent rift between Elmeshri and Takala.

Marai Rahil, a council member, told The New Arab on July 27, 2025, that the endorsement document signed by 102 members was intended to back the initiative calling for early presidential elections.

He emphasized that the call for early elections aimed to bring forward the usual annual presidential vote held each August.

Rahil also pointed to another key reason for advancing the council president’s election: the annual session requires a sitting president to chair it, which has become impossible amid the ongoing bitter dispute between Elmeshri and Takala over the legitimacy of the presidency, a deadlock that threatens to prolong the council’s paralysis.

Ahead of the initiative’s announcement, Elmeshri issued a statement in mid-July 2025 denying what he described as “false rumors” about any agreement to hold a new presidential election session. 

He insisted these claims were “completely unfounded and not based on any official source within the council.”

In a preemptive move, Elmeshri met with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, on July 7, 2025, in Alexandria, Egypt. 

Speaking in his capacity as president of the High Council of State, the two agreed to launch a negotiation track between the two chambers aimed at forming a new unified government for Libya.

Following the meeting, Saleh sent a letter to several Libyan judicial and financial institutions recognizing Elmeshri’s legitimacy as head of the High Council of State. 

The move prompted an immediate backlash from Takala, who issued a statement condemning what he described as “the House of Representatives’ interference in the internal affairs of the High Council of State.”

Takala expressed profound surprise at Saleh’s letter, particularly the recognition of Elmeshri’s presidential status and the addressing of sovereign bodies in that capacity.

Responding to the controversy over the council president’s legitimacy, Abdulrazag Aradi, a member of Libya’s Political Dialogue Forum, described the recent election as “the official death certificate for the High Council of State in both its government and opposition wings.”

In a Facebook post, Aradi elaborated, “With this, the government has succeeded in burying the political solution process through the two councils, turning instead to the UN-led track with hopes it will achieve what it once did in Geneva.”

“The death certificate has ended the High Council of State, while the House of Representatives remains intact and continues to expand,” Aradi said.

In response, Abdulhamid AlDabaiba, head of the Government of National Unity, congratulated Mohamed Takala on securing the confidence of the High Council of State members and his election as president during a session described as consensual, reflecting the members’ commitment to unity and collective will.

Speaking on Facebook on July 27, 2025, AlDabaiba affirmed his support for all efforts aimed at strengthening political stability, calling for greater understanding and cooperation between institutions to meet the aspirations of our people for security, development, and prosperity, and to realize their desire for direct elections and the conclusion of all transitional phases.

Deepening the Division

Reflecting on recent events, Fathi Omar al-Shibli, head of the Libyan Parties Coalition, dismissed Mohamed Takala’s election as president of the High Council of State as “a political farce with no real value.”

Al-Shibli told Al-Estiklal that the council is essentially a political body without influence or weight in Libya’s complex political landscape.

The political figure warned that this move risks deepening divisions rather than advancing a comprehensive political solution.

Al-Shibli argued that claims of Takala securing numerous votes were misleading, noting that he received less than half of the 95 members present, despite the legal quorum being met.

He added that the absence of more than 40 members from the session carried clear political significance, which would likely affect the council’s cohesion moving forward.

In contrast, Moussa Faraj, the newly elected second deputy president of the council, affirmed the legitimacy of the quorum, explaining that the session resulted from the formation of a consensus committee within the council over a month earlier.

Faraj told the press that the committee conducted extensive consultations among council members, culminating in an agreement to hold early elections in a publicly announced session.

He confirmed that the initiative had the backing of more than 100 members. 

The session was announced in advance and attended by over 90 members, with the number reaching 95 before it began, fully complying with the council’s internal regulations.

Faraj noted that some attendees did not sign the attendance register despite being asked to do so beforehand. 

He said opponents had seized on this omission to claim the session lacked a quorum.

However, he pointed out that all 95 members were called by name during the live broadcast of the session before the public. 

“There is no longer any room to question the quorum or the session’s adherence to the council’s rules,” Faraj noted.

Institutional Balance

Saeed Mohamed Wanis, a member of the High Council of State, described the efforts led by the Dialogue Committee to elect the council president as motivated by an independent national spirit, free from political calculations or internal alignments.

Speaking to Libya24 on July 28, 2025, Wanis said the committee members “came together voluntarily, driven by a genuine patriotic impulse, aiming to break the legislative deadlock and to foster a consensual foundation among members following the suspension of official committee work.”

He added that the initiative sought to create a cooperative atmosphere that respected transparency and ensured balanced representation within the council.

Wanis explained that the committee began its work in early July, initially setting July 9 as the date for the session. 

This was later postponed to July 23, and then to July 27, in response to requests from some members for additional time to consult.

“We were determined to hold a session that met essential guarantees, foremost among them the presence of two-thirds of the members, a neutral venue, impartial chairmanship, a clear electoral register, and balanced representation for all,” Wanis said.

Wanis emphasized that these conditions were not a tactic, but necessary to ensure a fair and equal contest for everyone without exclusion.

Wanis confirmed that the committee had no contact with the government in Tripoli at any stage of the preparations, adding, “We did not seek intervention from anyone, and if any political actor attempts to exploit what happened, that is beyond our responsibility.”

He stressed that the committee remained impartial and did not favor any candidate, emphasizing that “those who chose to boycott the session must bear responsibility for their decision,” a clear reference to members opposing the recent election process.

Concluding his remarks, the council member underscored that the High Council of State remains a “key instrument in the political process under the political agreement,” and that legislative authority and stability cannot be maintained in its absence.

He warned that any attempts to undermine its role would disrupt the delicate institutional balance in the country.