Strategic Leap: How Did the Rapid Support Forces Militia Obtain Drones Capable of Striking Cities Across Sudan?

In a scene that shocked and horrified Sudan and beyond, the city of el Fashir was shaken in the early hours of September 19, 2025, by one of the deadliest attacks since the outbreak of war in Sudan.

A drone operated by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia targeted a mosque in the Daraja Oula neighborhood as dozens of worshipers gathered for prayer, killing around 75 people instantly.

The strike, which hit during the second unit of prayer, exposed a deeply troubling turn in the conflict, revealing both the growing sophistication of drone warfare on the frontlines and the relentless targeting of civilians.

For over two years, the UAE-backed RSF militia had denied possessing such technology, yet it has now become an openly deployed weapon, capable of reshaping the rules of engagement and inflicting devastating human losses.

Sudden Change

For years after the war in Sudan erupted in mid-April 2023, spokespeople for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia insisted they did not possess drones, claiming instead that a third party was using them in an attempt to implicate the group in the eyes of public opinion.

That narrative began to unravel when the Sudan Founding Alliance, or known as the “Ta’sis” coalition, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), claimed responsibility for airstrikes in Khartoum and other cities on September 11, 2025.

For the first time, the coalition announced that its air force had carried out strikes targeting military sites and power stations in the capital.

It was an unambiguous admission of drone capability after a long period of denials and obfuscation, and the deployment of drones into Sudan’s battlefield marks not just a military development, but a strategic turning point.

These unmanned aircraft offer the ability to hit precise targets deep inside fortified cities such as Khartoum and Port Sudan, while operating at a fraction of the cost of conventional warplanes.

In recent months, they have also disrupted Sudanese army supply lines by striking logistical hubs and critical infrastructure from long range.

Most crucially, drones give the RSF militia a tactical edge in a complex urban environment like Darfur, where geography and infrastructure prevent Sudanese army aircraft from operating freely.

What is most alarming, however, is that these drones have not been aimed solely at military targets. The recent attack on el Fashir proved that civilians are now at the very center of the danger zone.

The timing of the strike, hitting the mosque mid-prayer, made escape impossible and turned a moment of worship into a massacre.

The lack of medical facilities in the besieged city only magnified the disaster, leaving the wounded in critical condition without adequate care and bodies trapped under the rubble for hours.

Sudan’s Sovereign Council described the attack as “a crime that shames humanity,” while observers called it a turning point in the course of the war, exposing the grave risks of drone warfare now in the hands of the RSF militia.

200 Kilometers

On February 26, 2025, the British news agency Reuters consulted two military experts about the manufacturer of the drones now being used so visibly in Sudan’s conflict. 

Companies in several countries, including Russia, Iran and China, produce models that appear similar in both design and capability.

Even so, the two experts agreed on one key point, that the likely range of several of the drones deployed by the RSF militia is now capable of carrying out long-distance strikes.

Independent analysis by the U.S.-based defense intelligence company Janes, along with a draft report by Wim Zwijnenburg of the Dutch peace organization PAX, interpreted images as showing long-range suicide drones resembling models produced by multiple countries, with an estimated maximum range of up to 2,000 kilometers.

That range extends far beyond Darfur, the RSF militia’s heartland, putting major cities such as Khartoum and Port Sudan within striking distance.

In parallel, Reuters reported spotting three Chinese-made CH-95 drones at Nyala airport in May 2025. These aircraft are said to be capable of reconnaissance and precision strikes at ranges of up to 200 kilometers.

Satellite imagery analyzed by the U.S. geospatial intelligence company Maxar revealed that the RSF militia built three drone hangars at the airport over a five-week period between January and February 2025.

At least one drone was seen at the site for the first time on December 9, 2024, and researchers from Yale University also confirmed the presence of drones at the airport in early January.

Emrati Involvement

An investigative report published by the U.S. outlet Politico on April 17, 2025, revealed what could be considered the key to the dramatic shift in the RSF militia’s aerial capabilities.

The report traced the turning point to the arrival of shipments of advanced, Chinese-made drones in Chad, routed through logistical channels financed by Emirati money provided as military support to the Chadian government.

According to information obtained by the investigative team, these aircraft were not merely a tactical boost, but a qualitative leap in the militia’s arsenal, expanding their range, precision, intelligence-gathering capacity and ability to carry out programmed strikes.

Until recently, the RSF militia relied on rudimentary, largely “suicide” drone systems, simple, short-range, high-risk devices used for quick-hit operations, often at a high cost and with limited effectiveness.

The new deliveries, Politico reported, included modern Chinese CH-95 models, capable of persistent aerial surveillance, real-time intelligence transmission, and precision targeting of ground objectives at ranges from dozens to hundreds of kilometers.

This shift from kamikaze-style drones to multirole platforms not only changed the nature of the strike, but also redrew its geographic and temporal scope.

Its battlefield impact soon became clear. Strikes grew more accurate, local ground-based air defenses proved increasingly ineffective, and army bases as well as logistical hubs came under fire in cities previously outside the RSF militia’s reach.

Among them were the attack on the Al-Jaili oil refinery north of Khartoum Bahri, the strike on a power station in the northern city of Berber, and the targeting of a cement factory near Atbara.

The RSF militia also hit the Sudanese army’s Wadi Seidna military base in Karari, north of Omdurman.

Taken together, these developments suggest Sudan’s war has entered a new phase of long-range combat, with unmanned aerial strikes becoming a tool of attrition and a means of reshaping the battlefield itself.

For the Sudanese army, this presents a dual challenge, upgrading its air defense and protecting critical infrastructure, while also mounting serious investigations to map the supply networks and logistical pipelines that enabled advanced drone systems to enter the theater of war.

Partition Plan

Sudanese journalist Mohamed Nasr said, “What we witnessed at the mosque in el Fashir’s Daraja neighborhood was not just a passing local massacre, but a crime that strikes at the conscience of humanity and threatens the future of Sudan as a whole.”

Speaking to Al-Estiklal, Nasr added, “The blood spilled among the worshipers carries the names and fingerprints of regional actors who funded, armed and enabled this, allowing deadly systems to fall into the hands of a militia. This is not merely a battlefield force, it is a project with geographic and political ambitions.”

“Based on field investigations, intelligence briefings and international reporting, I hold regional powers, foremost among them the UAE, responsible for supporting the drone program that caused this staggering loss of life.”

“Every drop of Sudanese bloodshed by these drone strikes has someone responsible, and history will hold them to account.”

“The transformation in the RSF militia’s drone fleet was not just a technical or military upgrade, but a strategic leap. What were once primitive, expendable drones have been replaced by long-range platforms capable of carrying out precision strikes hundreds of kilometers away, changing the depth and scope of the battlefield,” Nasr added.

The journalist pointed to the arrival of Chinese-made CH-95 drones, the construction of dedicated hangars, and their activation through regional logistical routes.

He argued that the militia no longer controls just a local patch of territory, but now has the ability to impose a new reality on the ground.

“This is where the real danger lies,” Nasr said. “I do not see this development as merely a bid to boost combat capacity, but as part of a vision to consolidate influence in western Sudan and turn Darfur into an area ruled by military facts on the ground, particularly if accompanied by a partition plan.”

He stressed that “drones have become a tool to guarantee the RSF militia’s battlefield gains and entrench a state of de facto occupation, not just a temporary offensive weapon.”