Captives as Bargaining Chips: How Operation al-Aqsa Flood Revealed Hamas’s Hardball Tactics

Operation al-Aqsa Flood marked a fundamental shift in Palestinian negotiation dynamics, introducing a new model of a negotiator—resilient, strategic, and backed by real military strength.

Negotiations are no longer just a political process dictated by U.S.-Israeli dominance and international pressure. Instead, the Palestinian Resistance now wields them as a tool for securing tangible gains, reshaping the balance of power in the conflict.

For decades, traditional negotiators have led the process, treating talks as an end in themselves while making repeated concessions—from the 1991 Madrid Conference to the 1993 Oslo Accords.

Subsequent interim agreements failed to end the occupation or establish sovereignty. Instead, they cemented a fragile political reality that “Israel” exploited to expand settlements and tighten its control on the ground.

The Last Test

The latest negotiations tested Hamas’s resilience, as the group defied threats from former U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who vowed renewed war against Gaza.

Trump had warned of severe consequences if Hamas failed to release all Israeli captives by February 15, 2025. “Israel” echoed the ultimatum, threatening a new war that would facilitate Trump’s plan to expel Gaza’s population unless the captives were freed.

As the Israeli military mobilized reserves in preparation for a possible offensive, Hamas remained firm. On February 10, Abu Obaida, the spokesperson for Hamas’s military wing, announced a delay in the release of captives, citing Israeli Occupation’s repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement, attacks on returning displaced civilians, and restrictions on humanitarian aid.

Before the deadline, “Israel” conceded to Hamas’s demands, implementing the humanitarian provisions of the deal, including allowing aid and reconstruction efforts. This episode underscored Hamas’s negotiating strength and its ability to push back against U.S.-Israeli pressure.

Throughout the 15-month war, Hamas consistently insisted on halting Israeli Occupation’s assault, securing troop withdrawals, and ensuring displaced civilians could return north—conditions it deemed essential for any agreement.

“Israel” sought the return of around 120 captives while maintaining its military campaign, but Hamas held firm, refusing any releases under military pressure and insisting that negotiations were the only path forward.

After handing over the sixth group of captives in the first phase of a three-stage deal, Hamas reaffirmed its stance: Israeli prisoners would only be released through negotiations, and Palestinians would only move in one direction—toward Occupied Jerusalem.

This declaration came ahead of the second phase of ceasefire talks, which Israeli media reported would hinge on Hamas’s disarmament—an offer Hamas flatly rejected.

On February 19, Israeli Occupatiokn’s public broadcaster reported that Netanyahu had formally initiated phase two of negotiations, aiming to dismantle Hamas and prevent Palestinian Authority control over Gaza. However, “Israel” was also preparing for renewed fighting, citing uncertainty over the talks’ outcome.

Hamas, unmoved by past proposals, reiterated that Gaza’s future would be decided by Palestinians alone.

The Sky Is the Limit!

Hamas has consistently maintained a high negotiating bar, in stark contrast to Fatah, which governs the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

For years, “Israel” ignored the Palestinian Authority’s demands to halt settlement expansion and release long-held detainees, effectively freezing peace talks since April 2014. The Israeli Occupation refuses to engage in any political process that could lead to a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, accusing the Authority of supporting terrorism.

Despite this, the Palestinian Authority remains committed to what it calls “security coordination with Israel,” even though none of its demands have been met.

Hamas, by contrast, demanded the release of 6,000 Palestinian and Arab detainees in exchange for Israeli captives—effectively seeking to empty Israeli prisons. While this goal was not fully achieved, Hamas forced “Israel” to free detainees who had previously been released in the 2011 Gilad Shalit deal but were later rearrested.

The recent agreement also secured the release of dozens of detainees serving life sentences—an achievement the Palestinian Authority has pursued unsuccessfully for years.

The Shalit exchange remains one of Hamas’s biggest negotiation victories, compelling “Israel” to release 1,027 Palestinian detainees in 2011 in return for a single soldier captured in 2006. Hamas also extracted concessions in 2009, securing the release of 20 female detainees in exchange for a two-minute video proving Shalit was alive—the first Israeli soldier to return alive from captivity since 1985.

One of those released in the Shalit deal was Yahya Sinwar, who later became Hamas’s political leader in Gaza. He was martyred before the ceasefire took effect.

Israeli and U.S. officials described Sinwar as a tough negotiator, often delaying responses due to his isolation from the outside world. In October 2024, some claimed that unlike Sinwar, other Hamas leaders might be willing to surrender or even accept exile in exchange for ending the war. This proved false, highlighting a collective decision-making structure that transcended individual leaders.

Sinwar was offered a chance to leave Gaza in exchange for Egypt negotiating on Hamas’s behalf. His response to Arab mediators, shortly after Operation al-Aqsa Flood began, was: “I'm not under siege, I'm on Palestinian land.”

During negotiations, Hamas rejected a proposal to end the Israeli war on Gaza by exiling its leaders and dismantling its rule in Gaza.

Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s leader in the Strip, emerged as a key regional figure during the war, steering negotiations from abroad while firmly upholding the movement’s conditions.

Despite Netanyahu’s stated objectives of total victory, Hamas’s elimination, and the end of its rule in Gaza, he failed to achieve any of them.

As soon as the agreement was signed, al-Qassam Brigades fighters staged a powerful display of force, reinforcing their continued presence in Gaza and marking the captive handover with unprecedented ceremonies.

Hamas's Strategy

During the war, Hamas leveraged its Israeli captives as a key bargaining chip in negotiations, compelling their families to protest in Tel Aviv by releasing continuous video messages.

Most of these videos carried the slogan “Time is running out,” suggesting that continued hostilities would result in their deaths. Several hostages were indeed killed by Israeli airstrikes—either deliberately to eliminate Hamas’s leverage or as collateral damage from indiscriminate bombing.

In September 2024, The Times of Israel reported that Hamas devised a psychological warfare strategy using captives to intensify public pressure on the Israeli government. The outlet noted that Hamas regularly published videos showing captives pleading for their release, along with footage of others killed during the conflict.

Meanwhile, Germany’s Bild claimed to have obtained a previously unseen document from Yahya Sinwar’s computer, shedding light on Hamas’s negotiation strategy. The report alleged that Hamas engaged in psychological torture of captive families to strengthen its position.

According to Bild, the document—verified by two independent sources and dated Spring 2024—was personally approved by Sinwar. It outlined key objectives, including exhausting Israeli Occupation’s military, increasing international pressure on Tel Aviv, preserving Hamas’s military capabilities, and using captives to bolster its bargaining power.

The document reportedly instructed Hamas to maintain psychological pressure on Israeli families to fuel protests against Netanyahu’s government.

Amid these tactics, the discovery of six Israeli captives’ bodies in a tunnel under Rafah prompted Hamas to release additional videos. These included statements from the deceased captives before their deaths, condemning Israeli leadership and detailing their dire living conditions.

The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs asserted that Hamas employed “dilatory tactics in their mediated negotiation with Israel,” playing for time to paralyze “Israeli actions.” In a May 2024 report, the center argued that delays allowed Hamas to divert Israeli forces from Rafah, increase humanitarian aid inflows, enable displaced Gazans to return north and strengthen its strategic position.

Hamas’s strategy was clear: “Play a ‘waiting game’ where time is the variable that serves to their advantage. The more time that passes, the greater the pressure on Israel to refrain from military operations, to formulate plans post-war [including normalization with Saudi Arabia], and to be subject to public and media demands to conclude a hostage deal.”

“Hamas determines the path and pace of the negotiations. They are the ones who determine whether there will be a deal and do so while humanitarian aid continues into Gaza, while the Rafah border with Egypt is still not under Israeli control, and while they maintain the ability to prepare for a possible Israel attack. Meanwhile, they continue to bolster their return to areas in the Northern and Central areas of the Gaza Strip.”

“Time is on the side of Hamas, and their strategy will result in lowering the probability of sustained Israeli military action, increase the chance that all the hostages will not be returned without significant concessions, and, most notably for Hamas, ensure their remaining in power in an eventually rebuilt Gaza Strip,” the center concluded.