A Fragile Bloc: Why Did Rwanda Quit ECCAS?

In a move that underscores the fragility of regional blocs in Africa, Rwanda has announced its withdrawal from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) following the bloc’s 26th summit held in Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea.

Established in 1983, ECCAS is a regional cooperation organization composed of 11 Central African nations: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe.

Rising Tensions

On June 7, 2025, Rwanda cited its withdrawal as a response to what it described as “repeated violations of its rights as a member state and the organization’s failure to uphold its founding principles.”

In a statement, the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation declared that the government sees no value in remaining part of an organization that no longer adheres to its own principles or fulfills its intended role.

Rwanda pointed to the ECCAS 26th Ordinary Summit as a turning point in its decision to withdraw, citing the bloc’s failure to honor Rwanda’s right to assume the rotating presidency, as stipulated in Chapter VI of the ECCAS founding treaty.

The move comes amid deepening tensions between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), fueled by the bloc’s handling of the conflict in eastern Congo between government forces and rebel groups.

Since late 2024, relations between Kigali and Kinshasa have sharply deteriorated over renewed fighting in North Kivu, a mineral-rich province in eastern DRC. Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of backing the March 23 Movement (M23) and attempting to seize its gold- and resource-rich territory—an allegation Rwanda strongly denies, claiming instead that it faces threats from hostile armed groups operating in the region.

Kigali particularly points to militias founded by Hutu leaders it holds responsible for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda, during which over 800,000 people—mostly Tutsis—were massacred over a span of 100 days.

Rwanda’s government justified its withdrawal from ECCAS by citing the bloc’s refusal to grant it the rotating presidency, accusing the organization of becoming politicized and manipulated by the DRC with the backing of certain member states.

Rwanda's request to assume the presidency was rejected. The final communiqué of the summit stated: “We have decided to postpone the transfer of the chairmanship to Rwanda to a later date, and President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo will continue to serve as ECCAS chair for another year.”

Agence France-Presse quoted a commissioner who said DRC representatives warned they would boycott any ECCAS activities hosted by Rwanda, given the ongoing tensions between the two countries.

Rwanda, for its part, condemned the decision, arguing that it violated its rights under the organization’s founding charter and that ECCAS had failed to uphold its own rules.

A Crisis of Trust

Commenting on Rwanda’s decision to leave ECCAS, Senegalese political science researcher Haroun Ba said the immediate trigger was Kigali being blocked from assuming the rotating presidency—an outcome rooted in its ongoing conflict with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

“Kinshasa accuses Kigali of backing the M23 rebel group, making Rwanda’s exclusion from the presidency a key factor in its decision to withdraw,” Ba told Al-Estiklal.

“Rwanda saw this as a violation of the bloc’s founding principles and there is no point in remaining in a body that disregards its own commitments and has become politicized by certain member states,” he said.

Fouzia Sabri, a researcher at the RA Center for Strategic Studies, said Rwanda’s exit carries significant geopolitical weight, foremost among them a loss of confidence in the bloc’s ability to manage internal crises.

In an article titled “The Implications of Rwanda’s Withdrawal from ECCAS,” Sabri wrote that Kigali’s decision also reflects its frustration with what it sees as “a lack of neutrality” in the bloc’s decision-making process.

She argued the move sends a clear message to the international community: Rwanda will walk away from any organization that undermines its national interests or fails to maintain impartiality.

ECCAS at a Crossroads

Rwanda’s departure from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is more than a diplomatic rift—it signals a deeper crisis of trust that threatens the future of regional cooperation in Africa and could reshape the continent’s alliance landscape.

Political analyst Ahmed Mohamed Fall warned that the recent wave of withdrawals from African regional blocs poses a serious threat to the survival of key institutions once seen as cornerstones of regional integration.

Speaking to Arabi21, Fall noted that ECCAS risks meeting the same fate as the G5 Alliance Sahel, which officially collapsed following the exit of three of its members.

In December 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger withdrew from the G5 Sahel, joining Mali, which had exited the group in May 2022. These successive withdrawals effectively marked the end of the bloc, which was formed in 2014 in Nouakchott to tackle security and economic challenges in the Sahel and had included Mauritania, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali.

Political science researcher Hicham Kadri Ahmed echoed this concern, arguing that Rwanda’s decision will have serious implications for ECCAS’s future and for regional security more broadly.

In his article “The Drivers and Potential Consequences of Rwanda’s Withdrawal from ECCAS,” he said the move reflects deep-rooted divisions and enduring political tensions among Central African states. According to him, the decision also reveals the fragility of regional organizations when it comes to managing conflicting interests and the failure of multilateral diplomacy to resolve political crises peacefully.

Kadri Ahmed argued that Rwanda’s withdrawal raises important questions about ECCAS’s neutrality and effectiveness—especially at a time when internal divisions and external meddling threaten regional stability. He warned that institutional backsliding could deepen mistrust among member states and further erode the bloc’s credibility as a platform for cooperation.

Rwanda’s exit could weaken military and security coordination in the region, undermine intelligence-sharing, and ultimately give armed groups more space to operate beyond the reach of affected states.

Kigali’s decision will have tangible consequences for regional cooperation in Central Africa—economically, politically, and in terms of security.

However, while both Fall and Kadri Ahmed emphasize the damaging effects of Rwanda’s withdrawal, Senegalese political analyst Haroun Ba took a more reserved view. He argued that the exit of a single member—especially one seen by others as controversial—may not have a lasting impact on ECCAS’s cohesion.

Ba also noted that Rwanda has alternative paths, including potential alignment with the East African Community or the Southern African Development Community.

He pointed out that ECCAS has faced internal tensions, wars, and crises since its establishment in 1983—challenges that have long hindered effective collective action. Between 1992 and 1998, the organization was largely inactive due to internal conflicts among member states, notably the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It wasn’t until February 1999 that a summit in Yaounde, Cameroon, revived the bloc’s work. Leaders at the time proposed the creation of a Central African Peace and Security Council in hopes of stabilizing the region.