What Does the Judicial Independence Candidate’s Victory Mean for Egypt?

After a delay of nearly six months from December 19, 2025, due to a prior court ruling suspending the vote over procedural irregularities, the Egyptian Judges Club elections were held on June 26, 2026, ending in victory for what is known as the "Independence Current."

The Independence Current is a longstanding, though informal, grouping of judges who advocate a vision aimed at reviving the Judges Club's tradition of independence. The club played a significant role in laying the groundwork for the January 25, 2011 Revolution.

The elections resulted in Counselor Mohamed Refaat Gabr being elected President of the Judges Club. Backed by the Independence Current, he won by a wide margin of 1,315 votes over his closest rival, Counselor Rabie Qassem, Assistant Minister of Justice and the government's preferred candidate.

Gabr received 4,111 votes, compared with 2,796 for his opponent. A number of judges viewed the result as an indication of broad support within the judiciary for judicial independence, particularly amid ongoing controversy over the mechanisms for appointing judges.

The defeat also marked the fourth consecutive loss for government-backed candidates in professional syndicate and club elections, following defeats in the elections for the Engineers, Lawyers, and Journalists syndicates, where candidates associated with the "Independence Current" also prevailed.

Election Results

The "Future of the Judiciary" slate, led by Counselor Mohamed Refaat Gabr, President of the Court of Appeal, secured a decisive victory in the Egyptian Judges Club's full Board of Directors elections. 

Gabr and several members of his 16-judge slate won by a wide margin over their rivals, reflecting, according to observers, a desire within the judiciary for change and for the election of independent candidates.

During his campaign, the newly elected Club president focused on the issue of judicial independence, earning him the nickname "the independence candidate" among judges. 

He also pledged to improve services for Club members, increase salaries, and safeguard judges' rights, according to al-Dostor newspaper.

Counselor Mohamed Refaat Gabr received 4,111 votes, compared with 2,796 votes for Counselor Rabie Qassem, a candidate whom some regarded as aligned with the government. Counselor Mohamed Abdel Rahman Mohamed el-Dahabi finished third with only 149 votes.

By contrast, judicial sources told Al-Estiklal that Counselor Rabie Qassem fell victim to what they described as "the political labeling trap." 

They said he was branded as "the government's candidate" despite resigning from his government post immediately after announcing his candidacy and declaring his independence. Nevertheless, that characterization continued to affect his electoral prospects.

The sources added that this labeling came at a sensitive time, as judicial circles were engaged in a debate over the system governing the appointment and promotion of judges, which negatively impacted his election campaign.

In his first statement following his victory, the new President of the Egyptian Judges Club's Board of Directors, Counselor Mohamed Refaat Gabr, sent a congratulatory message to President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on the anniversary of the June 30 Revolution, according to his statement.

At the level of the Board membership, five candidates representing the counselors (senior judges) won seats: Shady Khalifa, Dr. Tarek Abu Zeid, Hazem Rasmy, Ahmed Abdel Radi, and Mohamed Abdel Hadi, from a field of 26 candidates.

For the seats allocated to Court Presidents and Judges, the winners were Judges Mahmoud Zeidan, Ahmed el Hefny Ghanem, Islam Tamraz, Taher Abu Zeid, and Mohamed Attia, also from among 26 candidates.

In the Public Prosecution category, the successful candidates were Judges Mohamed Hany Abdel Gaber, Mohamed Abu el Dahab el Zaraa, Amr Nabih, and Ahmed el Tantawy, from a total of 14 candidates.

The election saw the participation of 7,260 judges out of 16,055 members of the Judges Club General Assembly, representing a voter turnout of 45%.

According to the results, only six candidates from Judge Rabie Qassem's electoral list secured seats. They included Gaber Khalil, who won the seat reserved for retired judges; Tarek Abu Zeid and Hazem Rasmy for the counselors' seats; Taher Abu Zeid for the Court Presidents and Judges category; and Mohamed Abdel Gaber and Mohamed Abu el Dahab el Zaraa for the Public Prosecution seats.

Five incumbent board members also retained their seats: Hazem Rasmy, Shady Khalifa, Mahmoud Zeidan, Mohamed Hany Abdel Gaber, and Mohamed Abu el Dahab el Zaraa.

The Judges Club Board consists of five seats for counselors (senior judges), five for judges and court presidents, five for members of the Public Prosecution, one seat for retired counselors, and one seat for the Club President.

Based on these results, the board seats were divided among candidates associated with the independence movement, independent individuals, and others considered close to the authorities. 

This distribution may present challenges in building consensus within the board, despite broad agreement on professional and livelihood-related issues affecting judges.

Among the most prominent independent winners who have maintained their positions over several terms are Judge Shady Khalifa, Judge Mahmoud Zeidan, who has served on the board for 10 years, Judge Ahmed Abdel Radi, and Judge Mohamed Abdel Hadi, who emerged victorious after a closely contested and decisive election.

The Struggle for Independence

The importance of these elections stems from the fact that they came in the aftermath of a series of tensions related to the issue of judicial independence, and what judges considered a decline in some aspects of that independence. 

These tensions began with constitutional amendments in July, which granted the President of the Republic powers to appoint heads of various judicial bodies.

The debate later escalated in January 2026, following reports of proposed amendments to the mechanisms of appointment and promotion within the judiciary and the public prosecution, as well as assigning some aspects of training and qualification to the Military Academy, within discussions that sparked objections within judicial circles.

Judges believe that the coming period may witness a broader debate over the limits of the Judges Club’s independence and its relationship with the executive authority, especially amid ongoing discussions about reforming the system of appointments and promotions.

The elections were held after months of crisis within the judicial community, following proposals that included assigning certain appointment procedures to the Military Academy. 

These proposals were met with reservations within the Judges Club before understandings were reached to maintain the status quo, following consultations between senior judges, government representatives, and executive bodies.

Judges speak of a growing sense that the club has gradually transformed into a service-oriented entity focused on trips, housing, and social services, rather than being a platform for expressing judges’ demands and defending the independence of the judiciary.

Some judges recall the club’s history, during which it played prominent roles in important political and judicial moments, and was seen as one of the most significant voices advocating for judicial independence in Egypt.

Since July 3, 2013, observers have pointed to a relative decline in the role of what is known as the “Independence Current,” amid political and legislative changes that have affected the structure of judicial institutions.

The “Independence Current” refers to a group of judges who emerged within the Judges Club of Egypt since the late 1990s and early 2000s, whose primary goal was to strengthen the independence of the judiciary from the executive authority.

This current reached its peak between 2001 and 2006, when it won the presidency of the club and a majority of its board under the leadership of Judge Zakaria Abd al-Aziz.

The roots of this current go back to prominent judges including Yahya el Refai, Zakaria Abd al-Aziz, Hisham Bastawisi, Mahmoud Mekki, and Ahmed Mekki, who called for legal and administrative reforms to strengthen judicial independence, particularly regarding the subordination of certain matters to the Ministry of Justice.

The current became widely known during the 2005 parliamentary elections crisis, when the Judges Club threatened to boycott election supervision unless demands related to guaranteeing judicial independence were met, leading to a major political and judicial crisis.

After those elections, allegations of irregularities and electoral fraud emerged, prompting disciplinary investigations against some figures of the current, including Hisham Bastawisi and Mahmoud Mekki.

Following the 2007 amendments and developments after 2013, the influence of this current within the club declined, and several judges affiliated with it were subjected to disciplinary measures or excluded from participating in some electoral activities.

Nevertheless, there is currently no organized or officially declared current within the Judges Club of Egypt under the name “Independence Current,” while independent candidates or informal lists participate in elections, often adopting rhetoric close to this orientation.

In his first speech after winning, Counselor Mohamed Refaat Gabr affirmed that “judicial independence will remain a fixed principle that cannot be compromised,” stressing that the club will continue its role in defending justice, preserving the dignity of judges, and promoting the rule of law.

He also reaffirmed his commitment to continuing the defense of judicial independence and rejecting any infringement upon it, in reference to the ongoing debate surrounding the system of judicial appointments and training.

Judges and the Military Academy 

In early February 2026, the issue of judges joining programs at the Military Academy sparked widespread controversy within judicial circles, after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announced during a visit to the Military Academy in the New Administrative Capital that judges would, within days, begin participating in training programs at the academy. This was presented as part of efforts to enhance standards of merit and efficiency within state institutions and to reinforce values of discipline and responsibility.

Analysts and judges viewed these remarks as an escalation in the ongoing debate over judicial independence, particularly amid then-reported trends suggesting the transfer of certain aspects of judicial appointments and promotions to the Military Academy, developments that raised concerns within the Judges Club of Egypt about their potential impact on the independence of the judiciary.

In response, the Judges Club of Egypt announced its readiness to hold an extraordinary general assembly on 6 February 2026, objecting to what had been raised regarding a trend within the authorities to expand the role of the Military Academy in the appointment of public prosecutors and newly appointed judges.

On the other hand, the Supreme Judicial Council intervened, and the call for the extraordinary general assembly was suspended, amid official assurances that there was no so-called “militarization” of judicial appointments, along with reports that the proposal had been withdrawn or temporarily frozen.

The Judges Club stated in a statement at the time that the Supreme Judicial Council’s decision to suspend the extraordinary general assembly called by the club did not constitute cancellation or concession, but rather a “calculated and conditional postponement.” 

It also warned against any interference in judicial appointment affairs, stressing that judicial independence is a “red line.”

The club explained that the call for the general assembly came after a consultative meeting with the Supreme Judicial Council, which concluded with rejection of any proposals affecting appointment and promotion matters, as these are constitutionally protected issues exclusively reserved for judges.

The statement added that the meeting with the Supreme Judicial Council resulted in understandings that included procedural and organizational points aimed at resolving the controversy over the appointment file, including the continuation of appointing new judges through the council without interference from other bodies.

The club further emphasized that suspending the general assembly was in response to requests from senior judges, represented by the President and members of the Supreme Judicial Council, after receiving official assurances respecting the judiciary’s competencies and keeping its affairs in the hands of judges themselves.

From Independence to Militarization

It was not the first time that the judicial arena in Egypt had witnessed controversy regarding the executive authority’s interference in judicial affairs, whether through appointments, training, or the restructuring of judicial qualification pathways. Judges and observers argue that since 2013, the country has been witnessing what they describe as a “gradual systematic approach” to increasing state intervention in the judicial institution, within what they refer to as the “militarization of the judiciary.”

According to this perspective, three main phases can be identified in the development of this trajectory, affecting the judiciary, judicial bodies, and judges themselves, as follows:

First phase: 2013–2017 (militarization of the judiciary)

During this phase, the jurisdiction of military courts was expanded to include cases that were previously referred to civil courts, particularly in the context of addressing protests following the events of 2013. Critics viewed this as an expansion of the role of military courts at the expense of ordinary civil judiciary.

Second phase: 2017–2023 (militarization of judicial bodies)

In this phase, the role of the executive authority in managing and appointing heads of judicial bodies was strengthened, which critics say increased its influence within the judicial system.

This phase began with Law No. 13 of 2017, which amended the Judicial Authority Law and granted the President broader powers in selecting the heads of judicial bodies. This move faced limited opposition from some judges.

This trajectory was further reinforced by the constitutional amendments of April 2019, which established the “Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies” chaired by the President of the Republic, seen by critics as an additional step toward increasing executive oversight over the structure of the judiciary.

In a previous memorandum, the Judges Club of the State Council criticized these amendments, considering them a violation of judicial independence and a restriction of its powers, describing them as a weakening of the principle of judicial independence.

The 2019 amendments also granted the President expanded powers to appoint heads of judicial bodies, replacing the previous seniority-based system.

Third phase: 2023–present (militarization of judges themselves)

According to critics, this phase reflects a deeper level of influence affecting newly appointed judges themselves, through training and qualification programs conducted at the Military Academy, as well as linking appointments to mandatory training programs.

On 22 April 2023, the Cabinet introduced a requirement obligating newly appointed individuals across various state institutions, including judicial bodies, to complete a six-month qualification program at the Military Academy in Cairo.

This applied to new appointees in the Public Prosecution, the State Council, the State Lawsuits Authority, and the Administrative Prosecution Authority, in addition to other categories of state employees, including diplomats, teachers, and employees of several ministries.

These programs were further expanded to include training for personnel from various sectors, as part of an official vision aimed at standardizing qualification and job readiness across state institutions.

On 13 June 2024, the Military Academy announced the graduation of the first cohort of newly appointed judges after completing the six-month training program, which sparked widespread debate within judicial circles, particularly regarding the nature of the training, which included physical and psychological tests that critics argued were unrelated to judicial work.

Prior to these changes, appointments to judicial bodies were exclusively governed by the Judicial Authority Law, specifically Articles 38 and 116, which regulate the conditions and traditional mechanisms for judicial appointments.