Sudanese Politician: UAE Wants to Plunder Our Wealth, and Chad Must Apologize to Sudan (Exclusive)

Mohamed al-Wathek Abu Zeid, Secretary of Foreign Relations for Sudan’s Future Movement for Reform and Development, accused the UAE of stoking the conflict between Sudan’s Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in a bid to gain control over the country’s vast natural resources.

In an interview with Al-Estiklal, Abu Zeid said the UAE’s interference didn’t stop there, it also influenced Sudan’s neighboring countries, worsening the political instability inside Sudan.

Commenting on the military situation following the army’s recapture of Khartoum, he noted that battles are now shifting toward Kordofan and nearby towns. He emphasized that the RSF militia is losing ground in areas it once believed to have tribal or popular support, as its crimes against civilians come to light.

Abu Zeid also criticized Chad for backing the RSF militia, urging it to take serious steps to correct what he described as a “grave mistake.”

He went on to analyze the positions of each neighboring country regarding the RSF’s rebellion, highlighting how the crisis created diplomatic confusion for many regional actors.

The conversation concluded with his predictions for Sudan’s post-war political landscape and the key challenges facing the new Prime Minister, Dr. Kamil Idris.

Abu Zeid, 46, is a Sudanese political figure known for advocating a renewal of Islamic thought and promoting technocratic governance. He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and a master’s in international relations, with a focus on institutional reform and governance.

The Future Movement for Reform and Development is a national political party seeking comprehensive reform in Sudan’s political system.

Inside the War Zone

How do you assess the current military landscape in Sudan after the army declared Khartoum fully cleared of RSF militia fighters?

There have been major shifts on the ground. Most of the areas where the RSF militia is present today weren’t captured through military offensives. These fighters were originally part of the Sudanese Armed Forces, stationed in various locations across the country, including around 18 military sites in Khartoum State alone. When they broke away and rebelled, they automatically maintained control of these positions.

At the start of the war, the RSF expanded quickly into major states like al-Jazirah and Sennar, backed by an arsenal of advanced weapons and a massive force of roughly 120,000 fighters—a number that's extraordinary for any militia in the region.

But that phase is now largely over. The army has retaken five states and many key cities. The RSF has been pushed out of Khartoum, al-Jazirah, and Sennar. Current clashes are concentrated on the edges of Kordofan and Darfur—areas where the RSF had already been stationed prior to their mutiny.

A few garrisons remain outside army control, mostly in cities like Nyala and Zalingei. However, Northern Darfur and the city of el-Fashir have remained strongholds; despite 210 attempts, the RSF has failed to seize them.

Militarily, the situation now favors the Sudanese Armed Forces. They have regained momentum, bolstered by mobilized volunteers and a strong determination to end the war and eliminate the RSF from both the military and political scenes.

Currently, the RSF occupies only about 15% of Sudanese territory, and serious efforts are underway to reclaim it completely.

One notable outcome of this war has been the rise in national consciousness among Sudanese citizens, allowing the army to move into older RSF strongholds in Kordofan—areas previously under the influence of Abdel Aziz al-Hilu. The army is now determined to retake them and expel RSF forces from the region.

What direction will the conflict take now that the RSF has been pushed out of Khartoum?

While the war began in northern Sudan, it escalated dramatically in Khartoum by mid-April. The capital, made up of three cities, is a strategic hub, connecting five states and four regions. Nearly a quarter of Sudan’s population lives there.

Retaking Khartoum was a major milestone, not just militarily but symbolically and economically. The city holds tremendous political weight and serves as a vital economic engine for the country.

With Khartoum and surrounding regions like White Nile and al-Jazirah now cleared, the path has opened for the army to move into Kordofan—a central gateway to western Sudan and a critical step toward entering Darfur.

Kordofan is not only economically significant and densely populated; it also holds deep cultural and civilizational importance in Sudan.

The battle has now shifted into areas once believed to be sympathetic to the RSF. The militia assumed it had grassroots protection in Kordofan and nearby regions. But that assumption has been shattered, as local communities rise up against them—especially following a wave of unprovoked RSF attacks on civilians throughout the country.

The Political Scene and the Future

How do you evaluate the Sudanese opposition’s overall stance regarding the war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces militia?

Let’s map out the opposition landscape: there is the traditional, classical opposition founded on sectarian lines, such as the National Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party. Then there is the ideological opposition that emerged from more recent backgrounds, like the Sudanese Communist Party and the Islamic Movement.

Currently, the political scene in Sudan has about 100 parties, distributed between regional parties and others. But if we talk about the opposition in light of the ongoing conflict in Sudan, it looks as follows:

There are parties aligned with the national army and the state; these are the strongest parties now and can be seen as representing a genuine political reality in Sudan.

There are also some political forces that were betting on the victory of the Rapid Support Forces to bring them to power in Sudan, meaning their alignment was based on self-interest.

These forces tried to deny this relationship, but their actions were completely contrary to their denial. These forces lost their political base in Sudan, became divided, and turned into a platform called Taqaddum (Progress). Then “Taqaddum” split into two parts: one called “Ta’sis” (Foundation), which clearly supports the Rapid Support Forces and speaks on their behalf, and another called “Sumood” (Resilience), which is a small group that broke away from certain parties, adopts external agendas, may not follow the Rapid Support Forces’ orientation but presents itself as the opposite of the army and claims to represent the civilian stream in the political process. They reject any practice that might lead to a real civilian transformation and see no one but themselves as representing civilian authority.

However, the Sudanese people do not respond to these forces because they do not genuinely represent or connect with them.

There are other groups trying to hijack the voice of parties or represent them or speak in their name. They receive support from abroad and some embassies of certain countries, and they seek to gain a position but find no real support.

Unfortunately, this complicated scene is a main cause of the lack of clear political vision currently, because many are linked to foreign interests, which negatively affects Sudan and its internal and external security. But now, after the militia’s retreat and defeat, I believe these groups will not have a significant impact on the post-war scene.

There are some armed groups fighting alongside the Sudanese army now. How do you see their future after the war? Are they seeking political gains, or how will the state deal with them?

This issue is divided. Some of these groups were former rebels who returned to the state under the Juba Peace Agreement, such as the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudan Liberation Movement, and some groups that, according to this agreement, returned to work with the Sudanese state.

These forces are now fighting alongside the armed forces as part of one of the conditions of the Juba Agreement, and these movements remain committed to this approach.

As for the “mobilized” groups who wanted to fight alongside the state by their own choice, some say they seek political roles, but I believe they are convinced that they fight to defend their honor and families.

Since the people witnessed direct attacks on property and civilians in this war, a very large number joined the armed forces’ ranks, including members of the Islamic stream, others from different currents, businessmen, engineers, employees — most of whom say that by the end of the battle, they will put down their weapons and return to their jobs to help rebuild the state and resume life.

Some of them may have political opinions they want to express, and that is their right, but I do not think they seek a political role in exchange for fighting, as some claim. Anyone among them who wants to work in politics will certainly go through official channels.

How do you generally read the political reality of Sudan if the war comes to an end?
After what Sudan has endured during this war and the facts that have become clear about certain parties, I believe it will be easier for Sudan to form a clear, nationally unified political scene. Personally, I am optimistic about this. Many national political forces have found themselves quite close to state institutions, especially on major issues.

Currently, there is talk about an inclusive Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue. The issues involved are many and shared by all, such as the question of identity, the system of governance, and what the best model is within this framework. We now have 18 states under some form of federal governance, and there needs to be a discussion about whether to strengthen this model or move to another one.

These are the issues occupying the political arena now, and I believe there is a significant convergence of visions among everyone.

Also, the model of economic development Sudan should pursue and what is most appropriate in this regard.

External relations and Sudan’s foreign ties must be addressed because Sudan is in a very complex geographic position. We are linked to Africa, the Arab world, and a politically and militarily unstable neighborhood — which causes many complications in foreign relations.

These are the topics that should be raised in a broad Sudanese political dialogue. The unity that emerged during the “Battle of Dignity” encourages us and gives hope for a broad and lasting consensus among the sincere political forces.

What do you think about the appointment of Dr. Kamil Idris as Sudan’s new Prime Minister? What are the main challenges he faces?

The choice of a civilian Prime Minister is a much-needed and widely welcomed step that has been delayed for a long time. Political forces have consistently called for the formation of a government made up of professional technocrats and specialists, so this is an important move.

On the military front, there has been significant progress, as well as in civilian work, but there is still a paralysis in the functioning of state institutions. This makes the need for this government even more urgent  to set appropriate policies for Sudan’s current situation.

The Prime Minister faces many challenges. The first is to select a wise government of specialists who understand the state and the needs of the citizens. The second is managing the relationship with the military establishment amid an ongoing conflict.

There are also challenges related to reform and reconstruction, especially considering that Sudanese livelihoods are currently severely affected by the war and its repercussions across all sectors. Thousands of factories are out of operation, the energy sector has been badly hit by drone attacks and others, which has also impacted agriculture. Large areas that used to be irrigated by electric-powered systems in various regions are now affected. 

The challenges before the government are vast. There is a huge imbalance in trade and issues related to food commodities. The government must work on completing the transitional phase in preparation for a genuine democratic transformation.

UAE: Selling Relations for Wealth

The Sudanese Security and Defense Council declared the UAE a hostile state. What do you think led to this point?

Historically, Sudan’s relationship with the UAE was good, dating back to the era of Sheikh Zayed, may he rest in peace. However, the current ruling leadership in the UAE has chosen to play a negative role in some countries, including Sudan. This role negatively affects the national security of those countries.

The Sudanese Security and Defense Council’s decision to designate the UAE as a hostile state came after clear UAE interference in Sudan’s affairs through supporting the war and backing the Rapid Support Forces militia by arming them. This role is documented with evidence that has appeared in some media outlets. 

The International Court of Justice ruled it had no jurisdiction in a complaint related to the UAE on this matter, but everyone knows that the UAE finances the war in Sudan and helps sustain it by supporting this militia.

The UAE has been attempting to interfere in our affairs for nearly two years, even before the war began. The UAE is seeking greater roles beyond its size, driven by the accumulation of wealth it possesses. Wealth does not justify such blatant interference in other countries’ affairs.

The UAE has assumed the role of advancing foreign agendas—an intervention Sudan will not tolerate on its own soil.

The UAE aims to achieve economic control over other countries. We now see it talking about ports, water resources, agriculture, and moving actively in many countries around Sudan and beyond, unfortunately.

As a result, the relationship between Sudan and the UAE has become toxic, as long as the UAE insists on encroaching upon the resources and wealth of the Sudanese people.

Sudan may consider mediation with the UAE, but only after the Emirates issues an apology and compensates the Sudanese people for the harm caused by its blatant support of a rebel militia that sought to undermine the state and its army.

This is if the UAE wishes to save whatever remains of its reputation after the clear failure of the militia it supported and continues to support in Sudan.

The UAE assumed that Sudan’s difficult economic conditions would push its people toward defeatism, but it failed to realize that this is a people who want to preserve their dignity before their wealth.

In battles in western Sudan, there has been intensive use of drones by militias. Do you see this as a sign that the militias might gain an advantage in upcoming battles?
Drone warfare is generally a hot topic in conflicts worldwide, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and others.

There is fierce competition among countries and manufacturers both for drones and their countermeasures. Sudan is one of the testing grounds for this form of warfare. The Rapid Support Forces’ use of drones — which they mostly obtained with the UAE’s help — caused more damage to the country’s infrastructure than to the Sudanese Armed Forces.

They targeted vital facilities that provide services to both citizens and the state, such as electricity companies and others.

However, the Sudanese Armed Forces have gained experience in countering such weapons through their ongoing experience. In reality, this did not give the militias a decisive advantage; because war is not just about drones. It is one type of weapon among many, and the Sudanese army has many alternatives and means of countering them. Victory always goes to whoever controls the locations and the ground, and this has been and continues to be in favor of the Sudanese army. The results of the battles in western Sudan are clear to all.

International Relations and Repositioning

With the recent victories of the Sudanese army, some expect certain countries to reposition themselves regarding their relations with Sudan. Which neighboring countries do you think deserve to take new steps and stand on the right side after previously being on the wrong side?

Many countries did not have an honorable stance toward Sudan during this war. Some friendly countries remained supportive of the Sudanese state and its army, while others changed their position during the course of the conflict.

The main reasons for this include the huge shock caused by the unexpected outbreak of the war. This led to confusion, especially within the diplomatic institutions of some countries, where normal communication was disrupted.

Another reason for this disarray was the uncertainty about who would win the war. The success of some rebellions in Africa encouraged certain countries to believe similar outcomes might happen in Sudan. As a result, these countries remained silent, took a spectator’s stance, or severed ties with Sudan’s official government.

A strongly influencing factor was the UAE’s position, which effectively isolated many neighboring and regional countries, encouraging them not to adopt clear stances regarding this war.

That said, some countries maintained a good position, including Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, and some friends like Russia, which did not withdraw its embassy from Sudan, as well as Turkiye and China. These countries supported Sudan’s legitimate institutions, and their roles will not be forgotten.

Regarding the neighborhood, Kenya became involved in the conflict, and to some extent Uganda facilitated the transit of weapons to the Rapid Support Forces. Chad’s negative stance is notable, as it became a base for arming the Rapid Support Forces. Ethiopia’s position was initially wavering at the start of the war, but it later retracted and sided with the Sudanese state and its armed forces. The relationship with Ethiopia is very important for Sudan. Despite Ethiopia’s severe internal challenges, it adjusted its position.

South Sudan has a weak grip over its territory, leading many militias from there to support the Rapid Support Forces. However, the South Sudanese state understands the importance of maintaining strong relations with Sudan and its armed forces.

Some Western countries moved away from what they called neutrality—standing equidistant from all parties—but with the Sudanese army’s victories, they realized this is not a conflict between two military leaders but rather between a rebellious militia and a state with its armed forces and people.

Overall, many countries are now reassessing the political landscape and withdrawing their hostility toward the Sudanese state. The biggest losers in this context are the neighboring countries that openly opposed Sudan and sided with the rebellious militias. Their current position is difficult, and they are the greatest losers.

Regarding Chad, what do you see as necessary to restore its historical and desired relations with Sudan?

Chad cannot do without Sudan, and vice versa. Chad is a neighboring country with many interests tied to Sudan, and it also holds significant influence in the Darfur region.

There is extensive demographic and tribal overlap between the two countries. Chad’s support for the rebellious militias will not last, as there is internal opposition in Chad due to the historical relations between the two peoples and countries. This is my expectation.

Future developments in Darfur will also shape the future of this relationship. Chad owes Sudan an apology if it genuinely wants strong or restored relations.

The Rapid Support Forces were betting on capturing el-Fasher in Darfur to declare a government there with Chad’s support, but after more than 200 battles to achieve this, they failed. In fact, there are promising signs of some cities falling to the Sudanese army. Therefore, Chad owes an apology and must return to close relations with the Sudanese state and reject the rebels.

The Chadian regime will pay a heavy price if it does not apologize to Sudan, and this price will come as soon as el-Fasher and Nyala fall and this war ends in favor of the Sudanese army.

The First Bullet

There is frequent debate within Sudanese political circles about who fired the first bullet in this war. Some believe opinions remain divided. What do you say?

The Rapid Support Forces’ attempts to promote the idea that the first bullet was fired from the Sports City in Khartoum are futile and misguided.

Observers of events before that moment know well that the Rapid Support Forces were attempting to seize power. Officially, this war is dated to have started on April 15, 2023, but militarily it is recognized to have begun on April 12, when Rapid Support Forces troops separately went to Merowe Airport, claiming their purpose was to prevent joint Egyptian-Sudanese maneuvers that had been agreed upon by both sides.

These maneuvers, called the Nile Eagles, were part of training exercises and experience exchanges. The troops who went to the airport refused to withdraw and attacked the airbase there—this was the beginning of the battles.

Therefore, the first bullet was fired by those who targeted the air force that day and attacked its bases. They also attacked the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at his home in the early hours of April 15, just three hours before the battles officially erupted. A group of armed forces officers was arrested on the night of April 14 in the Soba area south of Khartoum.

This was an attempt by the Rapid Support Forces to seize armored vehicles stationed at the First Armored Brigade. All these facts indicate that the rebellious militia initiated this tragedy endured by the Sudanese people.

The more important question here than who fired the first bullet is: how can it be justified or accepted that forces, supposedly part of the armed forces, would rebel against their own military leadership and even take control of sites belonging to an intelligence unit, under the pretext that this unit was attempting a coup against the army—when it later became clear that no coup or rebellion was being led?

Instead of a simple mistake, the Rapid Support Forces militia committed dozens of errors that led the country to this devastating war.