Why Turkiye Holds the Keys to Somalia’s Political and Security Future

Amid growing instability and the collapse of old alliances, Mogadishu has found itself facing a complex political and security equation.

The United States, long the primary source of military and logistical support, is quietly pulling back, leaving a vacuum increasingly filled by al-Shabaab’s firepower.

As battlefield setbacks mount, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government has had little choice but to look east, where Turkiye awaited with an outstretched hand and ready weapons.

From supplying modern drones and combat helicopters to considering the deployment of ground troops for the first time, Turkiye is evolving from a distant backer into a direct strategic partner, redrawing the Horn of Africa’s alliance map.

With every step Turkiye takes forward, the U.S. steps back, and Mogadishu grows ever closer to Ankara, seeing it as a more committed and pragmatic ally.

Is Somalia’s security now tied to Turkish decisions? Is a new regional order taking shape, with Turkiye playing a greater role than Washington?

These fast-moving developments raise big questions and the answers may carry implications far beyond Somalia.

Security Guarantees

Mogadishu is now seeking security guarantees from Turkiye, as U.S. support wanes and al-Shabaab closes in on the Somali capital.

With President Mohamud losing control and Western military aid declining, Turkiye has supplied weapons to Somalia and is now considering sending ground troops to help the Somali army recover from major defeats, according to Intelligence Online.

This has brought Turkiye-Somalia communication to an unusually high level: President Erdogan personally called President Mohamud, urging him to visit Ankara immediately.

During their March 27–28 meeting in Turkiye, Mohamud asked for more resources to help repel al-Shabaab’s advances.

Though still under review, Turkiye is now for the first time considering a ground troop deployment.

Time is running out for Mogadishu. Since February 2025, al-Shabaab has regained large areas in Hirshabelle, after several clan militias defected. Its fighters are now stationed in Afgooye, just 30 kilometers from the capital.

On April 6, al-Shabaab fired mortar shells at Mogadishu International Airport, which hosts embassies and troops from the African Union’s ATMIS peacekeeping mission.

Turkish Drones

Amid these unstable circumstances, Turkiye delivered several modern Akinci drones, produced by Baykar, and T-129 ATAK combat helicopters, developed by the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), to Somalia on March 18, 2025.

These weapons, part of a defense and economic cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in February 2024, have played a key role in preventing the collapse of several frontlines held by the struggling Somali army.

Turkish support goes beyond just weapons and drones, as Ankara also plans to protect its numerous investments in the country, especially those outside of the capital, Mogadishu.

For example, Turkiye is involved in the construction of a port in Hobyo, 500 kilometers north of Mogadishu, and is also building a space base in Adale, 150 kilometers north of the capital.

Given al-Shabaab’s recent advances, which have brought the group within 60 kilometers of Adale, this development has raised enough concern for Ankara to consider deploying over 300 special forces troops to the area.

Currently, there are no Turkish soldiers in Somalia. The Turkish military’s involvement is limited to the deployment of military trainers at Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, where they have been training the Somali commando units, known as Gorgor, since 2017.

Tension with Washington

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, during his recent visit to Turkiye, was accompanied by a small team that included Minister of Ports and Maritime Transport Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, who speaks Turkish and studied in Ankara. He is also the main mediator for Turkish interests in Somalia.

The United States deemed his proximity to Turkiye as excessive, which led it to pressure Mohamud to remove him from the Ministry of Defense on March 17, transferring him to another ministerial position.

However, the relationship between Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Washington has been tense since Donald Trump's return to the White House.

While the Pentagon has been intensifying its discussions with the Somaliland authorities about the potential relocation of an airbase to Berbera, President Mohamud seeks to regain control of the region.

On March 16, he sent a letter to Trump offering exclusive control over several ports and airbases in Berbera and Bosaso, which are not under Mogadishu’s control, but Trump did not respond.

As during Trump’s first term, the Pentagon plans to reduce its field commitments in Somalia. This includes gradually withdrawing funding for training the elite Danab Brigade of the Somali army, which consists of over 2,000 fighters, trained by the private American military company Bancroft at the former Soviet airbase in Baledogle, 100 kilometers north of Mogadishu.

In early April 2024, a crisis erupted between the United States and Somalia when Washington decided to suspend funding for food rations following a large-scale corruption scandal in which military rations were publicly sold in Mogadishu's market stalls, angering the U.S. embassy.

Multiple Crises

There are other reasons driving Mogadishu’s rapprochement with Ankara, such as the crises it faces regarding the budget for foreign troops fighting al-Shabaab.

In December 2024, Mogadishu's decision to deploy the Danab Brigade to Jubaland in southern Somalia—aimed at resolving a political dispute with regional president Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe), whose re-election it opposes—sparked irritation in Washington.

The Pentagon views the role of this force as countering al-Shabaab, not settling internal political disagreements.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud also dismissed Danab Brigade commander Arab Dheg Ahmed after he publicly criticized the dismantling of the Somali elite force.

Since early 2025, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has stopped paying the Danab soldiers’ monthly salaries of $300 each, leaving Mogadishu to cover the costs while searching for alternative donors to sustain the payments.

In January 2025, Washington significantly reduced the budget for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), halting other logistical expenses for Danab, such as medical evacuations for wounded soldiers via helicopters and the maintenance of the Baledogle site, significantly reducing its operational capacity.

On the other hand, the British army also suspended part of Operation TANGHAM in December 2025, which involved training several hundred Somali army officers in Baidoa, the capital of the southwest region.

This poses an additional concern for Somalia’s security partners at a time when the funding for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is set to start its mission in July 2025, is in doubt.

The number of personnel for the mission, which will replace the African Union Peacekeeping Mission, will decrease from 17,600 to 11,800.

At the African level, the Somali government also faces strong obstacles. The latest was on April 9, 2025, when the government asked the Deputy Head of the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), South African diplomat Sivuyile Thandikhaya Bam, to leave the country.

The Somali Foreign Minister, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, even accused him of supporting al-Shabaab.

A Challenge to Washington

Specialized military websites, including Defense Security Asia (based in Kuala Lumpur), have pointed out that Turkiye has become Somalia's closest ally.

In a report published on March 20, 2025, the site noted that the transfer of drones took place between Ankara and Mogadishu in defiance of the United States, which opposed this move.

This operation came just days after Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud dismissed Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur from his position as Minister of Defense and appointed him as Minister of Transport and Ports, a move made under U.S. pressure due to his role in strengthening military cooperation between Somalia and Turkiye.

The Malaysian site emphasized that the military cooperation between Turkiye and Somalia has become striking, especially after the signing of a maritime and defense agreement between the two countries in 2024.

The agreement granted Turkish naval and air forces the authority to secure Somali territorial waters, establish a Somali naval force, and assist in energy exploration operations.

The report highlighted that the close alliance between the two countries has raised concerns in Washington and other Western capitals such as Paris, as well as in Arab countries like Abu Dhabi and Cairo.

Turkiye continues its significant investments in Somalia’s infrastructure and military sectors, committed to supporting counterterrorism efforts and addressing other forces threatening Mogadishu.

“This geopolitical shift between Ankara and Mogadishu reflects Turkiye's “increasing strategic presence in the Horn of Africa, challenging traditional U.S. and Western dominance in the region,” according to Defense Security Asia.