The Battle for West Kordofan: Sudan’s Army Targets Oil Routes and Key War Hubs

The Sudanese army is not content with expanding its control in North Kordofan; it is seeking to shift the centre of gravity of the war westward through the gateway of West Kordofan, a move that could redraw the conflict map and impose new dynamics between central Sudan and Darfur.

After taking control of Sodari and al-Mazroub, the army began advancing from the outskirts of Umm Kurdem towards al-Khuwei and the outskirts of al-Nuhud. 

Its objective goes beyond retaking towns and positions: it aims to cut off or restrict the movement and supply routes the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia uses between Kordofan and Darfur.

Controlling al-Khuwei and al-Nuhud would give the army an advanced position at a geographical and economic crossroads linking the region's northern and western parts, paving the way for greater pressure on areas of influence, resources, and transport networks.

However, this advance also carries a high military and logistical cost, as expanding the area under control means extending supply lines and requiring the continuous protection of newly captured positions.

West Kordofan is thus entering a potentially decisive phase of the war. Can the army turn its successive gains into a breakthrough that shifts the balance of territorial control, or will the new front become a prolonged war of attrition? What stands between this advance and opening a viable route towards Darfur?

Geography at the Heart of the War

West Kordofan’s strategic importance stems from its location between Darfur, central Sudan, and the border with South Sudan, making it a corridor where military movements, trade, pastoralism, and oil exports intersect. 

It borders North and South Kordofan and meets North and East Darfur states to the west, meaning that the impact of the battle extends beyond its administrative boundaries to a wider region.

Within this area, key centers serve different functions. Al-Nuhud is a hub for the trade in gum arabic, groundnuts, and livestock, and holds social significance in Dar Hamar, while al-Khuwei serves as a link towards El Obeid.

Al-Fulah retains its importance as the state capital, while Babanusa is a historic railway junction connecting routes extending towards Darfur and South Sudan.

The southern part of the state contains the oil-producing area associated with Heglig, Balila, and surrounding production zones. 

The importance of these facilities extends beyond crude oil extraction to processing and transportation, including South Sudanese oil. 

Military control is therefore intertwined with cross-border economic interests, the government’s ability to collect revenue, and the revival of market activity.

These interconnections become more sensitive as production disruptions and transport costs rise. Control over crossings and markets can become a means of extracting revenue, exerting pressure on civilians, and financing the continuation of the war.

This geography gives the advance towards al-Khuwei and al-Nuhud significance beyond the amount of territory recaptured. 

It could alter the movement of goods and troops between El Obeid and western Sudan, while threatening resources and transport networks used by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.

However, economic power is distributed across a commercial and agricultural north, an administrative and logistical centre, and an oil-producing, borderland south. 

Recapturing al-Nuhud therefore does not automatically mean reaching the oilfields, just as entering the state capital is not enough to secure its outlying areas.

The significance of the advance ultimately depends on how well it connects with other key centers and restores movement between them, allowing scattered gains to become a territory that can be effectively administered and supplied.

Extensive Control

The Sudanese Armed Forces are entering this battle against a territorial landscape shaped by a series of successive losses. 

El-Fula came under Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia control in June 2024, followed by al-Nuhud in May 2025, after it had served as an alternative administrative capital. 

In December 2025, the RSF militia seized the headquarters of the 22nd Division in Babanusa, ending the army’s control over one of its most important strongholds in the state.

By contrast, the Sudanese Armed Forces are relying on El Obeid and their recent gains in North Kordofan. However, they face a different reality further south, where they retain Dilling and Kadugli amid threats to the roads, while the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, maintains influence in parts of the Nuba Mountains and is allied with the RSF militia.

Heglig occupies a unique position. Following the Sudanese army’s withdrawal from the area in late 2025, Juba announced arrangements to secure the facilities through South Sudanese forces, under an understanding with both sides in the war. 

This situation requires a distinction between protecting the oilfields, exercising sovereignty, and managing the economy, rather than automatically placing the area under the control of either camp.

In Darfur, the RSF militia retains influence over most of the region, alongside areas held by the army and its allies, and others controlled by the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Abdelwahid El Nur (SLM-AW). 

This further complicates any subsequent military advance there. Thus, the army’s gains in the north are putting pressure on an extensive network of influence, but have yet to dismantle it.

Supply Lines First

The nature of the army’s movements in Umm Kurdem indicates that it is seeking to prepare the ground for a broader advance through reconnaissance and special forces operations, alongside aerial pressure.

In a report published on October 6 by the local media network Ayin, a field source said that the advance towards al-Khuwei locality was continuing under air cover, with al-Nuhud identified as a key objective for the next phase.

These developments suggest that the operation is an attempt to shift the focus of the fighting westward and force the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia to divide their troops between protecting their strongholds and maintaining pressure on el Obeid.

If the army manages to establish a foothold around the targeted centers, it could restrict the movement of reinforcements and increase the cost of supplying the front lines, although this would not necessarily mean cutting off all routes.

The connection with Darfur is supported by previous events. Visual investigations have documented reinforcements arriving from East Darfur for the battle of Babanusa. 

The loss of some key transit points in West Kordofan could therefore affect the RSF’s militia's ability to move troops between the two regions and limit its use of the state as a strategic rear base for operations further east.

However, opening a route toward Darfur depends on several successive stages of the army’s advance. These begin with securing recaptured areas and linking them to a stable supply base, followed by expanding control within the state. 

Equating reaching al-Nuhud with recapturing el Fashir or Nyala overlooks the differences between the fronts and the vast areas under RSF militia influence.

In this sense, a breakthrough matters if it can reduce the RSF’s militia capacity to move and fight, while allowing operations to continue without exhausting troops defending widely dispersed positions. 

The advance could yield a significant gain by curbing attacks on North Kordofan, even before it develops into a direct offensive inside Darfur.

Drones and Distances

Nevertheless, the challenges facing the army in this battle begin with the breadth of the front and the long distances between towns, as well as differences in terrain, from sandy areas in the north to more clay-rich areas in the south that are more affected by rainfall.

Every expansion of the army’s control therefore adds the responsibility of protecting supply routes and rear positions, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia can withdraw from one stronghold while retaining the ability to attack outlying areas or disrupt movement around them.

Drones further complicate this equation, as they enable strikes against troops and facilities far from direct lines of engagement. 

On October 5, the army announced that it had shot down a drone northwest of al-Khuwei, reflecting the role of aerial warfare on the new front.

The continued targeting of El Obeid also shows that advancing westward does not eliminate the threat to the base on which the offensive depends. 

The burden is compounded by ongoing fighting on multiple fronts simultaneously, requiring the army to balance continued offensives with securing the cities from which its forces operate.

The Sudanese Armed Forces face another challenge in coordinating their various allied formations, ranging from armed movements to mobilization groups and popular resistance forces. 

Expanding territorial control requires coordination and discipline to ensure that decisions are implemented and civilians are protected, while successive defections from the RSF’s militia ranks provide a morale boost.

Local relationships remain an influential factor in this test. Previous reports have highlighted differing positions among leaders of the Misseriya community, with some seeking to avoid confrontation with the army while others continue their alliance with the RSF militia. This underscores why local communities should not be treated as a single, unified bloc.

From Recapturing Territory to Restoring Governance

The impact of the army’s expanding advance extends beyond military control to the question of governance. Recapturing al-Nuhud could allow part of the government administration to return to the state, while returning to Al-Fulah would signify the recovery of the state capital.

The state government is headed by Hamed Hamad Tirab, appointed in July 2026, who outlined military preparations and recovery plans in September, despite government institutions continuing to operate from outside areas previously under their control.

On the other side, losing population centers and economic hubs threatens the territory on which the Tasis alliance relies to build its parallel authority. 

However, the RSF’s militia retreat in West Kordofan would not automatically end its influence in Darfur or eliminate the institutions and forces of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in South Kordofan, where local power dynamics differ.

Translating military gains into stable governance in these areas therefore requires the return of the police, judiciary, public services, and wage payments, as well as the protection of markets and residents’ rights and property.

Harnessing the region’s resources also depends on repairing facilities and restoring employment and trade. Meanwhile, the Heglig area requires coordination with South Sudan over security, operations, and the flow of oil.

The International Organization for Migration recorded the displacement of more than 308,000 people from the Kordofan states between late October 2025 and early September 2026.

Civilian safety stands out as a direct test of the advance’s effectiveness. The operation’s results will therefore be measured not only by changes to the front lines, but also by whether movement and humanitarian aid can continue and residents can return. 

If the authorities fail to translate their military presence into protection and services, troop positions may change while the governance crisis persists, delaying the transformation of the route towards Darfur into a sustainable advance.