The First Foreign Visit After the Elections: What Was Erdogan Doing in Iraq?

On July 25, 2023, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani met with Turkish Ambassador to Baghdad Ali Riza Guney and discussed many important issues between the two countries.

Among the issues they discussed was the search for preparations related to the visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Baghdad next month, his first official visit after his election as president of the republic.

The anticipated visit of President Erdogan, in addition to its importance and impact on relations between Baghdad and Ankara, comes in the context of launching a new phase of Turkish foreign policy toward Iraq, which has settled over the past period on the basis of instability.

 

Outstanding Issues

There is no doubt that there are many outstanding issues between the two countries, as well as some thorny files, which will be present in the political discussions that will take place between Erdogan and Iraqi officials, as Turkiye aspires to reach political, security, and economic understandings with Iraq, and in a way that reflects positively on the overall course of relations between the two countries.

Iraq is also looking forward to this visit with great importance, especially since it comes in complex circumstances that it lives in, specifically at the level of water and energy files, as Turkiye’s water measures adopted in the recent past, in addition to stopping oil exports through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Turkish pipeline, resulted in Iraq losing about 400 thousand barrels of oil per day.

Talking about a new Turkish approach in Iraq represents the most important question in the post-election stage of Erdogan due to the continuous transformations that have passed through the Turkish role in Iraq after 2003, as many Turkish institutions competed to manage the Iraqi file, most notably foreign affairs and intelligence.

And after the transformation of the political system in Turkiye from parliamentary to presidential in April 2017, the presidency became the main controller of the Iraqi file.

Now after President Erdogan’s victory for a new term and bringing personalities who are ideologically and intellectually compatible with him by appointing Hakan Fidan as head of foreign affairs, it can be said that we will witness a state of ideological and political integration directed toward Iraq.

The direct impact resulting from Fidan’s appointment as head of Turkish foreign affairs toward Iraq is reflected in reshaping Turkish diplomacy and ending the state of rupture that created a distorted situation in Turkish foreign policy, as Turkish diplomatic mechanisms in Iraq are not truly expressive of President Erdogan’s orientation in foreign policy.

This pushed Fidan during his presidency of intelligence to bypass bureaucratic circles in Turkish diplomacy and extend bridges of communication with Iraqi actors and structures, which was clearly evident in the role he played during the formation of al-Sudani’s government.

As a result, his most prominent task in the next stage will be to repair this distorted situation and activate diplomatic mechanisms to harmonize with the orientations of the new government and achieve greater effectiveness in Iraq in particular.

The shift from “intelligence diplomacy” that Fidan managed in the past to “security diplomacy” with its various dimensions in the next stage will be the most prominent title through which President Erdogan will manage the Iraqi file.

 

Complex Policy

The process of pushing an intelligence personality at the head of foreign affairs indicates the importance of the security dimension in Turkish foreign policy in general, and toward Iraq in particular, which has many outstanding issues with Turkiye intersecting with the security side, whether at the level of water security or energy security or even at the level of relationship that links Turkiye with armed factions in northern Iraq.

The talk here is about Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Yazidi factions allied with it or armed factions loyal to Iran. The past period witnessed many operations of action and reaction between Turkiye and these factions in Sinjar, Nineveh Plain, and Mosul.

The expected Turkish role in Iraq will be subject to a comprehensive review by Erdogan, specifically at the level of priorities and issues, as he may aspire to continue the “complex foreign policy” toward Erbil and Baghdad, for what this policy provides from a comfortable margin of maneuver for Ankara in the Iraqi interior.

This is in addition to giving the file of military presence and PKK great importance, as well as keeping water and energy issues as central issues in the Turkish vision toward Iraq, especially since Turkiye has developed a “supra-national” policy when discussing these issues with Iraq.

Turkiye will probably increase its support for the Development Road project with Iraq, as through this project, Turkiye aspires to expand its economic spread inside Iraq, in addition to facilitating access to markets in the Gulf countries.

This road will also provide Turkiye with an opportunity to transform areas of conflict with PKK and factions loyal to Iran in northern Iraq into areas of economic interdependence, which is a strategic goal that Turkiye also seeks to neutralize Iranian influence and influence, specifically Nineveh Governorate.

 

Water Crisis

As Turkiye continues to build dams and divert water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Iraq faces a looming water crisis that threatens its agriculture, economy, security and public health.

The two countries have been locked in a long-standing dispute over the management and allocation of the shared water resources, with Turkiye rejecting any international agreements or arbitration that would limit its sovereignty over the rivers.

The issue of water sharing has become a central and contentious topic in the bilateral relations between Ankara and Baghdad, especially after Turkiye completed the construction of the Ilisu Dam in 2020, which reduced the flow of the Tigris River by more than 50 percent.

The latest round of talks between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Sudani in Baghdad failed to produce any breakthroughs or commitments on the matter.

Iraq, which depends on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for more than 90 percent of its water supply, is suffering from severe drought, climate change and environmental degradation.

The decline in water levels has led to the loss of arable land, the spread of waterborne diseases, the displacement of rural populations, the increase of social unrest and the exacerbation of political tensions.

The southern provinces, which are predominantly Shiite and host Iranian-backed militias, are among the most affected by water scarcity.

Iraq’s options to influence Turkiye’s behavior are limited, as Turkiye has not ratified the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which is the only global treaty that regulates the use of transboundary watercourses.

Iraq also lacks the military and economic leverage to pressure Turkiye, which views water as a strategic asset and a bargaining chip in its regional policies.

Turkiye’s main motivation for building dams and hydroelectric power plants on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers is to develop its southeastern Anatolia region, which is home to a large Kurdish population that has been engaged in a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state.

The Southeastern Anatolia Project, which includes 22 dams and 19 power plants, aims to provide electricity, irrigation and flood control for the area. Turkiye also wants to use water as a tool to counter the influence of Iran and its proxies in Iraq, as well as to control the oil exports from the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq.