Sudanese Army Liberates Presidential Palace, Shifting the Tide Against Hemedti's Militia

After a prolonged siege and fierce battles, the Sudanese army, along with allied forces, successfully liberated the Republican Palace, a prominent symbol of the nation, located in central Khartoum. This victory marked the destruction of the most powerful brigade of the Rapid Support Forces militia.

The liberation of the presidential palace, a key center of governance, after two years of occupation following the outbreak of war between the army and the RSF militia in April 2023, represents a significant military and symbolic triumph. 

It signals a shift in the balance of the conflict, tipping the scales in favor of the army and its popular allies.

It also revealed that forces loyal to the militia leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), are indeed suffering losses, and that his pledge to remain in the palace, much like his previous commitment to Jebel Moya, is nothing more than empty rhetoric.

The liberation of the palace coincided with Hemedti militia’s failed attempt to seize control of al Fashir, the fifth region of Darfur still held by the army, as well as the announcement of a separatist Sovereign Council and government, challenging Khartoum’s authority.

This raises questions about what remains of the Rapid Support Forces militia's territorial control in Sudan, and what remains of the UAE-backed project supporting them in the country.

Palace Liberation

Before the army’s announcement on March 21, 2025, of the liberation of the Republican Palace in central Khartoum, along with the Arab Market and government ministries, the official state television sent a mission to the palace—a move sources in Sudan viewed as a significant indicator of its liberation and importance.

The presidential palace holds profound symbolic value, not only as a center of governance but also for its historical significance in the country’s independence. It was from this very location that Sudan declared its independence in January 1956.

Central Khartoum, home to the Republican Palace, also houses most of the country's sovereign institutions, government ministries, key markets, major hospitals, and financial institutions, making its recovery a critical step in the restoration of the Sudanese state.

For months, the army laid siege to the palace, gradually attempting to reclaim it while securing control over nearly all of the capital. This effort culminated in success.

Following the palace’s liberation, the army declared it had secured all official institutions and sovereign ministries across Khartoum.

In a swift assault during the early days of the conflict, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia seized several key landmarks in Khartoum, including the Gold Market, major bridges, and the headquarters of both state television and radio.

In recent months, the army has reclaimed almost all of these sites, with the presidential palace now standing as the last major stronghold of the RSF militia.

Sudanese affairs journalist, Sabah Moussa, asserts that the liberation of the presidential palace in Khartoum is "a significant step, symbolising the return of Sudanese sovereignty."

Moussa explained to Al-Estiklal that the significance of the victory at the presidential palace lies in its similarity to the victory at Jebel Moya, a key military triumph that marked a turning point in the battle. 

This victory contributed to the liberation of the island and signaled the beginning of the real collapse of the militias.

Moussa also believes that the liberation of the presidential palace will be the first concrete step towards a complete victory for the Sudanese Armed Forces over Hemedti's militia.

In October 2024, the army regained the strategic Jebel Moya area in the Sennar region, southeast of Sudan, and engaged with forces in the White Nile state, effectively ending the siege of both states. This opened the path for a series of consecutive victories over Hemedti’s militia.

Alan Boswell, Director of the Horn of Africa Project at the International Crisis Group, described the army's control over the presidential palace in Khartoum as "the big prize."

“The RSF has gone from controlling the vast bulk of the capital to losing most of it,” said Alan Boswell. “For the military, Khartoum is the big prize — and the loss of the palace is even more remarkable after Hemedti’s speech last week. The RSF will have a hard time spinning this as a tactical retreat.”

Palace Assault

Turkish drones, delivered to the Sudanese army, played a crucial and significant role, alongside new Chinese-made Sudanese aircraft, in bombing Hemedti's militia and accelerating their defeat, according to sources.

Sources told Al-Estiklal that the army this time aimed to resolve the matter and secure all routes leading to the palace, after blocking them with infantry and covering them with drones. 

They also reported that the army destroyed a convoy of 30 Rapid Support Forces militia vehicles attempting to retreat.

The strategy aimed to eliminate the Rapid Support Forces militia in the palace area and prevent them from finding a safe exit, ensuring they could not regroup elsewhere. As part of this, the army encircled the western part of Khartoum (the industrial area), the eastern side (the Nile Towers), the southern area (al-Mugran), and the northern part (Bahri city).

The tightening of the noose around the RSF militia in the presidential palace and central Khartoum was further aided by intensified aerial strikes using drones and artillery. This forced the militia to flee, but they were also targeted by drone strikes. 

Ultimately, control was secured by the army and the popular forces supporting it.

Hemedti's militia attempted to use the same weapon—drones—to disrupt this victory, successfully carrying out a suicide drone attack targeting the presidential palace in Khartoum. 

The strike resulted in the deaths of several soldiers and three journalists, signaling that the militia remained present in the palace's vicinity.

In mid-March, Hemedti pledged, in a recorded message broadcast on X, that his forces would not leave the palace. 

However, the army's assault on his militia ultimately forced their retreat, and they withdrew from the palace, which had become untenable after the tightening of the siege from all directions.

Military analysts suggest that the army’s control of the palace, followed by the cleansing of the rest of the capital, could accelerate the army’s complete takeover of central Sudan, although this may deepen the divide between the east of the country (the army) and the west (the Rapid Support Forces militia).

Former army chief of staff, General Hashim Abdel Muttalib, confirmed to Al Jazeera Net on March 21 that the army’s recapture of the presidential palace deprived the RSF militia of a goal that held significant symbolic value both domestically and internationally, as it represented sovereignty and governance.

The Rapid Support Forces militia had swiftly seized the palace and much of Khartoum when the war erupted in April 2023. 

However, in recent months, the government forces have steadily advanced toward the palace along the Nile River.

The presidential palace is located on the southern bank of the Blue Nile, at the edge of an area in the heart of the capital that houses numerous government buildings and commercial centers. During the Ottoman era, it was known as Governor’s Palace or “Saray of the Hakimdar.”

Parallel Government

Despite the army’s victory and several significant gains at the expense of the Rapid Support Forces militia, which is gradually retreating to maintain control over western Sudan, media forecasts fear that the situation may ultimately lead to the actual division of the country, particularly with Hemedti being accused of forming a government and presidential council.

"The military victory in Khartoum likely just moves the war into a new chapter, creating a de facto partition of Sudan into military- and RSF-run zones," the Associated Press reported.

This is further reinforced by the refusal of Sovereign Council Chairman and army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to engage in peace talks with the Rapid Support Forces militia, alongside the latter’s determination to continue fighting and establish an independent government separate from Khartoum’s.

Adding to these concerns is the potential division within the Popular Forces alliance, which has been working alongside the army against the Rapid Support Forces militia, as tensions within this military coalition grow.

The army enjoys support from a range of armed factions, including Islamic brigades and historically rival groups, united only by their shared goal of fighting the Rapid Support Forces militia.

With the loss of central Sudan (the presidential palace, ministries, and other key sites), the RSF militia’s influence is now confined to a few areas in the center, while its power continues to grow primarily in western Sudan.

The Rapid Support Forces militia still maintain control over much of western Sudan, particularly the Darfur region.

These militias have strengthened their control in the west, with the Rapid Support Forces militia primarily dominating the Darfur region, where their roots trace back to the formation of the Janjaweed militia.

Hemedti attempted to compensate for his losses in central Khartoum (the presidential palace) by focusing on two fronts. The first was to concentrate on Darfur, aiming to fully capture the region, where he already controls four out of five states and seeks to annex the fifth, North Darfur (al-Fashir). He succeeded in liberating the Malha area.

The Rapid Support Forces militia maintain control over a few areas within Khartoum and neighboring Omdurman, but their presence is primarily concentrated in western Sudan, where they are battling to seize the last military stronghold in al-Fashir, Darfur, while their defeated forces continue to retreat there.

The second front involved a political divide, as Hemedti announced a separate Sovereign Council and new government on the same day he was expelled from the presidential palace.

Mohammed Hassan al-Taishi was appointed head of the Sovereign Council, while Nasr al-Din Abdel Bari became prime minister. 

General Suleiman Sandal was named interior minister, Abdul Wahid al-Nur took over foreign affairs, Osama Saeed was appointed governor of the East, and Abdelaziz al-Hilu was assigned to the Kordofan region.

Sudanese journalist and Hemedti supporter, Abdel Moneim al-Rabee, reported that Hemedti nominated his brother, Abdel-Rahim Daglo, as defense minister and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "in the civilian government expected to be announced in the coming days," with a promotion from "Colonel" to "General."

Despite establishing a parallel government in the areas under his control, it is unlikely that Hemedti’s move will gain widespread international recognition.

The Rapid Support Forces militia and their allies signed a pact in February 2025 in Nairobi, Kenya, to form a parallel government in Sudan.

Meanwhile, al-Burhan has spoken of creating a transitional government, raising the likelihood of two competing governments controlling different parts of Sudan, further entrenching the de facto division of the country.

Emirati Involvement

The consecutive losses suffered by Hemedti’s militia, particularly the loss of central Khartoum, home to the presidential palace and key ministries, represent a defeat for its primary backer, the Abu Dhabi regime, and a blow to the UAE’s project in Sudan, which now appears to be on the verge of collapse.

After the Sudanese army entered the presidential palace and expelled Hemedti's forces, the Sudanese discovered a range of advanced weapons and thanked the UAE for these gifts.

The Rapid Support Forces militia attempted to demonstrate their continued strength by releasing a video in which they claimed to have destroyed a Sukhoi 24 fighter jet at the Wadi Seidna Air Base area in Omdurman, using a strategic drone supplied by the UAE, according to Sudanese journalists.

Sudanese army leaders have repeatedly accused the UAE of being behind Hemedti's militia, with Sudan filing complaints against the country with the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.

Following the liberation of the presidential palace, army chief al-Burhan spoke of "countries and parties supplying the rebels with advanced weapons," adding that "they will be revealed in the future."

In a statement, Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the recapture of the presidential palace as "another nail in the coffin of the external conspiracy against Sudan’s sovereignty, stability, unity, and the dignity of its people," a clear reference to the UAE.

A social media account under the name "Emirati Minister" claims that Palestinian leader and UAE advisor, Mohammed Dahlan, who has been instrumental in the Sudan file and a key link to the Rapid Support Forces militia, received a severe reprimand following the collapse of Hemedti’s militia in Khartoum.

He noted a state of unrest within the ruling palace in Abu Dhabi after the Sudanese army tightened its grip on the presidential palace. 

A sudden meeting was held between UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed and Dahlan, during which Dahlan received a sharp reprimand from bin Zayed himself.

The account also discussed contracting the Canadian lobbying firm Dickens & Madison, which the UAE had previously employed in 2019 to polish Hemedti’s image. 

The firm was tasked with discrediting the Sudanese army’s narrative in the Western media, portraying the conflict as a "complex internal dispute with no external parties involved."

Additionally, efforts were made to improve the UAE's diplomatic image through public relations campaigns, aimed at denying any Emirati involvement in supporting the Rapid Support Forces militia.

Al-Malha 

At the same time the army entered and liberated the presidential palace from the Rapid Support Forces militia, the militia announced its capture of the strategic al-Malha area in North Darfur state.

The significance of al-Malha area lies in its proximity to al-Fashir, the fifth and only Darfur region still under army control, while Hemedti militia’s forces dominate the remaining four regions.

Al-Malha is also under the control of the army and the Joint Forces, which have previously reinforced the city with additional troops. 

The Joint Forces have played a role in alleviating pressure on the area through occasional skirmishes that help to defend it.

As a result, Sudanese analysts believe that the fall of al-Malha would tighten the noose around al-Fashir even further, potentially leading to its capture. This could allow Hemedti to take full control of Darfur, possibly declaring it an independent region or even establishing a government separate from Khartoum.

Since October 2024, clashes have erupted between the Joint Forces allied with the army in Darfur and the Rapid Support Forces militia in al-Malha area of North Darfur, marked by a back-and-forth of advances and retreats.

The army has sought to use this region to keep the Rapid Support Forces militia occupied while attempting to break the siege on al-Fashir, which has been surrounded by the militia since April 2023.