Why Is Chinese Intelligence Intensifying Its Presence in Afghanistan?

9 months ago

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By activating the security partnership, it appears that China aims to shift from investment and economic support to ensuring a long-term presence and increasing security influence in Afghanistan, which is now governed by the Taliban since the withdrawal of foreign forces in August 2021 and the departure of former President Ashraf Ghani’s government officials.

 

Security Presence

To bolster its expansion in Afghanistan following the American withdrawal, the Chinese Communist Party has instructed its intelligence agencies to operate more independently in the country and be willing to reduce reliance on assistance from the Pakistani intelligence agency.

In June 2023, the Chinese Ministry of State Security (Guoanbu) became increasingly active in Kabul, as reported by Intelligence Online on July 13, 2023, citing sources close to the Afghan intelligence agencies.

The Chinese Communist Party seeks to establish direct communication between the Chinese and Afghan intelligence agencies swiftly, with the aim of providing better security for Chinese companies in the region.

Since the return of the Taliban to power, China–Afghanistan relations have been solely managed by the Ministry of State Security.

The Intelligence Online confirms that the ministry primarily relied on Pakistani intelligence agencies, despite being considered less reliable in Beijing.

As a result, the Chinese Ministry of State Security began searching for a more direct way to operate in Afghanistan and relied less on the services of Pakistan’s domestic intelligence agency (ISI) to get information about the situation in Kabul.

The ISI still holds the upper hand in the ever-changing developments of the Afghan landscape.

A source close to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) committee stated to Intelligence Online that Beijing decided to reevaluate its relationship with Afghanistan due to the difficulties encountered in the CPEC project and the accuracy of the information received from Pakistan.

By activating the security partnership, it seems that China aims to shift from mere investment and economic support to ensuring a long-term presence and bolstering its security influence in Afghanistan, which is now under the governance of the Taliban following the withdrawal of foreign forces in August 2021 and the exodus of former President Ashraf Ghani’s government officials.

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a substantial infrastructure project valued at $60 billion, designed to connect Kashgar in Xinjiang Province to the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, spanning 2,000 kilometers.

Linking China and Pakistan, the project is a key component of the Belt and Road Initiative launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, aiming to enhance China’s international trade.

The corridor, initiated in 2015 as an extension of the New Silk Road (Belt and Road’s first phase), includes the construction of roads, railways, and pipelines, along with specific infrastructural and agricultural projects.

Despite Beijing’s claims that the corridor has only yielded modest results so far, it has nevertheless entangled China in an international dispute over implicit recognition of Pakistan’s sovereignty claims over the part of Kashmir it controls—a matter the Chinese Communist Party preferred to avoid.

Following the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, a security vacuum emerged in Central and South Asia, providing new opportunities for regional powers and Afghanistan’s neighbors to devise more effective security strategies that serve their own interests, economic aspirations, and political ambitions.

Since then, the level of security has defined China’s new policy towards the Taliban and its efforts to consolidate its foothold, particularly with regard to investment in areas where Chinese companies find favorable conditions.

Although China has not officially recognized the Taliban government, it is one of the few countries that has maintained full diplomatic presence in Afghanistan.

China recognizes that Afghanistan remains an investment prospect fraught with security risks when initiating certain projects or embarking on large-scale ventures in partnership with the Taliban government.

In this context, Vanda Felbab-Brown, a prominent fellow at the Brookings Institution, a non-profit public policy organization in Washington, states that China still has significant security interests and vulnerabilities in Afghanistan, and its security agenda remains dominant.

She further stated to Voice of America (VOA) on July 14, 2023, that extending the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan is indeed tied to China’s global position and an attempt to separate itself from the United States.

Many observers assert that the competition among major powers could create some obstacles in implementing China’s policy of incorporating Afghanistan into the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.

In this regard, China expert Razan Shawamreh explains to Al-Estiklal that China is the primary challenger to U.S. hegemony at present, and, therefore, it has adopted a policy of filling voids in many regions, including Afghanistan, especially after the U.S. withdrawal.

Beijing’s intensified presence in Kabul is part of its regional expansion, she added.

China’s expansion in the Asian continent is a priority in its foreign policy, and Afghanistan is one of 14 countries bordering China.

Shawamreh continues, stating that China possesses a continental vision manifested in President Xi’s declaration of “Asia for Asians.” As such, China believes that Asians are responsible for their own leadership, free from Western foreign interference.

The document sheds light on China’s belief that it must play a pivotal and influential role in ensuring regional security, as it forms the foundation for the success of the Silk Road, often dubbed the project of the century, which Beijing claims will bring security and prosperity to all inhabitants of the continent.

According to Shawamreh, China has presented numerous initiatives to ensure Afghanistan’s security, the latest being the document titled China’s Position on the Afghan Issue, issued in April 2023.

In the document, China asserts that its strategy in Afghanistan is guided by what it calls the “Three Respects” and “Three Nevers”: No interference in its internal affairs, no pursuit of selfish interests, and no seeking of influence there.

However, it is crucial, as she points out, that “China, as an ascending state, targeting Afghanistan in its most important project (the Silk Road), cannot claim that it does not intend to establish its sphere of influence. The document makes it clear that terrorism is the most pressing concern for Beijing in Kabul, for several reasons.”

Firstly, “Economic Security: Afghanistan is an integral part of the Silk Road, connecting China overland to Iran, making it Beijing’s primary gateway to the Middle East.”

Iran is one of three key stations along the Silk Road in the region, and therefore, the security of Kabul cannot be bypassed, according to Shawamreh.

Secondly, “Energy Security: As of 2023, China remains the world’s largest oil importer. Concerning Kabul, it was the first country to sign an international deal with the Taliban government since its takeover in 2021. On January 5, 2023, an agreement was signed to import oil from northern Afghanistan.

“Thirdly, Chinese Sovereignty: This tops China’s priorities, as it cannot afford to ascend while facing sovereignty crises, such as the attempted secession of some regions.”

In this regard, China believes that it must support Afghanistan in combating terrorism decisively and fighting against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, according to the researcher.

Therefore, Beijing, according to many observers, has three primary security concerns in Kabul: Firstly, the strength of the Taliban government on Afghan soil and ensuring that its borders with Afghanistan are secure.

Secondly, ensuring that the Taliban is willing to reduce the presence of Uyghur Muslims, who are second-generation immigrants who fled China several decades ago and currently reside in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, China aims to protect its current investments and its citizens working in Afghanistan.

The lack of recognition of the Taliban government by any state has been a stumbling block for any country in dealing with the movement. Thus, intelligence cooperation forms a robust foundation in the China–Pakistan relationship.

This was demonstrated by Intelligence Online on April 14, 2022, which mentioned that the Chinese Ministry of State Security called for cooperation between Pakistan and Taliban intelligence agencies due to its concerns about the security situation in Afghanistan.

The report stated that China has been in contact with the Taliban to secure its interests with the help of Pakistani intelligence experts.

A large delegation from the Chinese Ministry of State Security held an unprecedented series of meetings with senior officials of the Taliban intelligence apparatus in Kabul between March 20 and 23, 2022. To facilitate these discussions between Chinese intelligence and the new leadership in Kabul, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was specifically summoned to attend these important meetings.

China also hopes to extract lithium and copper in Afghanistan in the future. However, due to the security situation, these mines have been excluded from its current projects. The facts on the ground indicate that China is interested in investing in Kabul’s natural resources.

 

Fear and Caution

Some observers of Chinese affairs argue that China will not undertake serious long-term investments in Afghanistan unless the Taliban can prove to Beijing that they are reliable partners capable of containing any violence that may arise in the country.

For example, China imports gas from Turkmenistan through four pipelines, three of which pass through Uzbekistan and one through Tajikistan. There is an opportunity for Afghanistan to become part of the fourth pipeline route.

This makes China interested in charting its own intelligence path, as it perceives gaps in Pakistani intelligence that may hinder its investment projects in Afghanistan.

This concern is also reinforced by China’s fear of the potential spread of chaos throughout the wider region, which could threaten the Belt and Road Initiative. This initiative must pass through the highly sensitive Wakhan Corridor in the Badakhshan province of northeastern Afghanistan.

Despite China’s awareness that the Taliban considered it an outcast state, it has moved forward with promising investments in Afghanistan.

During a meeting with Taliban officials in Kabul in July 2023, representatives from the Fan China Afghan Mining Processing and Trading Company (FAMPTC) announced their plan to invest $350 million in various sectors in Afghanistan, including construction, healthcare, and energy.

On January 6, 2023, the Taliban government signed an agreement with a Chinese company for oil extraction in northern Afghanistan. This would mark the first major energy deal between the Taliban and a foreign company, with a duration of 25 years. According to the statement by Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) would be responsible for oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin.

Mujahid also mentioned that the Chinese company would invest $150 million annually in the project, and this investment would increase to $540 million over three years.

It is evident that China cannot hide its concerns despite its ambition to establish a presence and influence in Afghanistan, alongside Russia and Iran.

A UN report released in June 2023 stated that the Taliban still maintains relations with al-Qaeda and other groups, including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, also known as the Islamic Party of Turkestan.

China’s Ministry of State Security has accused the East Turkestan Islamic Movement of orchestrating attacks in China and against Chinese citizens and interests in Pakistan, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

However, former Afghan Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, Hamidullah Farooqi, stated to Voice of America (VOA) on July 14, 2023, that the Taliban tried to reassure China and Pakistan that they can address their security concerns and will not allow any terrorist group to use Afghan soil, nor will any terrorist organization be allowed to exist.

In the context of the joint construction of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to enhance the economic corridor between China and Pakistan, extending into Afghanistan, the three countries held a meeting in Islamabad in July 2023.

In a joint statement issued after the meeting, they reaffirmed their support for Afghanistan to fully utilize its potential as a regional hub of connectivity. They also emphasized their commitment to strengthening trilateral relations.

In April 2023, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that Beijing would provide assistance within its capacity for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.

Chinese companies have shown increasing interest in investing in Afghanistan in recent months.

According to Omar Sadr, an Afghan academic and former professor at the American University in Afghanistan, in an interview with Al Jazeera English on February 27, 2023, China’s engagement with the Taliban is primarily driven by security concerns rather than economic interests.

He continued to say that China’s interest in Afghanistan is rooted in two main factors: preventing the solidification of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and the return of the United States to the region.

Both of these interests have historically underpinned China’s engagement over the past decade, and any form of economic interests will be secondary to the security interest.

On December 13, 2022, members of the Islamic State launched an attack using explosives, grenades, and firearms on the Kabul Intercontinental Hotel, which was frequented by Chinese businessmen, resulting in casualties and injuries.

At that time, the group said in a statement that two of its members detonated two pre-planted explosive bags targeting a gathering of Chinese, while the second targeted the reception area for visitors on the first floor.

However, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid tweeted at the time that all hotel guests were rescued, and no foreigners were killed. Only two foreign guests were injured when they jumped from an upper floor.