'Sadrist Movement': How Iran's Influence in Iraq Faces Critical Challenge

How would Baghdad be affected if Tehran abandoned its support? This question has sparked a heated debate within Iraqi circles, as discussions intensify over an American condition that ties progress in the nuclear file to Iran halting its support for proxy groups in the region.

On March 13, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov revealed that Washington is demanding Tehran cease its backing of certain groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria before a new nuclear deal can be reached, describing these demands as "concerning and disturbing."

But can Iran comply with this new condition that directly threatens its influence in the Middle East? And what are the potential consequences for Iraq if such a scenario unfolds?

Iran's Vulnerability

Regarding Iran’s potential abandonment of its Iraqi militia allies, Foreign Affairs magazine published a report on March 11, discussing Iran’s influence in Iraq and the possibility of Tehran losing a crucial piece of the regional domino.

“Ever since its revolution in 1979, Iran has cultivated a network of proxies and friends throughout the Middle East. For years, this strategy proved successful. Slowly but surely, Tehran’s “axis of resistance” gained influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, where it railed against Israel and the United States,” the magazine reported.

“But events over the past year have upended the regional order. Today, Iran has largely lost control of two of those four Arab capitals. Israel’s war in Lebanon has decimated Hezbollah, the Tehran-backed militant group that dominated Beirut. In December, Turkish-backed Sunni forces wrested control of Damascus from Bashar al-Assad’s regime, an Iranian ally that had controlled Syria for half a century. Now, the Islamic Republic is terrified that another domino might fall.”

“Security forces in Yemen and in Iran itself appear strong and brutal enough to maintain control of their own populations. But Tehran’s lackeys in Iraq are getting nervous. Iran-backed Iraqi militias attacked U.S. forces and Israeli targets regularly throughout 2024, killing three U.S. soldiers in a drone strike in March of that year. But these militias appear to have changed course.”

“They have not launched a strike since early December—a sign that they are growing more fearful of attracting Washington’s attention.”

“Iraq’s politicians also seem more eager than usual to appease the United States. Iraq’s government is led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and his Coordination Framework, a coalition closely allied with Iran.”

“But Sudani’s team made three compromises with U.S. officials in late January: removing an arrest warrant on U.S. President Donald Trump for ordering the killing of terrorists in Baghdad during his last administration; agreeing to release the Princeton researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov, who has been held hostage by Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-backed militia; and passing a vital budget amendment that has long been sought by Iraq’s Kurds, the segment of Iraqi society that has the closest ties to Trump. These compromises indicate that Iran’s allies in Iraq are feeling vulnerable.”

“Washington should take advantage of this moment to permanently reduce the level of Iranian control in Iraq. It should do so not through wide-scale military action but with tough diplomacy, the threat of sanctions, and intelligence operations.” 

According to Foreign Affairs, “Such measures would deprive Iran of a vital source of funding and give the United States leverage in any negotiations with the regime’s leaders. Most importantly, it would lead to better governance for Iraqis, who have suffered for too long under Iran’s thumb.”

“Tehran is desperate to hold on to Iraq, in part because the country is a cash cow for the Islamic Republic. [...] Iran, for example, avoids sanctions by moving its oil into Iraq’s waters so it can be falsely labeled as Iraqi and exported to world markets.”

“Iran-backed militias in Iraq, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah—both designated by the United States as terrorist organizations—outright steal Iraqi oil by pilfering it from wells directly or by creating fake companies that unfairly receive government-subsidized fuel.”

The magazine stressed that "Economically, Iran needs Iraq now more than ever. The Iranian government is under immense financial pressure. The national currency is in freefall, and the price of essential goods is increasing daily."

“Between January 2024 and January 2025, the Iranian rial fell in value by 62 percent and inflation averaged 32 percent. Bilking Iraq is thus one of the only ways that Iran can get enough cash to provide basic services to Iranians. In doing so, Tehran also ensures that much of the cost of its malign activities throughout the Middle East are paid for by Iraqis, not by Iranians.”

“Maintaining control in Iraq is vital to the Iranian regime for symbolic reasons as well. The failure of Iran’s proxies and allies in two Arab countries has made the Islamic Republic seem shaky and has strengthened the morale of the regime’s opposition.”

Iran's Influence

Regarding the potential impact of a reduced Iranian influence or the withdrawal of support for its proxies in Iraq, Iraqi researcher Latif al-Mahdawi argued that "the political reality will certainly be affected. Although these groups have been financially weaned off by Iran for years, the mother’s embrace remains their only refuge from the American father’s grip."

Al-Mahdawi told Al-Estiklal that "Iran may not defend them, but it will remain their closest escape route if they face pressure in Iraq. The Iraqi government, after all, will not arrest them or hold them accountable for the crimes they have committed."

"The absence of Iranian support will lead to a decline in the influence of its political and security allies in Iraq. These groups are the creation of Tehran, which has supported them and allowed them to dominate both the Iraqi state and its power structures."

"The feeling of losing their last stronghold would deal a heavy blow to their morale, leaving them vulnerable to a popular uprising. They will not withstand for long against the will of the people who rejected them during the 2019 protests. However, Iran's intervention and the support of its allies led to the suppression of those protests, resulting in the deaths of nearly 800 demonstrators," he continued.

Iraqi researcher on Middle Eastern affairs, Shaimaa Abdelhamid, argued that "despite the challenges facing Iran's regional influence in Iraq, it is unlikely that Baghdad will free itself from Iranian control in the near future."

"Tehran's influence in the Iraqi arena is rooted in an ideological, sectarian, and military foundation, embodied in the armed factions loyal to it."

"Iran's insistence on maintaining the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which are a key element in Tehran's strategy to establish a foothold in Iraq, serving as its most important ally in countering U.S. and Israeli influence in the region."

"Thus, Iran shows strong determination to retain them, urging the Iraqi government to protect this force and not to squander its political and military gains," she continued.

According to the researcher, this was evident during Prime Minister al-Sudani's visit to Tehran on January 8, where he met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. 

Khamenei called for the preservation and further strengthening of the Popular Mobilization Forces, as well as the termination of the U.S. presence in Iraq, describing it as "illegal and against the interests of the Iraqi people and government."

According to the researcher, Khamenei's call suggests that “Tehran is attempting to preserve what remains of its proxies in the region by urging the Iraqi government to keep the PMF intact without dismantling it.”

‘Sadrist Movement’

While some speculate that the role of Iran's allies will diminish if Tehran abandons them, attention is turning to “the Sadrist movement,” led by Muqtada al-Sadr, as a potential alternative in Iraq's future, given that it often operates outside of Iran's orbit.

In this regard, political analyst and Sadrist ally Rafed al-Atwany notes that "the divisions within the Coordination Framework (the ruling coalition) and its declining popularity on the streets might lead Iran to allow al-Sadr the space to become an alternative in forming the next government."

"Iran wants to maintain its influence in Iraq and fears the loss of the Coordination Framework and its detachment from power, similar to what happened with Hezbollah in Lebanon," Al-Atwany added in a television interview.

As a result, the opportunity may arise for “the Sadrist Movement” to become a potential alternative in forming the next Iraqi government.

In a new development, al-Sadr urged his followers in February 2025 to update their voter registrations, emphasizing that "it is an absolute necessity." 

This came after his decision in June 2022 to withdraw completely from the political process in Iraq and refrain from participating in any upcoming elections.

At the time, al-Sadr justified his withdrawal by expressing his unwillingness to collaborate with "corrupt" politicians, following his call for the resignation of his parliamentary bloc, which consisted of 73 members.

This came after the Sadrist movement failed to form a political majority government with Sunni and Kurdish forces following the 2021 elections.

Al-Sadr stated that updating the voter registry would be "beneficial to you whether you participate in the elections or boycott them, so please pay attention to this," ahead of the scheduled parliamentary elections in November 2025.

Iran is accused of being behind the dismantling of the tripartite alliance formed by al-Sadr with Sunni and Kurdish allies, and of sabotaging his efforts to form a political majority government independent of the Shiite Coordination Framework, its key ally.

Al-Sadr rejects the idea of forming a government with the Shiite Coordination Framework, which he blames for fostering financial corruption, deteriorating public services, and mismanaging the country since the U.S. invasion in 2003.