Iran at Crossroads: Inspections, Military Tensions, and Economic Sanctions

With the UN Security Council’s approval on September 19, 2025, to reimpose sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, urgent questions have arisen about why Tehran has been unable to reach agreements that would prevent the return of these measures.

Iran rejected key conditions set by the E3 group—Germany, France, and the UK—including resuming negotiations with Washington on its nuclear program, allowing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors access to its nuclear sites, and clarifying the fate of more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.

On August 28, 2025, the E3 invoked the so-called snapback mechanism under the 2015 nuclear deal, formally notifying the Security Council that sanctions would be automatically reinstated within 30 days if Iran did not comply.

The snapback mechanism, part of the 2015 agreement, allows member states to trigger the automatic reimposition of all previous UN sanctions if Iran is found to be in breach of its obligations.

Iraq Scenario

Amid Western demands, Iran has been seeking guarantees that its nuclear sites will not be targeted and that sanctions will begin to be lifted—requests that Washington and European powers have largely ignored.

In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran has presented an innovative, fair, and balanced proposal that addresses real concerns and benefits both sides. Turning this idea into practical action could happen quickly and set clear goals to avoid a crisis.

“On behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I yesterday presented a reasonable and actionable plan to E3/EU counterparts to avert an unnecessary and avoidable crisis in the coming days,” he posted on X.

“There is a way forward, but Iran cannot be the sole responsible actor.”

Iran had submitted a proposal, revealed by Wall Street Journal (WSJ) correspondent Laurence Norman, offering to address its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, approaching weapons-grade, and gradually reduce it to 20%.

Tehran had expected the United States to lift some sanctions and the UN Security Council to first extend, then cancel, the snapback mechanism allowing penalties on Iran.

According to WSJ, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi raised the offer during phone calls with European counterparts and expressed willingness to meet with U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff to demonstrate Iran’s seriousness.

At the same time, Iran demanded U.S. guarantees against new attacks on its nuclear sites, similar to the joint Washington-Tel Aviv aggression in June 2025.

The proposal called for first reclaiming the full 60% enriched uranium stockpile before starting the down-blending process. However, the fate of roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium remains unclear. Iran claims the material was buried under rubble following U.S. strikes on three nuclear sites on June 21. Experts warned that recovering these stocks could increase the risk of another military attack.

On September 19, Iranian politician Mohammad Saleh Sedghian cited unofficial sources saying Iran’s proposal also included “eliminating highly enriched uranium.” 

“The Cairo Agreement will serve as the basis for cooperation with the IAEA. After that, negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program can proceed.”

Earlier, on September 9, Cairo hosted a meeting between Araghchi and IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi, resulting in an agreement granting inspectors free access to Iran’s nuclear facilities, though its implementation later sparked controversy.

Commenting on Tehran’s proposals, international affairs analyst Adel al-Shajiri said the Iranian government fears the inspections themselves, recalling what happened in Iraq before 2003, which ultimately led to its occupation and the overthrow of its government under the pretext of WMDs.

“Any concession by Iran on its nuclear program would be a literal surrender, as it represents the last line of defense they can use to negotiate with the West and push for sanctions relief,” he told Al-Estiklal.

Al-Shajiri believes that Iran’s refusal to make significant concessions and its tight control over IAEA access is a tactic to buy time and eventually negotiate smaller compromises rather than abandon its nuclear program entirely.

The Cairo Agreement

A day after the Cairo meeting, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi clarified that IAEA inspectors’ access to the country’s nuclear facilities would be limited.

He emphasized that Tehran would not allow inspectors to enter any site except the Bushehr nuclear power plant in the south, according to IRNA.

Araghchi’s statements differ from Grossi’s brief remarks on the agreement, which outlined a mechanism for resuming inspections at specific sites, including those targeted in the U.S. and Israeli aggression on June 21.

Despite this, Grossi described the Cairo Agreement as an important step forward, establishing procedures for inspecting Iran’s nuclear facilities and notifying the IAEA of planned visits.

He added that the agreement also includes Tehran’s commitment to report on its enriched uranium stockpiles, according to Reuters.

On September 14, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council said the latest agreement with the IAEA “generally” aligns with the text approved by the council’s nuclear committee.

The council noted that implementation is subject to its final approval, adding that reports on facilities targeted by the U.S. and the Israeli Occupation will only proceed once security conditions are ensured and approved. Any “hostile action,” such as triggering the snapback mechanism, would halt cooperation.

This announcement comes amid ongoing uncertainty over the contents of the new Cairo agreement, fueling widespread speculation and criticism inside Iran about its details.

Slim Chance

Commenting on Tehran’s inability to reach an agreement that would prevent international sanctions, former Iranian diplomat Fereydoun Majlesi told the reformist newspaper Setareh Sobh on September 21 that Iran’s chances of stopping the activation of the snapback mechanism are slim.

Majlesi attributed this to “provocative rhetoric and threats from certain officials inside and outside parliament against the U.S., Europe, and Israel, including threats to close the Strait of Hormuz,” warning that such tensions increase the risk of war and regional alignments against Iran.

“Continuing these threats opens the door for the snapback mechanism and makes Iran vulnerable to preemptive responses, especially from Israel, which could strike if it feels threatened,” he said.

Meanwhile, international affairs expert Mahmoud Abbaszadeh-Meshkini said that the Security Council’s refusal to lift sanctions on Iran reflects the nature of the post-World War II international order, designed to legitimize Western unilateral dominance.

In an article for the economic newspaper Tejarat on September 21, Meshkini said Western pressure, including the snapback mechanism, ultimately aims to place Iran’s nuclear dossier under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing coercive international measures in preparation for any potential attack.

Political commentator Salahuddin Khadiv warned that codifying the sanctions framework could give the Israeli Occupation a pretext for “a new military adventure” against Tehran. Writing on his Telegram channel on September 18, Khadiv noted that the threat grows because the Trump administration was a primary supporter of the Israeli government in its ongoing wars, including the Gaza aggression.

Khadiv questioned why Iran had not taken meaningful steps to prevent the snapback, while noting that the European Troika’s main condition to halt it is to revive negotiations with the U.S. unconditionally and quickly. He added that given Washington’s agenda, Iran has little room to make concessions on enrichment.

He further noted that the White House is keeping a tight watch on Iran’s missiles, leaving Tehran little to gain and plenty of reason to hold its cards close.