What's Behind the Resurgence of 'Union of Arab Tribes' in Egypt?

It was a surprising development that the Union of Arab Tribes took on the responsibility of organizing a celebration for the anniversary of the October War victory in 1973, inviting Head of the Egyptian regime Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to attend.

The Union is headed by the controversial Sinai businessman Ibrahim al-Arjani, who is 50 years old, and was launched in early May 2024. 

The event was referred to as the "Ceremony of Setbacks," as Sisi invoked the defeat of June 1967 rather than discussing the triumph of October.

The gathering's purpose was evident as it aimed to showcase popular support for Sisi through the Union, which mobilized citizens using 50 buses, along with meals and cash incentives.

The celebration of the October War victory in 1973 seemed like a second inauguration, a revival of the ‘Union of Arab Tribes and Egyptian Families’, following several months of obscurity.

Historically, it has been uncommon for civil associations or NGOs to organize large public celebrations attended by tens of thousands of Egyptians to mark the October 6 victories from over 51 years ago. 

Such events have traditionally fallen under the responsibility of state institutions and the armed forces.

Thus, many Egyptian politicians and analysts interpreted the Union’s ability to arrange such a celebration—and Sisi's attendance—as a significant indicator of its esteemed status within the regime, effectively granting it official validation of its legitimacy.

Tribal Influence Returns

Estimates from various political factions suggest that the resurgence of Ibrahim al-Arjani and the Union of Tribes may be linked to the regime's attempts to overcome the weakness of civilian parties established by military generals to support its authority.

This strategy, however, has largely failed. In particular, the Nation’s Future Party, often regarded as the ruling party, has struggled to fully consolidate power, leaving room for alternative political forces to rise.

It appears that Head of the Egyptian regime Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is endeavoring to forge a new and genuine support for his regime that seems to arise organically from the populace. 

However, relying on a union rooted in tribal affiliations and influential families to bridge a significant gap may be a losing proposition, especially given al-Arjani’s tarnished reputation and Egypt's historical detachment from tribalism.

In the lead-up to the October 26, 2024 celebration organized by the Union of Tribes, al-Arjani announced the appointments of former Minister of Housing Assem al-Gazzar as Secretary General of the Union and former Minister of Agriculture el-Sayed el-Quseir as Deputy Secretary General.

The inclusion of these two former ministers within the Union of Tribes indicates a political dimension to its role, suggesting a coordination and partnership between the Union and the Egyptian authorities.

The Union reappeared after a mysterious absence, amid speculation about the military's dissatisfaction with its role. 

It was seen as competing with the military establishment through its militia, raising concerns that it could divide Egypt into tribes and families.

Sisi’s invitation for the October Victory celebration raised questions about the revival of the Union of Arab Tribes, which had been out of the spotlight for some time.

This resurgence seems to have occurred despite concerns from military and governmental authorities regarding its expansion beyond Sinai to the capital and other provinces.

The Union of Arab Tribes resurfaced after the ousting of Sisi's right-hand man, former intelligence chief Abbas Kamel, and a shake-up in the military leadership, including the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff.

Does this signal an underlying conflict between the military or sovereign entities and Sisi over the establishment of the Union of Tribes, which may have led to al-Arjani's absence and the Union's dormancy? 

Their return coincides with the absence of the leaders of these sovereign institutions that opposed al-Arjani's influence and the Union's expansion.

Alternatively, has Sisi decided to leverage the Union to construct a new popular base, distancing himself from the ineffective "cartoonish generals' parties" that emerged after the 2013 coup, which ultimately failed to cultivate genuine support for his presidency?

In this scenario, the Union of Tribes could serve as Sisi's new popular backing, gathering support for his regime apart from his traditional allies—the Egyptian church and certain beneficiaries of the system, along with military and police forces, whose reputations have taken a hit.

A previous report stated by Al-Estiklal indicated that the Union of Tribes, likened to "Sisi's militia," sparked tensions within the factions of the Egyptian regime, particularly after a spokesperson for the Union, Mostafa Bakry, referred to it as "a faction of the army," angering military leaders.

Additional questions arise regarding the Union's resurgence, including speculation that al-Arjani is being positioned to resemble Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces militia leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo known as Hemedti.

Al-Arjani, along with the controversial businessman Sabri Nakhnoukh, is poised to bolster Sisi’s rule through militia power in the event of an uprising against him. 

This strategic positioning is particularly crucial given the fears surrounding economic decline and rising prices, which could ignite public discontent. 

These concerns are heightened by recent lessons learned from Hemedti’s failed confrontation with the military and the subsequent fragmentation of the state, underscoring the need for a robust support mechanism to maintain stability.

Notably, the Union of Sinai Tribes previously circulated an image of the Egyptian flag split in two: one half featuring the traditional Egyptian flag with the golden eagle of Salah al-Din at its center, while the other half displayed the Union’s emblem.

State Disintegration

Due to the role played by al-Arjani and the tribes in Sinai alongside the military, which armed them under false pretenses to confront ISIS, his influence grew, leading to the emergence of armed militias called “the Knights of al-Haitham,” which began to compete with the military establishment.

As the influence of the Sinai Province of ISIS waned, al-Arjani's role shifted from a military to an economic one. 

He became responsible for the “military business” in Sinai, managing contracts and sharing profits with the military establishment, as he implicitly admitted in previous interviews with foreign newspapers.

Al-Arjani thus evolved into a political figure and leader, drawing comparisons from politicians and analysts to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces militia leader, Hemedti. 

Speculation arose that he might challenge the military’s role and aspire to succeed Head of the Egyptian regime Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

What began as influence limited to Sinai has expanded to the capital and other Egyptian provinces with the announcement of the establishment of the Union of Arab Tribes in early May 2024. 

This Union appeared to be a substitute for the Egyptian government in addressing both domestic and foreign issues, such as the Palestinian cause.

The expansion of this new entity from Sinai to the Delta, Upper Egypt, and the Canal Cities, along with Ibrahim al-Arjani's growing influence—culminating in the Union's declaration that it will work toward establishing a Palestinian state—has sparked a wave of criticism, as it increasingly appears to be a competitor to the Egyptian state and military.

According to Al-Estiklal, Egyptians are grappling with fundamental questions about the legal status of the Union. 

“Is it a political party or a civil society association? Does the constitution allow for the tribal division of citizens?”

“What connection does the Union of Arab Tribes have with the foreign policies of the Egyptian state to the extent that it claims a role in shaping the future of Palestine?” 

“And how does this Union, which professes to protect Palestine, justify hosting an extravagant celebration that costs the public significant sums of money, all while turning a blind eye to the atrocities occurring in Gaza and Lebanon?” 

Moreover, since the onset of the Israeli war on Gaza more than a year ago, al-Arjani's name and his company Hala have emerged prominently, particularly in discussions surrounding the movement of Palestinians out of the enclave.

Al-Arjani, who owns a wide range of construction, real estate, and security firms, has imposed exorbitant fees on anyone wishing to exit Gaza—up to $5,000 per person—prior to the complete closure of the Rafah crossing following its invasion by Israeli Occupation Forces.

He is one of the few Egyptian businessmen licensed to export goods from Egypt to Gaza, and he is a leading figure in the Tarabin tribe in Sinai. 

Al-Arjani was once an adversary of the military before being granted significant influence.

About 15 years ago, al-Arjani was serving a prison sentence for the kidnapping of dozens of police officers and soldiers following the killing of his brother by an officer at a checkpoint in the Sinai Peninsula. 

He was released after approximately two years.

Political figure Yahya el-Kazzaz questioned if the Union of Arab Tribes serves as an alternative to the Egyptian state, and whether its leader is a substitute for the current president. 

He described the Union's celebration of the October 1973 victory as "a celebration of the disintegration of the Egyptian state into warring Arab tribes and families."

El-Kazzaz called for the dismantling of this Union, arguing that it threatened to destroy the Egyptian state, suggesting that if left unchecked, Sisi would bear the responsibility for fragmenting the nation into feuding tribes.

Support or Protection?

The intent behind the celebration organized by the Union is underscored by al-Arjani's assertion that it was established to unite all Arab tribes in Egypt under one entity that stands behind the political leadership.

As reported by al-Arabiya on October 27, 2024, al-Arjani mentioned that the Union "seeks to be a significant player on the national stage, without intending to replace the existing political parties."

Al-Arjani stated that the Union aligns itself with the military and endorses the actions taken by the leadership and armed forces to protect both Egyptian and Arab national security.

This statement appears to be an attempt to rectify a previous mistake that angered the military establishment and contributed to the Union's disappearance after its launch, when the Union’s spokesperson Mostafa Bakry referred to it as "a faction of the army." 

The decision to organize a dialogue with al-Arjani seems aimed at addressing the considerable controversy surrounding the Union’s role, the many questions regarding its nature, and whether it has morphed into a militia, as well as the rationale behind appointing a strongman from Sinai to lead it.

The Emirati site al-Arab drew a connection between the timing of the celebration organized by the Union of Arab Tribes and the internal discontent in Egypt, sparked by decisions to raise fuel prices and cost of living.

Al-Arjani noted the emergence of a dominant political narrative indicating that the silent majority, which has consistently supported Egypt's ruling system since 2014, endorses the current direction and acknowledges the necessity of advancing economic reforms.

However, political estimates from Egyptian opponents suggest that the timing of the celebration—coinciding with the third fuel price increase of 2024, along with escalating public discontent—signals an effort by Sisi’s regime to showcase the existence of popular support, even amid widespread frustration over inflation and impoverishment.

The resurgence of the Union of Tribes through this grand celebration carries a crucial message: it is positioned as a safeguard for the regime, though it is presented as a display of popular support.

Supporting this assessment is Sisi’s demeanor during the event, which appeared anxious and troubled, as he compared the current climate in Egypt to the atmosphere following the 1967 defeat.

It has been reported to Al-Estiklal that a former sovereign official suggested that security reports had reached Sisi, warning of expanding public anger due to the consecutive fuel price hikes and the subsequent rise in commodity prices.

It is believed this might explain Sisi's remarks on October 20, 2024, when he called for a review of the situation with the International Monetary Fund, should his economic reform program place unbearable pressure on the populace.

Journalist Qutb al-Arabi argued that the formation of this Union is intended to generate a grassroots support base capable of mobilization—something that political parties have struggled to accomplish. 

Al-Arabi noted that the true measure of this initiative will be its ability to rally support for the October Victory celebration.

In an article for Arabi 21 on October 27, 2024, Qutb al-Arabi elaborated that the goal is to showcase a massive popular mobilization representing a grassroots support system for Sisi, whose popular backing has gradually eroded over the years.

Al Arabi noted that Sisi's support base following the July 2013 coup had devolved into three categories of Egyptians:

First, some segments of the populace who were lured by his promises, fell for his deceptions, and underwent intensive media indoctrination. 

These groups became restless as Sisi’s pledges of prosperity evaporated, leaving them facing rampant inflation and depleted savings.

The second group included political forces, cultural elites, activists, and rights advocates who opposed the Muslim Brotherhood during their rule. 

This group grew disillusioned with the prospect of returning to civilian governance, which they expected to lead, especially following Sisi’s concessions over the Tiran and Sanafir islands and his failure in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam crisis, compounded by widespread arrests within their ranks.

The third category consisted of sectarians who harbored an unfounded fear for their beliefs and practices under the Brotherhood's rule, disseminating these anxieties within their communities. 

The third category primarily represented the Christian community, largely expressed through the church, which remained supportive of the regime despite ongoing fears; however, their resolve was not as steadfast as it once was, especially with the emergence of new voices opposing the government on political grounds.

Amid this continuous erosion of the regime’s support base, Sisi sought ways to rejuvenate it, steering clear of the parties formed in the offices of security agencies, which competed for greater slices of power alongside him.

In response, Sisi established a non-partisan popular formation—the Union of Arab Tribes and Egyptian Families—claiming it represented all Egyptians.

Qutb al-Arabi argued that Sisi's endorsement of this mobilization, while refusing to permit any other protests amid hundreds, if not thousands, of detainees on protest-related charges, was intended to project an image of substantial popular support for him.