Turkiye and Iran: Shifting Alliances in Post-Assad Syria

Iran fears Turkiye may encircle it in the Caucasus and Iraq after the fall of al-Assad's regime.
Following the fall of the Syrian regime on December 8, 2024, much of the analysis has focused on the future of relations between the key players who intervened in the Syrian conflict, whether in support of the opposition or the regime.
An Italian Institute of International Relations has argued that the collapse of al-Assad’s authoritarian regime, which ruled Syria with an iron fist for over fifty years, represents "a defeat for Russia and Iran and a victory for Turkiye."
Amid shifting interests in Syria and the downfall of the brutal regime, the Italian Institute of International Relations raises the question of whether the future of Turkish-Iranian relations will see dialogue or conflict.

Turkish Victory
The Italian Institute pointed out that Russia and Iran were the main supporters of the ousted Assad's regime, driven by the need to protect their respective interests in Syria.
It explains that Russian influence in Damascus “meant having an outlet on the Mediterranean Sea, therefore on a warm sea, a missing element of Russian geography.”
The Institute adds that Russia’s intervention in Syria allowed the Kremlin "the possibility of becoming a crucial actor in an area outside the post-Soviet space," viewing it also as a form of "revenge" for its defeat in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, Syria hosts two Russian military bases: “Khmeimim airport and the port of Tartus.”
Iran’s interest, on the other hand, stems from the need to gain influence in Syria to "contain both Israel and the United States in the Middle East," according to the institute’s analysis.
It attributes their defeat in Syria to the strain their forces have endured, particularly Russia's ongoing conflict in Ukraine and Iran's continuous support for Hezbollah in its fight against Israeli occupation in recent months.
The report also notes that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerges as “the big winner of Assad’s defeat”, explaining that Turkiye’s primary goal remains to weaken the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which it views as a direct threat to its national security, especially since it considers them an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
The report also highlighted another pressing issue for Ankara: the Syrian refugee crisis, with “about 4 million Syrians in Turkiye.”
“This presence, coupled with concerns about rising inflation, was one of the hottest debate points in the election campaign of the 2024 elections.”
“The fall of the Damascus regime has already prompted many Syrians to return home.”
According to the institute, Erdogan's main hope is for a large-scale return of refugees, a move that could bolster his political position, particularly in the context of a proposed new constitution that would allow him to extend his presidency.

The Italian Institute of International Relations argues that the Syrian conflict has become “a battleground for two regional powers: Turkiye and Iran.”
“The two countries have been raping since the early ’1900s, in the face of the victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) victory in 2003, when it was clear that Turkey would attempt to abandon the laity path.”
“Iran also showed great support for Erdogan on the occasion of the failed 2016 coup.”
“Despite this, in Syria their interests are opposed, but a path of dialogue was kept open thanks to the Astana Trial, a series of negotiations, which began in 2016, during which the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran and Russia met in the capital of Kazakhstan, to discuss possible solutions to the conflict in Syria.”
“Most likely the three countries, which have paid some attention to maintaining good relations despite the different interests in Syria, will continue to maintain dialogue.”
“Erdogan will probably want to give the chance to both Russia and Iran to maintain its own position in Syria, as long as this does not harm its interests.”
The report speculated that Erdogan “could allow Russia to continue to use its bases on Syrian territory, although, at that point, it would serve more as Russia’s logistics to Africa. Ankara and Moscow are also linked by numerous economic projects, including the Turkstream pipeline.”
Recent remarks by Erdogan on Putin's leadership appear to confirm this trajectory, according to the Italian institute.
“Now, there are only two [experienced] leaders in the world. They are myself and Vladimir Putin. I am not saying this because one of them is me. But I have been in office for 22 years, nearly as long as Mr. Putin. The rest are gone. And we want our dialogue to continue,” Erdogan stated.
Ongoing Dialogue
For Iran, the Institute explained that "losing Syria means losing its logistical connection with the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon, therefore, now has the task of redesigning its regional strategy."
In this context, the analyst raised the question of whether Iran will enter into a confrontation with Turkiye or attempt to negotiate with Ankara to carve out its own space in the new geopolitical landscape.
According to the Institute, “The problem is even wider than the Syrian scenario alone: Iran fears that Turkey may surround the Islamic Republic through its settlements in the Caucasus and Iraq.”
“The two great variables at stake are the position of the two countries towards Israel and Tehran’s likely unwillingness to open a new front of conflict.”
“Turkiye maintains an ambiguous stance on Israel, but statements against Netanyahu’s actions in Gaza suggest at least ideological positioning against the Jewish state.”
Furthermore, the Institute suggests that "the Islamic Republic would also not have the strength and clarity of the conflict at this time. It will most likely take time to redesign your strategy in the area."
It also predicts that "Iran could also benefit from it, given the partnership with Moscow. Much will depend on the structure of the new Syria after the fall of the regime, an element that makes Iran’s (momentary) wait for an attitude of Isher”.
Meanwhile, Turkiye “will try to strengthen its position, while Moscow will still try to find its own space.”
“both Turkiye and Russia can serve to get out of economic isolation, another reason that suggests a continuation of the dialogue that has laboriously established in the Astana Process,” the Institute concludes.