Key Scenarios: Palestinian Division Complicates Gaza's Future After the War

The Israeli Institute for National Security Studies published a paper discussing the fate of the current war on the Gaza Strip, which has been ongoing since October 7, 2023.

The institute pointed to the ongoing dispute between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the Palestinian National Liberation Movement Fatah amid the exclusion of the possibility of reconciliation between the two sides.

It also touched upon the idea that there is no Arab or international force willing to engage in governing the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war.

In these circumstances, the security institute wonders if this could be a factor pushing "[Israel] toward establishing a temporary military administration in Gaza."

Undemocratic Step

In the view of the Israeli institute, head of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas's decision to appoint Mohammad Mustafa as the new prime minister after accepting the resignation of Mohammad Shtayyeh was not surprising.

In the end, Mohammad Mustafa is nothing but a similar version of Mohammad Shtayyeh, as Abbas replaced one colleague with another.

To illustrate the similarities between the two personalities, the institute notes that both are members of the Fatah movement.

It is worth mentioning that Mohammad Mustafa is a member of the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization and an economic advisor to Abbas.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian public views Mustafa as implicated in facilitating economic corruption for Abbas and his family at the expense of the people and their economy.

Meanwhile, the security institute highlights that Mustafa is accepted by Abbas's inner circle and senior Fatah officials, including foreign leaders who arrived in the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the Oslo Accords (1993).

In contrast, Mustafa's appointment angered Hamas and other Palestinian organizations.

In this regard, it is stated that Hamas's opposition to the appointment, on the pretext that it is an undemocratic step, led to a particularly harsh reaction from Fatah, which included accusing the (Islamic) movement and holding it responsible for the war in Gaza.

It described it as an Iranian envoy who caused the worst catastrophe for the Palestinian people worse than it was in 1948.

In this context, the institute explains that the competition between Fatah and Hamas, which has fundamental ideological roots, revolves around the leadership of the Palestinian national struggle.

"Currently, what Hamas views as the national war of liberation on a historic scale, comparable to Salah al-Din's victory over the Crusaders, Fatah as a national catastrophe worse than the Nakba in 1948," the institute writes.

Hamas is doing its utmost to maintain its civilian control over Gaza, even in areas occupied by the Israeli army and already cleansed in the north of the strip, while Fatah is trying to convince the international community and local residents that it is the alternative after the war, the same paper said.

A Large Gap

In these circumstances, it is difficult to see reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, as affirmed by the Israeli Institute for Security Studies.

The institute describes the efforts of discord and reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas as a recurring theme since Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007.

It added: "Nevertheless, in the meantime, Abbas expects a unilateral declaration from Hamas to relinquish power in the Gaza Strip and agree to the entry of the technocratic Palestinian unity government without condition."

In this context, the institute goes on to state that "the current crisis and divide between the two sides are even more significant due to the efforts of the Americans and the Palestinian Authority, supported by some part of the Israeli defense establishment, to restore the PA to manage the civilian and security affairs in Gaza and to lead its reconstruction."

In this context, Majed Faraj, head of the General Intelligence Service and the closest security advisor to Abbas, is mentioned as a person who could lead this mission.

It is worth noting that Faraj enjoys the trust of both Abbas and the U.S. administration, as appreciated by the Israeli security establishment.

Among other things, the institute mentions another proposal; namely, the training of about 7,000 Fatah members in the Gaza Strip militarily by U.S. forces in Jordan, before returning them as security and police forces to the Strip under Faraj's leadership.

Regarding these proposals, the question arises: "What convinces those who support the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza that this is a practical idea, especially given that the public legitimacy of the PA and Abbas is deeply lacking"?

The institute pointed out that the Palestinian public sees the Palestinian Authority as a "burden" and has been calling for Abbas "to resign" for some time.

With reference to the growing rift between Fatah and Hamas, the institute points out the announcements by Hamas leaders that "the organization is not interested in returning to rule Gaza" and that it "is ready to let the Palestinian Authority manage the civilian affairs, but demand coordination between the PA and themselves."

The institute added that Husam Badran, a member of Hamas's political bureau and responsible for relations with Fatah, announced at a conference of all Palestinian organizations held in Moscow on February 26, 2024, that "Hamas agreed to the establishment of a technocratic government with the PLO as its source of authority."

Badran also mentioned that "Hamas was ready for the PA's entry with no preconditions and to accept the PLO's plan for a political solution to the conflict with Israel according to UN resolutions."

However, from the institute's point of view, these declarations "do not provide evidence that Hamas would be willing to hand over its weapons and make its military force subordinate to the security mechanisms of the Palestinian Authority."

It recommends dealing with these statements similarly to what happened after Hamas's announcement of the political document in May 2017, which appeared to be somewhat pragmatic but did not change Hamas's ultimate goal or vision in dealing with "Israel."

It emphasized that "For Hamas, maintaining its military force is crucial and necessary for action, following the Hezbollah model."

Returning to Hamas's statements regarding the technocratic government, the institute suggests that it means that "the Palestinian Authority would manage civil matters in Gaza, but ultimate control would remain subordinate to Hamas's armed forces."

Ineffective Leadership

Returning to the topic of Mohammad Mustafa once again, the Israeli institute states that his appointment "as prime minister is merely a smokescreen and does not represent any genuine desire for meaningful reforms in the Palestinian Authority."

The institute notes that "Abbas and his associates have no interest in reforms and certainly not in elections that could remove them from positions of control and influence."

In its view, the "organizational culture essentially replicates the revolutionary culture of the PLO and its patterns of action over the years."

According to the institute, the current leadership "is not capable of bringing about any profound change within the PA, as it would require a complete change of leadership and an admission of the failure of their previous approach."

In this context, the institute points out that "Majid Faraj, despite being considered professional, businesslike, and relatively removed from political activity, is also incapable of effectively addressing the security challenges in the areas under the PA's responsibility in the West Bank."

Without the Israeli military's activity in the heart of Palestinian cities and refugee camps, the institute asserts that "Hamas would already have completed taking control over the PA."

Therefore, the institute wonders, "It is unclear how someone who was unsuccessful in a less complex mission in the West Bank would be able to manage to establish security and civilian control in the unique and complex conditions of the Gaza Strip, particularly during times of war and its aftermath."

Temporary Military Government

Ultimately, according to the institute's claim, "No Arab, international or Israeli entity will be willing to invest in the reconstruction of Gaza as long as Hamas maintains any control."

The institute emphasizes that "Israel is being pushed toward establishing a temporary military administration in Gaza. This is because there are no viable alternatives."

Moreover, in the absence of a governing alternative to Hamas, the institute says that "the population will continue to believe in the possibility of [Hamas's] survival and continued rule," encouraging its leadership "to regain civilian and military control even in areas captured by Israel."

Therefore, it believes that "Israel should now announce the formation of a temporary military administration in the northern Gaza Strip, where there are relatively few residents and weakened Hamas infrastructures," according to its assessment.

The institute concludes by explaining that:

1. Ensure that humanitarian aid reaches the intended recipients, while bypassing Hamas, and minimizing chaos and harm to civilians;
2. Send clear messages to the Hamas leadership and the Palestinian people that Hamas is no longer a viable option. This could weaken any popular support for the organization;
3. Lay the groundwork for the entry of an international or regional task force or a combination of the two, to assume authority over the management of the area and its population. This force could also be responsible for facilitating the rehabilitation and training of a local cadre in preparation for future Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip.