How Is Hezbollah Coping with the Cutoff of Iran’s Funds via Syria and Beirut Airport?

Hezbollah is actively seeking new avenues to keep its financial lifeline open after facing intensified monitoring and restrictions on its foreign funding, particularly from Iran. The group’s weakened position following its support for Gaza against the Israeli Occupation has further strained its Iranian financial backing, which Hezbollah openly acknowledges.

Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader—assassinated by “Israel” on September 27, 2024—had explicitly stated on June 24, 2016, that “the party’s budget, salaries, expenses, food, drink, weapons, and missiles all come from Iran.”

A second major blow came with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, which had provided Hezbollah with multiple financial supply routes.

Notably, even the Lebanese government has begun restricting Hezbollah’s cash flow, recently blocking funds from entering via Beirut International Airport.

Cash Seizure

Lebanese authorities announced Friday that officials at Beirut Airport had intercepted $2.5 million in cash carried by a passenger arriving from Turkiye, with reports suggesting the funds were destined for Hezbollah.

Judicial authorities have launched an investigation into the detained individual, Mohammad Arif Hussein, who was apprehended upon arrival on a Pegasus Airlines flight from Turkiye.

Three days later, the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council unexpectedly claimed ownership of the seized money, stating that the $2.5 million was a donation from foreign organizations and demanded its release.

In an official letter to Lebanon’s top prosecutor, Judge Jamal Hajjar, the council insisted that the confiscated funds belonged to them and should be returned, framing them as legitimate charitable contributions from international organizations.

According to Janoubia, the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council’s request to Lebanon’s top prosecutor, Judge Jamal Hajjar, for the release of the confiscated funds is unlawful.

The report argued that “as long as the money was smuggled through the airport and did not enter the country through legal channels, it cannot be considered legitimate. This effectively turns the council into a money-laundering institution.”

It further noted that the council “is not a commercial company, a civic organization, or a charitable institution. It is an official Lebanese body under the Council of Ministers, with its head and staff receiving salaries from the Lebanese treasury, funded by taxpayers—both Shiite and non-Shiite.”

Established in 1969, the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council is Lebanon’s first official Shiite institution. However, many Lebanese Shiites view it as a body controlled by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, as lawmakers from both groups in parliament are also members of the council’s General Assembly. This dynamic effectively ensures that any decision issued by the council has their approval.

In Lebanon, all foreign donations, whether intended for charities or religious institutions, must be declared in advance. The sources of these donations must also be identified before they can enter the country.

Financial Scrutiny

Lebanese observers believe the seized $2.5 million was on its way to Hezbollah before authorities intercepted it at Beirut Airport. They view the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council's claim over the money as a maneuver to recover the funds.

“It appears that the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council is covering Hezbollah’s illicit cash smuggling operations by falsely claiming that the $2.5 million seized at the airport belongs to the council and originates from foreign aid,” Lebanese journalist Jad Yateem posted on X.

“This council remains subservient, unmoved even in the face of the significant challenges that have befallen the Shiite community.”

Lebanese media have questioned why the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council would resort to smuggling funds if they genuinely belonged to the council. The suspicion comes as Hezbollah’s financial capabilities have visibly declined since October 2023.

In late January 2025, the group announced it was postponing compensation payments to residents of southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs whose homes were destroyed in the war with “Israel.”

A fragile ceasefire between Hezbollah and the Israeli Occupation has been in place since November 27, 2024, ending hostilities that began on October 8, 2023, as part of Hezbollah’s declared support for Gaza.

On December 5, 2024, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, stated that the group, with Tehran’s backing, had provided $57 million in aid to Lebanese families displaced by Israeli strikes—part of a larger $77 million relief effort. Speaking on Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV, Qassem added that in November alone, the group distributed Iranian-funded cash gifts of $300 to $400 per family, benefiting over 233,000 registered households.

According to the U.S.-based Alhurra news site, Hezbollah is currently unable to transfer funds through Beirut’s airport as freely as before, as the facility is no longer under its direct or indirect control.

Since February 18, 2025, Lebanese authorities have suspended flights to and from Iran indefinitely. The decision followed their refusal to grant landing permits for two Mahan Air flights after “Israel” threatened to target Beirut’s airport.

Following a high-level meeting between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, key ministers, and the head of airport security, presidential spokesperson Najat Charafeddine confirmed that the transport minister had been instructed to extend the suspension of Iranian flights.

Lebanese reports suggest Iran has used diplomatic personnel and intermediaries traveling on flights to Beirut to deliver cash to Hezbollah—a route now effectively blocked by the latest restrictions.

Alternative Funding Sources

Strategic expert Amir al-Saadi believes Hezbollah does not always rely on Iranian funding, as it has multiple financial streams both inside and outside Lebanon.

Speaking to Alhurra on February 16, 2025, he noted that these sources include “legitimate business operations linked to the party’s economic networks in Latin America, Africa, and even Asia, which help sustain its financial needs.”

“If Iran wished to support Hezbollah, it could do so through commercial and economic channels,” al-Saadi said.

“Tehran does not necessarily need covert routes; it can funnel funds through tourism companies organizing travel for Lebanese pilgrims to Mashhad and other religious sites—or vice versa, through Iranian tourism to Lebanon.”

In January 2025, Israeli outlet Globes reported that Hezbollah had managed to maintain its economic activity through sectors such as construction, business ventures, and smuggling operations between Iran and Beirut.

The report highlighted that one of the key challenges facing Lebanon’s new president would be cutting off Iranian financial flows, which account for 90% of Hezbollah’s budget—a move that could significantly weaken the group’s military and economic capabilities.

Hezbollah's financial backbone relies heavily on Qard al-Hasan, a lending association with around 30 branches in Lebanon. Established in the 1980s and officially registered, it provides interest-free loans in exchange for collateral.

According to experts, Hezbollah’s military structure and organizational expertise have enabled it to secure alternative funding sources, making it a persistent challenge for its adversaries.

In response, “Israel” has systematically targeted Hezbollah figures linked to its financial operations. On October 21, 2024, the Israeli Occupation army announced the killing of a senior Hezbollah operative in Syria, claiming he was responsible for a significant portion of the group’s financial activities.

Syria’s Route

Hezbollah’s illicit financial empire, particularly its narcotics production and smuggling operations, has suffered severe blows following the weakening of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the fragmentation of networks linking Lebanon to Iran.

Syria’s new security apparatus has tightened its grip on the Syrian-Lebanese border to curb drug trafficking, following the destruction of numerous drug manufacturing facilities discovered inside Syria.

Hezbollah’s narcotics trade generates an estimated $1 billion annually, while the now-defunct Assad regime once profited around $1.8 billion per year. Under Assad’s rule, Syria became a global hub for the production and export of captagon, according to the World Bank.

The drug trade alliance between Hezbollah and the Assad regime took shape after Hezbollah intervened militarily in Syria in 2012 to help crush the uprising. As both parties faced severe financial strain from the war, they turned to large-scale drug production and trafficking as a lucrative revenue stream.