Hezbollah and Amal Face First Electoral Test After Clashing with ‘Israel’ — How Did They Fare?

Lebanon’s Shiite duo—Hezbollah and Amal Movement—proved they still hold significant sway over their Shiite base, securing strong support in any electoral contest.

The municipal and local elections held from May 4 to 24, 2025, clearly marked the return of the duo’s candidates, reaffirming their dominance in a new phase of Lebanon’s political landscape.

This comes despite Hezbollah’s declining military influence due to its confrontation with Israeli Occupation forces, which left widespread destruction across southern villages and inflicted a heavy toll in casualties among its Shiite support base.

A Political Test Run

The elections recorded an unusually high rate of uncontested wins: 109 municipalities out of 272 were secured by default. This contributed to lower voter turnout in Shiite-majority towns. According to Janoubia, “the Shiite duo pushed for uncontested wins to stage a show of dominance, attempting to signal that their popular standing remains intact despite the devastating war with Israel.”

In southern Lebanon, the duo dominated most municipal seats through a mix of pressure tactics and careful slate-building. Remarkably, the elections were completed across the country, from north to south, even as “Israel” continued to violate the ceasefire agreement signed in November 2024.

For many political forces, these local elections were a litmus test of public support amid the severe economic toll left by the October 2023 conflict. For Hezbollah, it was the first political test since its military and political influence began to wane and its southern strongholds were heavily damaged and depopulated.

On the logistical front, Lebanon’s new government successfully oversaw elections in five provinces over three Sundays in May. Now, attention turns to whether the government can provide the budgets needed for the elected municipalities, especially in southern towns devastated by Israeli strikes and infrastructure losses.

This presents an opportunity for Hezbollah and Amal to meet public expectations and restore services and homes in the south.

The Alliance Factor

Political analyst Wael Najm told Al-Estiklal that the Shiite duo’s strength in the municipal elections stemmed largely from the high number of uncontested wins and the enduring alliance between Hezbollah and Amal.

Najm noted that the Shiite electorate’s sense of being targeted was evident in the voting results, which mirrored past election patterns in the south. “Right now, the priority for this community is rebuilding their homes and returning to them as soon as possible,” he said.

While Hezbollah’s opponents have blamed it for the widespread destruction of southern Lebanon’s infrastructure, the reconstruction process remains stalled at the official level.

Behind the scenes, international donors have made it clear: financial aid will depend on disarming Hezbollah. According to The Wall Street Journal on May 28, 2025, sources close to Hezbollah say the group is buying time, aware that major donors, especially in the West, oppose it and attach strict conditions to reconstruction aid.

“Unless Hezbollah is willing and ready to disarm itself, I don’t see a scenario where a Lebanese government will take the decision to disarm them by force,” said Randa Slim, a fellow at the Johns Hopkins University-based Foreign Policy Institute. 

“Instead, they need to make Hezbollah’s unwillingness to disarm untenable and politically costly to them by linking reconstruction of Shia-majority areas to their disarmament.”

The World Bank estimates the cost of reconstruction and recovery at around $11 billion, with housing the hardest-hit sector at $4.6 billion in damages. Severely damaged infrastructure alone needs an estimated $1 billion.

Reconstruction is now one of the Lebanese government’s most pressing challenges. Beirut is relying on international support, particularly from Gulf nations, to finance recovery and pull the country back from economic collapse.

In April 2025, Finance Minister Yassine Jaber confirmed that Lebanon had received preliminary approval to increase its World Bank reconstruction loan from $250 million to $400 million.

At the Arab League summit in Baghdad on May 17, Iraq pledged $20 million to support Lebanon’s reconstruction efforts.

For Hezbollah and Amal, these elections are more than just local contests—they’re a strategic prelude to reclaiming momentum ahead of Lebanon’s 2026 parliamentary elections.

Absence of a Political Alternative

Within this context, Lebanese writer Marwan el-Amine argued that the municipal elections served as a preliminary indicator for political forces ahead of the parliamentary elections. However, he noted they do not accurately reflect the true balance of power, especially within Sunni, Christian, and Druze communities. The Shiite context, however, is entirely different, as the results carry clearer implications due to the political landscape’s stability and defined alignments.

In his article “Municipal Elections and Their Shiite Implications,” el-Amine attributed the Shiite duo’s strong performance in the elections to several factors. Chief among them was the “blood and martyrdom” narrative and loyalty to Hassan Nasrallah—both central themes in Hezbollah’s mobilization rhetoric.

He noted that this emotionally charged approach resonated more with voters than promises of local services, despite Hezbollah’s significant failures in most towns and villages.

Roughly 80% of Hezbollah’s leadership was killed in the latest confrontation with the Israeli Occupation, primarily through targeted assassinations on Lebanese soil, including former Secretary-Generals Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, who were eliminated in separate strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs.

El-Amine emphasized that Hezbollah still draws strength from a deeply rooted armed religious ideology built over four decades and backed by an expansive network of health, education, social, and financial services, supported by billion-dollar budgets. This model remains intact despite recent military defeat and political setbacks.

He noted that while Hezbollah’s military role in confronting “Israel” has diminished, it retains strong security and political influence inside Lebanon. This dominance, particularly within state institutions in security, judiciary, and service sectors, directly shapes the daily lives of Shiite voters and reinforces their sense of subordination.

Despite growing public anger over the stalled reconstruction efforts, el-Amine argued that this resentment remains largely contained. Many still cling to the hope of eventual compensation, making them reluctant to break ranks with Hezbollah.

He concluded that the absence of an effective political alternative within the Shiite community is a key factor. The opposition lacks both organizational capacity and a secure environment for mobilization. Any attempt to challenge Hezbollah is often met with social ostracism, economic pressure, and accusations of treason, which further entrenches the Shiite duo’s grip on political representation.

Many Lebanese observers believe the opposition, which could potentially capitalize on Hezbollah’s declining influence, still struggles to present a viable roadmap for gaining the loyalty of the Shiite base.

According to Lebanese writer Hassan Ataya, southern Lebanese towns devastated by war have been left to an uncertain fate “in the absence of a national authority that can offer the southerners reassurance and protection.”

In his article published on May 27, 2025, Ataya wrote that the Shiite duo, from the highest to the lowest levels, used a mix of intimidation and incentives during the lead-up to local elections to pressure southern candidates into withdrawing, allowing their lists to win uncontested.

Ataya concluded that what the Shiite duo implemented in the municipal elections was essentially a rehearsal for the upcoming parliamentary elections—a test run to gauge the new era’s push for disarmament, neutrality, and state authority over the entire national territory.