From Bosaso to Darfur: How Abu Dhabi Is Waging a Shadow War Against Sudan’s Army

In early July 2025, the French publication Africa Intelligence published an investigative report that redrew the map of Sudan’s conflict. 

But this time, the front lines weren’t in Darfur or Khartoum — they were traced to a small airport on Somalia’s northeastern coast.

The airport in question lies in the city of Bosaso, perched at the tip of Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of Somalia. 

For years, it appeared — to civilian eyes — to be just another regional airstrip serving local transport needs.

In reality, however, it served a far more clandestine purpose: a covert logistical hub in a shadowy arms network allegedly run by the United Arab Emirates, channelling weapons and equipment to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces militia, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti.”

According to the French investigation, Bosaso airport is no longer merely a civilian transport facility — it has become a pivotal node in an aerial supply chain stretching from Emirati military bases to the heart of Darfur. 

Under its cover, aircraft, mercenaries, and weapons move quietly, beyond the reach of international scrutiny.

Behind this murky network lies a web of unanswered questions: Who is pulling the strings? How does the operation function? And why has a remote Somali port city become the beating heart of a war tearing Sudan apart?

Civilian site, Military Cover

Along the shores of the Gulf of Aden, in the quiet northern Somali city of Bosaso, few could have imagined that its modest airport would one day anchor one of the region’s most secretive and complex military networks.

In 2021, a UAE-based company named BIAC took over the management of the city’s civilian airport.

The official narrative spoke of infrastructure development and improved air navigation services. 

But behind the scenes, a different set of arrangements was quietly being put into motion.

BIAC is owned by Terminals Holding, a company linked to the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development — chaired by none other than the UAE’s national security advisor, Tahnoun bin Zayed, a key architect of the country’s expanding security footprint in Africa.

Throughout 2023 and 2024, construction activity was observed in a sealed-off section of the airport, accessible only to Emirati personnel. Within it, drone hangars and command rooms quietly sprang up.

A familiar pattern soon began to emerge: large cargo planes — most notably the Ilyushin IL-76 — making repeated landings, turning the once-sleepy city into a strategic waypoint on a clandestine arms corridor into Sudan.

Since the outbreak of war in Sudan, Bosaso airport has become a central hub in a logistical airbridge feeding the Rapid Support Forces militia led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti.

According to intelligence sources and flight monitors cited by Africa Intelligence, cargo planes take off from Emirati bases — including the Al Dhafra military base in Abu Dhabi — make a stop in Bosaso, and then continue on to destinations in Chad or Sudan, such as N'Djamena and Nyala, or via circuitous routes into Libya.

At the heart of this network, strikingly, are two aviation companies: New Way Cargo and Gewan Airways.

Gewan Airways, though formally registered in Kyrgyzstan, is effectively controlled by a UAE-based conglomerate tied to Ethmar International Holding — a company under the influence of Hamdan bin Zayed, brother of Abu Dhabi’s crown prince.

Flight data reveals a telling pattern: the cargo aircraft routinely switch off their tracking systems upon entering Sudanese airspace.

By May 2025, the frequency of these flights had settled at around 15 per month — down from a peak in early 2024, when the RSF militia launched a major offensive in western Sudan.

Mounting international criticism had previously forced the UAE to scale back its operations at Umm Jars airport in eastern Chad — a move that placed Bosaso firmly in the spotlight as its replacement.

At the same time, logistical and security challenges hampered the Emirati’s ability to rely consistently on Nyala airport in Sudan, prompting them to double down on Bosaso as a more adaptable and discreet alternative — one largely shielded from meaningful international oversight.

Mercenaries and Radars

The Colombian outlet La Silla Vacia revealed that the Emirati security firm GSSG has deployed hundreds of Colombian mercenaries to Sudan, funnelling them through temporary camps set up within Bosaso airport.

Some of these fighters had previously served in Puntland’s maritime police force — a coastal unit established and trained by the UAE since 2010 — giving them the kind of local logistical know-how that allows for discreet movement without drawing unwanted attention.

On May 3, 2025, a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone operated by Sudan’s military struck Nyala airport in Darfur, targeting an aircraft suspected of carrying Colombian fighters — an attack that triggered a sharp escalation in tensions between Khartoum and Abu Dhabi.

The Emirati response was swift. Acting through its proxy, the RSF militia, Abu Dhabi launched a series of retaliatory strikes on military installations in Port Sudan — the seat of Sudan’s internationally recognized government — in a campaign that stretched over six consecutive days.

At the time, local Sudanese sources on social media speculated that the drones involved may have been launched from facilities in northern Somalia, with Bosaso airport widely believed to be the point of origin.

In a related development, the British outlet Middle East Eye reported on April 25, 2025, that the UAE had deployed an advanced Israeli-made military radar system — the ELM-2084 — around Bosaso airport. 

The installation was reportedly intended to provide early warning against aerial threats, particularly drones and missiles potentially launched by Yemen’s Houthi militia.

Satellite images captured in early March 2025 revealed that the radar — a 3D electronically scanned array (AESA) system — had been installed near the airport’s main runway.

According to the report, the deployment came shortly after the RSF militia lost control of much of Sudan’s capital, Khartoum. 

This setback prompted the UAE to bolster its defensive measures in Bosaso, fearing retaliatory strikes on its facilities there, particularly from the Houthis — who have previously targeted critical infrastructure deep inside the Emirates.

According to a regional source speaking to the outlet, arms transfers through Bosaso airport have not only continued but accelerated in recent months.

Emirati aircraft are reportedly ferrying large consignments of ammunition and military equipment to the RSF militia — sometimes carrying as many as five shipments at once — strengthening suspicions that the airport has effectively become an open logistical operations base.

The report also highlighted that this military expansion is taking place without any clear legal mandate or oversight.

Undermining Sovereignty

Two Somali sources told the British outlet that Puntland’s president, Said Abdullahi Deni, neither secured approval from the federal government in Mogadishu nor from Puntland’s own parliament to allow the radar deployment or the military use of the airport.

One source described these arrangements as a “secret deal” bypassing official institutions — even within Puntland’s own administration — suggesting that coordination is likely managed directly between Deni and the Emirati authorities.

The same source also confirmed reports of the redeployment of mercenary groups flown into Bosaso airport en route to Sudan, casting fresh light on the UAE’s extensive mercenary network across Africa and underscoring the ongoing sidelining of Somali state institutions in security and military arrangements taking place on their soil.

It is worth noting that relations between the UAE and Somalia have long been marked by security and economic entanglements, with Abu Dhabi having previously funded the training of Somali police and military units.

The UAE has also provided direct financial aid to local administrations in Mogadishu and Puntland, before later leveraging these ties to establish networks of influence operating beyond the formal state framework.

In a striking development, Turkish writer Tunc Demirtas highlighted the dangerous strategic shift unfolding in Bosaso in an article published by the Turkish newspaper Sabah on May 3, 2025.

He noted that the geopolitical battleground in the region is no longer confined to capital cities but has expanded to ports and airports along the edges of the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, where spheres of influence are being quietly redrawn.

Demirtas argued that what is unfolding in Bosaso is no less consequential than the conflicts playing out in traditional power centers. 

He described it as a case of “sovereignty bypass,” where fragile regions and local authorities outside the central state’s control are exploited to establish military and intelligence infrastructures serving external agendas.

The writer pointed out that recent satellite imagery and flight records reveal facts that can no longer be dismissed as mere details—from the installation of an Israeli-made radar system to the operation of military cargo flights ferrying arms to Sudan’s RSF militia.

All of this is taking place without the knowledge or consent of Somalia’s federal government, representing a clear breach of national sovereignty and international law.

He stressed that what is unfolding in Bosaso is far from a limited logistical operation; rather, it constitutes a “systematic series of intelligence and military operations” overseen by Emirati and Israeli patrons, leveraging facilities provided by the Puntland regional authorities.

He described this as a direct breach of Somalia’s statehood and a grave challenge to the principle of its territorial integrity.

The Turkish writer emphasized that international law—specifically the United Nations Charter—leaves no room for interpretation: no country has the right to conduct military operations or deploy defense systems on another state’s soil without the explicit consent of its sovereign authorities.

Yet what is unfolding in Bosaso reveals a new approach adopted by certain regional powers to bypass weak capitals and negotiate directly with local actors, undermining political legitimacy and deepening internal divisions.

“What is most alarming is that this military and intelligence infrastructure entrenched in Bosaso is not being used to defend Somalia or bolster its stability, but rather to fuel a brutal civil war in Sudan by supporting a militia accused of crimes against humanity.”

“Is it conceivable that Somali territory should become a launchpad for exporting arms and mercenaries to regional conflicts? And if such actions are tolerated today, what will prevent the same scenario from playing out in other fragile coastal cities tomorrow?” Demirtas concluded.