Escalating Disputes: Is a Proxy War Unfolding Between Mohammed bin Zayed and Sisi in Sudan?

It appears that escalating disputes have developed into a proxy war between Egypt and the UAE on Sudanese soil. Abu Dhabi supports Rapid Support Forces leader Hemedti against the regular army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who is backed by Egypt.

Part of this battle seems to have spilled over onto Egyptian territory, as “the prime UAE vehicle investing in Egypt, has paused its projects in the country,” as revealed by the Financial Times on April 28, 2023.

This can be seen as a form of punishment for Cairo after the visit of UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed to Egypt on April 12, 2023, three days before the Sudan war, to persuade Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to support Hemedti.

However, the Financial Times indicated that another anticipated meeting between Sisi and bin Zayed in May 2023 could determine whether the freeze on UAE projects in Egypt continues or is lifted.

Observers consider this as confirmation of previous speculation that the earlier visit on April 12 was meant to pressure Sisi, while the second visit aims to determine the UAE’s final stance on Sudan.

 

Public Bargaining

In light of these developments, analysts believe that the signal from the Financial Times regarding the resumption of Abu Dhabi’s investments and aid to Cairo, popularly known as “rice,” after the meeting between Sisi and bin Zayed in May, indicates a public bargaining related to Egypt’s stance in Sudan to align with the UAE’s support for Hemedti.

They speculate that if Egypt agrees to adopt the UAE’s position in Sudan, Abu Dhabi will resume its projects through the sovereign fund.

However, if Egypt refuses or maintains its non-intervention policy, as declared by Sisi in his meeting with the military council, and continues to support the Sudanese army covertly, the disagreements may persist, and Emirati investments will remain halted.

Columnist Dalia Ziada, who supports the Egyptian regime, wrote about this matter on April 30, confirming that Egypt is under immense pressure from both near and far, exploiting the economic file.

She explicitly states that the UAE holds Egypt by its greatest weak point, referring to the economic collapse that would occur if the UAE did not support Egypt with investments.

Regarding bin Zayed’s visit to Cairo three days before the war, it was reported that during the secretive visit, he asked Sisi to support Hemedti’s militias or cease their partnership with the Sudanese National Army.

Meanwhile, the Sada Elbalad website, owned by a businessman who is also loyal to the Egyptian regime, began discussing the fact that the UAE is the largest Arab investor in Egypt, with its investments reaching $28 billion at the beginning of 2023.

The Secretary-General of the UAE Council for Foreign Investors, Jamal bin Saif al-Jarwan, was quoted as saying that UAE investments in Egypt have increased from $20 billion in 2020 to $28 billion by early 2023 following bin Zayed’s visit to Egypt on April 12.

Hemedti is the UAE’s man in Sudan, and he was received by bin Zayed in February 2023. Hemedti’s closest ally in Abu Dhabi is Vice President Mansour bin Zayed, as confirmed by The New York Times on April 22, 2023.

 

Proxy War

On April 20, 2023, AFP warned of the potential confrontation between the UAE and Egypt in Sudan due to Abu Dhabi’s support for Hemedti’s forces.

The agency also mentioned Ethiopia’s involvement in the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

AFP stated that the conflict in Sudan extends beyond the leaders, Burhan and Hemedti, to allies in the region and the world. The current situation allows the UAE to maintain its influence, especially through its ally Hemedti, who feels threatened by Egypt.

Opposition website Emirates Leaks affirmed on April 25 that the UAE’s halt of investments in Egypt was a strong Emirati response to Egypt’s failure to support Hemedti and the Egyptian army’s backing of its Sudanese counterpart.

On April 26, International France Radio (RFI) also mentioned a hidden conflict between Egypt and the UAE in Sudan due to conflicting interests.

It stated that Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh are engaged in a conflict among the generals.

RFI mentioned that each country works to support one of the warring parties based on its interests. However, the relationship between Egypt and the UAE is currently complex, and each country works behind the scenes to support one of the warring parties according to its interests.

The radio station stated: “Cairo is currently haunted by the fear of witnessing a situation similar to Libya unfolding in Sudan. The arrival of Hemedti’s forces to power poses a significant dilemma, as it may clash with Egypt’s vested interests in Sudan.”

On April 19, 2023, The Wall Street Journal also reported that Abu Dhabi and Cairo were facing off in Sudan by supporting opposing sides in the conflict. Abu Dhabi was providing support to the Rapid Support Forces militia, while Cairo was backing the Sudanese army.

Citing informed sources, the report stated that Khalifa Haftar, the powerful Libyan militia leader supported by Abu Dhabi, and the Egyptian army were providing military support to the two rival generals engaged in fighting in neighboring Sudan.

They revealed that Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the faction controlling eastern Libya, had sent at least one aircraft to transport military supplies to the Rapid Support Forces, while Egypt simultaneously sent fighter jets and pilots to support the Sudanese army.

On April 18, 2023, the Sudanese army announced that Hemedti was mobilizing a significant force at a northern airbase to secure the landing of military aid from regional parties.

On April 23, The Guardian confirmed that Haftar was sending trucks carrying oil along with small shipments of ammunition, weapons, and medicines to the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces at the request of the UAE.

The newspaper explained that Egypt covertly targeted Hemedti’s camps, weakening the UAE’s support through Khalifa Haftar, who initially informed Hemedti of the movement of the army led by Burhan against him.

The UAE’s support for Haftar and Hemedti is part of the competition in the Middle East and financial gains, according to The Guardian.

Prior to Mohammed bin Zayed’s visit to Egypt on April 12, his son, a relative of Khalifa Haftar, had already visited Sudan and met with Hemedti, raising questions about the purpose of the visit and its connection to the ongoing war, as well as attempts to constrain Egypt’s role there.

 

Egypt without Help

Another indicator of the Egyptian–Emirati confrontation over influence in Sudan emerged during the return of the Egyptian soldiers and officers from Sudan.

This embarrassed Egypt by showing that it was done through the UAE’s intervention rather than the Egyptian army, at the request of Hemedti.

Egyptian sources informed Al-Estiklal that there are several undisclosed behind-the-scenes details regarding the release of the soldiers and officers who were in Sudan, especially the 27 who were detained by Hemedti’s forces at Merowe Airport in northern Sudan.

The sources mentioned an implicit Egyptian–Emirati dispute due to Abu Dhabi’s deliberate attempt to embarrass Cairo through a foreign statement, claiming that it was the one that “mediated” the release of the Egyptian soldiers, while the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not mention the word “mediation.”

They stated that Cairo’s keenness to ignore any mention of the UAE’s mediation was to save face, since highlighting the UAE’s role as a mediator undermines the prestige and image of the army and the regime in Egypt.

Emphasizing the role of the International Red Cross implies that the soldiers were “captives.”

This dispute over the word “mediation” appeared in the joint statements of the Egyptian and Emirati foreign ministries.

Abu Dhabi’s statement mentioned that “the UAE succeeded in mediating the safety of the Egyptian soldiers in Sudan.”

The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spoke of the “success in securing the safety of the remaining Egyptian soldiers in Sudan” without referring to Emirati mediation, only mentioning “coordination and cooperation with the UAE,” without using the word “mediation."