Election Alliances in Iraq: Shifts and Potential Outcomes

With six months to go before Iraq’s parliamentary elections, the country’s political arena is witnessing intense maneuvering. Key factions—Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish—are actively reshaping alliances amid internal struggles for leadership and control over government positions.

The elections, scheduled for late October 2025, will allow more than 29 million Iraqis to vote out of a total population of nearly 46 million. This marks an increase of approximately one million voters compared to the last parliamentary elections in 2021.

Shia Alliances: Fragmentation and Realignment

Iraq’s Shia political forces are currently split into two main camps. The first is the Coordination Framework, the bloc that formed the government under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. It commands a significant presence in parliament, holding around 180 seats out of the total 329.

The second camp is the Sadrist movement, led by influential cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. After securing 73 seats and emerging as the dominant force in the 2021 elections, al-Sadr abruptly withdrew from parliament in June 2022. Just months later, in August, he declared his full withdrawal from politics.

Al-Sadr’s decision to step back followed his failed attempt to form a majority government alongside Sunni and Kurdish allies under the “Save the Homeland Alliance.” His plan aimed to sideline other Shia factions, particularly those with strong ties to Iran, whom he accused of corruption and misgovernance since 2003.

As election preparations gain momentum—just two months before the registration window for political coalitions opens—Shia alliances are taking shape, revealing deep divisions.

According to leaks from Iraqi politicians and lawmakers, the Coordination Framework will compete under at least five separate lists: one led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, another by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali, and a third under Deputy Speaker of Parliament Muhsin al-Mandalawi.

The fourth list will be a coalition led by Ammar al-Hakim and former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, while the fifth will be headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, alongside Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and Popular Mobilization Forces chief Faleh al-Fayyadh.

A potential sixth list could emerge under the leadership of Humam Hamoudi, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, with the possible inclusion of the Iqtadar Watan party, led by former minister Abdul-Hussein Abtaan. These details were revealed by Abtaan himself during a televised interview on March 26, 2025.

On the other side of the Shia divide, Muqtada al-Sadr announced on March 27, 2025, that he would not participate in the upcoming elections, citing the continued dominance of “corrupt and oppressive forces.”

He dismissed any potential for meaningful change, stating that Iraq is taking its “final breaths” due to foreign interference and deep-state control over its institutions.

Despite his withdrawal, speculation about al-Sadr’s return to the political scene has persisted for months, particularly after his supporters were urged to update their voter registration in February 2025.

Sunnis and Kurds

Sunni factions remain a key force in Iraq, striving to reclaim their parliamentary representation after a significant decline in recent years. Internal divisions among political groups, coupled with the aftermath of the war against ISIS—which overran Sunni-majority cities in 2014—have weakened their presence in government.

ISIS had seized control of key Sunni-populated areas, including Nineveh (Mosul), Anbar, Saladin, Kirkuk, Diyala, northern Babil, and parts of Baghdad’s outskirts.

Currently, four major Sunni electoral lists are taking shape: al-Takadum (Progress Party), led by Mohammed al-Halbousi; Siyada, headed by Khamis al-Khanjar; and Azm Alliance, under the leadership of Muthanna al-Samarrai, according to Sunni politician Yazan Mashaan al-Jabouri in a televised interview on March 24.

A fourth bloc is being formed by current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, who confirmed in a March 25 interview that former Prime Minister Eyad Allawi—a secular Shia politician—would be joining his coalition.

Sunni leaders are approaching the upcoming elections with determination, aiming to regain their parliamentary strength. According to al-Mashhadani, Sunnis currently hold about 94 seats out of Iraq’s 329-seat parliament, a number they seek to restore.

Among the Sunni coalitions, Azm, led by al-Samarrai, is the broadest alliance, incorporating key figures such as former Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and ex-Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi, along with political movements like Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan (Justice and Goodness) and others.

In a March 24 interview, al-Nujaifi highlighted how the decline in Sunni parliamentary seats after ISIS’s 2014 invasion sidelined their influence, allowing Shia-dominated factions to expand their presence in Sunni-majority provinces—further tipping the balance of power.

According to exclusive political sources who spoke to Al-Estiklal on condition of anonymity, the Takadum Party, led by Mohamed al-Halbousi, plans to form around four separate electoral lists to compete independently. This strategy aims to secure control over parliamentary seats in Sunni-majority provinces.

The sources added that indicators suggest al-Halbousi is making a strong comeback in the Sunni political arena after being removed as parliament speaker over allegations of falsifying a lawmaker’s dismissal. His main rival is expected to be Muthanna al-Samarrai, while Khamis al-Khanjar is likely to have a limited role, as he has yet to take any steps in preparation for the elections.

On the Kurdish side, alliances among political forces remain crucial, given their self-governance in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the presence of Kurdish communities in other areas like Kirkuk and Nineveh, which fall under Baghdad’s administration.

The most prominent Kurdish electoral lists currently include the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Bafel Talabani; the New Generation Movement, led by Shaswar Abdulwahid; the Kurdistan Islamic Union, under Salahuddin Muhammad Bahauddin; and the Kurdistan Justice Group (formerly the Islamic Group), led by Ali Bapir.

Possible Outcomes

With the initial outlines of electoral alliances taking shape, projections regarding the number of parliamentary seats each political faction might secure remain speculative. Naturally, these projections will only become concrete once the elections take place and official results are announced.

Among Shiite forces, early predictions placed the Sadrist Movement in the lead, estimating it could win around 100 seats if it participated—an increase of 30 seats compared to its performance in the 2021 elections—before its leader decided to boycott the vote. This assessment was made by Manaf al-Mousawi, head of the Baghdad Center for Strategic Studies.

Al-Mousawi, who is close to the Sadrists, told Arabi21 on February 24, 2025, that had the movement joined the race, the “silent majority” would have backed it, allowing it to secure enough seats to form a majority government rather than a power-sharing one, as has been the norm since 2003.

As for the other Shiite factions currently united under the Coordination Framework, analysts predicted that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s alliance could win around 50 seats. This estimate was shared by his associate, Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, during a televised interview on March 23.

However, al-Sadr’s decision to boycott the elections is expected to significantly alter the seat distribution among competing Shiite parties, as they are all vying for dominance in the country’s Shiite-majority regions.

Political sources told Al-Estiklal that the Takadum and Azm alliances are each expected to secure around 30 seats. Meanwhile, the two other Sunni lists, led by Khamis al-Khanjar and Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, are projected to perform more modestly, with al-Khanjar’s bloc possibly winning around 20 seats or slightly fewer, while al-Mashhadani’s list may secure around 10 seats or slightly more.

The same sources emphasized that financial influence and external backing play a major role in the Sunni electoral competition. Among the four main Sunni-led blocs, some—such as Takadum and Siyada—benefit from both domestic influence and foreign support, while others, like Azm and al-Mashhadani’s list, rely more heavily on their internal standing.

The results of the Kurdistan Region's parliamentary elections, held on October 21, 2024, are expected to serve as a reference point for the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to senior Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) figure Hoshyar Zebari, who made the remarks during a televised interview on March 2.

At the time, the results showed the KDP leading with 39 seats, followed by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Bafel Talabani, with 23 seats. The New Generation Movement, headed by Shaswar Abdulwahid, secured 15 seats, while the Kurdistan Islamic Union, under Salahuddin Bahauddin, won 7 seats.