Egypt's Defensive Agreement with Somalia: A Strategy Against Ethiopia or a Challenge to Turkiye?

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Since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in Egypt following the July 3, 2013 coup, Turkiye has replaced Egypt in several vital Arab countries, including Libya and Somalia, due to Cairo's declining regional influence.

Whenever countries, often neglected by Egypt and the Arab League, face security threats, Turkiye hastens to sign defense agreements with them. Subsequently, Cairo attempts to compete with Ankara's role in these countries that it previously neglected.

Egypt's latest pursuit of Turkiye followed Ethiopia's threat to the security of both Egypt and Somalia by negotiating with the Somaliland government to establish a military base on the Red Sea.

Somaliland, or "Land of the Somalis," has not received official recognition since declaring its separation from Somalia in 1991 as an independent administrative, political, and security entity, with the central government failing to assert control over the region or its leadership managing to secure independence.

Balancing Influence

When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's office announced in early January 2024 that Ethiopia had signed a memorandum of understanding with secessionist Somaliland for a maritime outlet on the Red Sea through the port of Berbera, both Egypt and Turkiye expressed concern.

The agreement granting Ethiopia a 20-kilometer maritime strip of Somaliland’s territory for 50 years via a lease agreement was rejected by Egypt, Turkiye, and Somalia.

An emergency Arab meeting was held at that time to condemn the agreement and support Somalia’s position, but there was no concrete Arab or Egyptian action.

At that time, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud contacted Sisi, discussing "Egypt's firm stance in supporting Somalia and its security and stability."

Egypt’s reaction to this Ethiopian agreement with Somaliland was forceful, with Sisi asserting that Egypt will not tolerate any threat to Somalia or its security, and the recent agreement is rejected by all.

However, Egypt did not announce specific steps to support Somalia, prompting Turkiye to step in to fill the Egyptian void and address Somalia’s concerns.

Notably, Turkiye has maintained its largest military base in Mogadishu since 2017 to train the Somali army and police.

On February 21, 2024, Turkiye signed a defense agreement with Somalia, and Egypt followed by signing a similar agreement four months later.

On July 21, 2024, the Somali Cabinet approved the defense agreement with Egypt following a visit from a delegation led by Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Atti to Mogadishu.

Egyptian diplomatic sources told Al-Estiklal that Egypt was slow to act, allowing Turkiye to fill the gap by signing a defense agreement with Somalia in response to Ethiopia's acquisition of a port and military base in the secessionist Somaliland region.

“However, the Egyptian-Somali defense agreement was aimed at balancing Turkish influence and containing Ethiopian ambitions," according to the sources.

They stated that Egypt did not ignore the Ethiopian threats and was already making arrangements with Somalia against this Ethiopian move. However, Cairo delayed action to avoid straining relations with Ethiopia. The subsequent escalation by Addis Ababa, which included convincing South Sudan to sign the Entebbe Agreement and the fifth filling of the Renaissance Dam, which harms Egypt, expedited this agreement with Somalia.

In mid-July 2024, the South Sudanese government ratified the Entebbe Framework Agreement for Nile Basin countries, known as the Entebbe Agreement, raising Egypt's concerns about the implementation of the agreement, which does not recognize Cairo’s share of Nile water, estimated at 55.5 billion cubic meters annually.

With Juba’s ratification, the legal quorum for establishing the Nile Basin Commission is expected to be completed, with the commission’s establishment process to begin 60 days after the republic deposits the ratification documents with the African Union.

Egyptian strategic expert Major General Samir Farag confirmed that the agreement with Mogadishu "represents an indirect message to Ethiopia following its agreement with Somaliland and its efforts to establish a military base there."

In an interview with the Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat on July 21, he discussed Cairo's efforts for "strategic containment" of Ethiopia’s neighboring countries, also noting that Egypt "seeks to balance Turkiye’s presence in the region" through this agreement.

While the details of the Egyptian-Somali defense agreement have not been disclosed, sources speculate that Egypt may gain military presence in Somalia or the right to deploy ground forces as part of its attempt to deter Ethiopia from pursuing the Somaliland port deal.

A Sudanese source close to Al-Estiklal suggested that part of Egypt's move in Somalia was to compensate for its lost advanced military base in Sudan. This came after the Rapid Support Forces detained Egyptian soldiers and officers at the Meroe base in northern Sudan in March 2023 and destroyed aircraft used by Egypt for training and possibly as a forward base against the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

What Is the Objective?

Egypt's rush to sign a mutual defense agreement with Somalia, after delaying urgent support and being outpaced by Turkiye by four months, has raised several questions.

Is Egypt's swift action this time due to Ethiopia's stubborn stance on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the activation of the Entebbe Agreement, which permits dam projects for Ethiopia and all Nile basin countries along the watercourse?

Or is it driven by Egyptian-Turkish rivalry, unrelated to addressing the real threat, which is Ethiopia and its military base agreement in Somaliland?

African affairs expert Dr. Badr Shafei told Al-Estiklal that there is competition between Egypt and Ethiopia over dominance in the Nile Basin region, with Somalia being one of the areas of competition.

He noted that after the Addis Ababa-Somaliland military base agreement angered Somalia and brought it closer to Egypt, Egypt might have seen an opportunity to strengthen relations with Somalia, as Egypt's goal is to counter Ethiopia and its influence in the Horn of Africa.

"However, Somalia has become Turkiye's regional hub in the area, so Cairo might also aim to contain Turkish influence through this defense agreement with Mogadishu," he said.

Conversely, Shafei believes that Egypt might exploit Turkiye’s presence in Somalia to coordinate with Ankara against Ethiopia, thus avoiding an overt competition with Turkiye.

“It is in Egypt's interest not to antagonize Turkiye or compete with its strong presence in Somalia, especially after South Sudan signed the Entebbe Agreement, leaving Cairo alone in the Nile Basin."

Shafie believes that Egypt is now trying to form a front with countries in conflict with Addis Ababa to confront Ethiopian influence in the Horn of Africa.

"Thus, we see Egypt and Turkiye strengthening relations with Djibouti and Kenya [which has not ratified the Entebbe Agreement and has disputes with Ethiopia] to form a front to encircle the Ethiopians in the Horn of Africa," Shafei said.

The signing of a security and economic agreement between Somalia and Turkiye, enhancing Turkiye’s presence in the Horn of Africa, has been a concern for Egypt, as reflected in Egyptian reports and media commentary.

Despite the improvement in Egyptian-Turkish relations, the Sisi administration remains wary of Turkish moves in Arab and African countries and agreements that might affect Egypt’s interests in the region.

The Turkish-Somali military agreement includes 10 clauses, the most significant of which grants the Turkish navy full rights to use existing Somali ports and request new military naval bases.

Under the 10-year defense agreement, Turkiye, a NATO member and close ally of Somalia, will assist in defending the Somali coast and help reorganize its naval forces, as stated by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Among the agreement’s provisions are the establishment of Turkish mechanical bases and other cooperative facilities in Somalia (land, sea, and air), conducting joint naval and aerial exercises, and selling military ships to Somalia, as well as benefiting from Somali natural and oil resources.

On July 21, 2024, Anadolu Agency reported that Turkiye is preparing to send naval forces to Somali waters after sending an exploration vessel off Somalia’s coast to search for oil and gas.

The agency also reported that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed to parliament on July 19, 2024, to authorize the deployment of Turkish military forces in Somalia, including Somali territorial waters.

Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre stated that the defense agreement with Turkiye would contribute to protecting the maritime borders from terrorism, piracy, and illegal fishing, describing Ankara as a "true ally and friend" on the international stage.

Analysts believe that there are understandings between the two countries since the improvement of relations and assume there is coordination in their actions or at least a careful avoidance of conflicting or harming each other’s interests.

They view the alignment of Egyptian and Turkish positions against the Ethiopian agreement with Somaliland as evidence of mutual interests in the Horn of Africa and cooperation between them to achieve each party’s objectives in the region.

Egyptian analyst Hamed Fathi used the example of how improved relations between the two countries helped them manage the Libyan file successfully, suggesting their capability to work together in Somalia.

He explained to Lebanon’s Annahar al-Arabi newspaper on February 28, 2024, that Turkiye's relations with Ethiopia were not favorable to Cairo. However, with the decline in relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian-Somali crisis, and the restoration of relations with Cairo, Turkiye would not risk harming Egypt’s interests in the region.

He affirmed that the Turkish-Somali defense agreement, which positions Turkiye against Ethiopia, will bring it closer to Egypt.

Encircling Ethiopia

Shafei stated that when Ethiopia signed its agreement with Somaliland, it was clear that it sought to "challenge Egypt’s attempts at dominance in the Red Sea, after competing with its influence in the Nile Basin through the Renaissance Dam."

However, he explained that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inadvertently provided Egypt with an opportunity through this agreement to potentially encircle and pressure him.

This can be done within the regional context through neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa, such as Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and possibly through Sudan and Kenya as well.

Ethiopian newspapers have reported that Addis Ababa played a role in convincing South Sudan to sign the agreement.

The Ethiopian Prime Minister praised South Sudan's signing of the agreement, which becomes effective after being signed by 6 out of the 11 Nile basin countries.

With South Sudan’s ratification, the legal quorum for establishing the Nile Basin Commission has been met, which internationalizes the river’s waters and does not recognize agreements Egypt signed with upstream Nile Basin countries in 1929 and 1959 to secure its rights to 55 billion cubic meters of water annually.

The agreement includes a clause granting upstream countries the "right to build dams on the Nile River without consulting or reaching an agreement with downstream countries, or even providing prior notice."

This creates dangerous realities on the ground, making what Ethiopia and any other African country do regarding Nile water retention through dam construction legally permissible and threatening Egypt’s and Sudan’s water security and existence in a severe manner.

This coincided with Ethiopia starting the fifth filling of the Renaissance Dam in July 2024, disregarding any notification to Egypt about the damage caused by holding Nile water within the dam.

This constituted a double blow to the Egyptian regime at a time when its credibility and influence were collapsing on several vital regional issues, such as the security of Sudan, Libya, and Gaza, and the threat to Nile water, which means the thirst for Egyptians.

Arab diplomats suggest that Cairo’s move to sign a defense agreement with Somalia is primarily directed at Ethiopia, although it also aims to counter Turkiye’s influence in the Red Sea region.

They view the Egyptian military agreement with Somalia as a response to Ethiopia’s continued plans to fill the Renaissance Dam without coordinating with Egypt. It also serves as a reaction to Addis Ababa’s push for South Sudan to ratify the Entebbe Agreement, which disregards Egypt’s water rights, and Ethiopia’s attempt to secure a foothold on the Red Sea, potentially threatening Cairo’s security from the southeast.

On October 13, 2023, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed delivered a speech before parliament, highlighting the existential need for his landlocked country to access warm waters once again, according to the Addis Standard on October 14, 2023.

He stated that Ethiopia’s targeted sovereign port on the Red Sea would be through Eritrea, Somalia, or Djibouti. He cited the 19th-century Ethiopian military leader Ras Alula Engida (known as Abba Nega), who said that "the Red Sea is Ethiopia’s natural boundary."

Since the mid-20th century, Ethiopia had a permanent and sovereign maritime outlet to the Red Sea through the ports of Assab and Massawa in Eritrea until its independence in 1993.

Since then, Ethiopia has relied on the port of Djibouti as its sole outlet, through which about 95 percent of its trade with the outside world passes.

To regain access to the Red Sea and achieve this strategically crucial goal, Ethiopia announced a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland to use the port of Berbera.