With Appointments Settled, What Awaits Lebanon’s New Army Chief?

The long-awaited military and security appointments in Lebanon have brought a sense of relief to political circles, as the Lebanese state prioritizes the security file.

On March 13, 2025, Lebanon’s Cabinet appointed several key security officials, most notably the new army chief.

Brigadier General Rodolphe Haikal was named Army Commander, Brigadier General Hassan Chekir was appointed Director General of General Security, Brigadier General Edgar Lawandos was assigned as Director General of State Security, and Brigadier General Raed Abdullah was designated as Director General of the Internal Security Forces, following their promotions to the rank of Major General. Brigadier General Morshed Hajj Suleiman was also appointed Deputy Director General of State Security.

These security appointments, however, are just a drop in the ocean of Lebanon’s widespread vacancies, which extend across hundreds of public sector positions. There are currently 47 vacant positions in the first category, while in the second and third categories, more than 270 out of 600 positions remain unfilled.

A Critical Juncture

Lebanon’s minister of Information Paul Morcos stated that the recent military and security appointments were based on expertise and competence. This comes in a country where the political and sectarian quota system dictates key positions, with the army chief post traditionally reserved for a Maronite Christian.

Brigadier General Rodolphe Haikal, 56, has held several key positions in the Lebanese Army, most recently serving as Director of Operations since June 2024. In March 2023, he was appointed commander of the South Litani Sector, overseeing the border region with “Israel”—an area where the Lebanese Army has bolstered its presence since the ceasefire between Hezbollah and the Israeli Occupation took effect on November 27, 2024.

Haikal is considered close to Lebanon’s new president, Joseph Aoun, who served as army commander from March 8, 2017, until January 9, 2025. Given his past responsibilities, Haikal is among the military leaders most familiar with the situation in southern Lebanon and along the border with “Israel.”

His primary challenge now is ensuring the full deployment of Lebanese military units across all southern border towns to enforce the ceasefire agreement with the Israeli Occupation, which has been repeatedly violated by Israeli forces.

Under the deal, “Israel” was to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah would pull back north of the Litani River—about 30 kilometers from the border—in exchange for an increased presence of the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL forces in the area.

However, despite the extended deadline for Israeli Occupation’s withdrawal on February 18, 2025, Israeli forces have remained stationed on five strategic highlands, granting them oversight over large swathes of land on both sides of the border. This has complicated the Lebanese Army’s mission and raised concerns about future escalations.

In response, U.S. Deputy Special Envoy to the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, announced on March 13, 2025, that Washington is working diplomatically with Lebanon and “Israel” through three working groups to resolve outstanding issues, including the Israeli withdrawal from the five contested points.

Experts say Israeli Occupation’s stalling tactics in southern Lebanon have increased the Lebanese Army’s responsibilities. The military has instructed displaced residents not to return to villages where troops have yet to be deployed.

To address this challenge, Lebanon’s Cabinet approved a request from the Ministry of Defense on March 13, 2025, to recruit 4,500 new soldiers in three phases, reinforcing military units stationed in the south.

Another key task for the army is clearing unexploded ordnance left behind by Israeli occupation forces, a crucial step to ensuring the safety of returning civilians.

The ceasefire agreement stipulates the deployment of 10,000 Lebanese troops along the southern border below the Litani River, coinciding with the withdrawals of both “Israel” and Hezbollah.

Security analysts note that Lebanon’s deep political and social divisions have historically limited the army’s influence, leaving it relatively weaker—particularly when compared to Hezbollah. Before the latest confrontation with “Israel,” the Lebanese Army was seen as a force that should match or surpass Hezbollah’s military strength, with the group’s fighters numbering around 100,000—roughly equal to Lebanon’s total army personnel.

The Lebanese Army recruits from all sectarian communities, including Shiites, Sunnis, and Christians. Meanwhile, the Internal Security Forces number about 20,000, while the air force and navy each have fewer than 2,000 personnel.

For years, Lebanon’s armed forces have struggled with limited resources for conventional defense operations, focusing primarily on internal security.

Border Control

Despite its shortcomings, the Lebanese Army remains the most trusted institution in the country, with nearly 90% of Lebanese backing it.

The U.S. sees Lebanon's multi-sectarian army as a key counter to Hezbollah, backing it with nearly $3 billion in aid since 2006. Recently, Washington and European allies have boosted their support, aiming to strengthen the army’s role in securing Lebanon’s southern border as part of its ceasefire commitments.

Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, the Lebanese Army has intensified efforts to control its side of the border, as ongoing developments in Syria pose additional national security challenges. The newly established Syrian state has launched repeated security operations to track down Assad loyalists and drug traffickers who previously dominated smuggling routes between the two countries.

On March 5, 2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met with Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in Cairo on the sidelines of the Arab summit on Gaza. According to the Lebanese presidency, the two leaders emphasized the “necessity” of border control between their countries.

Lebanon and Syria share a 330-kilometer border, much of which remains unmarked, particularly in the northeast, making it highly vulnerable to smugglers, hunters, and even refugees. Before Assad’s fall, the border regions in Homs countryside and predominantly Shiite villages—some inhabited by Lebanese nationals—served as crucial logistical hubs for Hezbollah, facilitating the movement of fighters and the storage of weapons. The Lebanese Army now seeks to reestablish control over the border and thwart Israeli airstrikes aimed at preventing Hezbollah from smuggling arms.

While recent military and security appointments have been met with general approval in Lebanon, a notable development was the Lebanese Forces ministers’ call for a timeline to disarm Hezbollah. They proposed a six-month period, with only one minister from the Shiite duo objecting, while the rest remained silent. After Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government secured parliamentary confidence on February 25, 2025, President Joseph Aoun stated in a press interview, “If we want to talk about the concept of sovereignty, its concept is to place the decisions of war and peace in the hands of the state, and to monopolize or restrict weapons to the state.”

Hezbollah’s former leader, Hassan Nasrallah—assassinated by “Israel” on September 27, 2024—had openly declared on June 24, 2016, that “the party’s budget, salaries, expenses, food, drink, weapons, and missiles all come from Iran.”

However, in its report published on February 27, 2025, the International Crisis Group cautioned that any attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah is unlikely to succeed, as the group is not expected to yield to such pressures.

Internal Stability

Under its mandate, the Lebanese army is tasked with dismantling all of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, while ensuring it remains the sole security force in the region.

This remains its greatest challenge in enforcing the ceasefire agreement signed on November 27, 2024, between Lebanon and “Israel,” especially as the Israeli Occupation continues to seek pretexts to maintain a presence in southern Lebanese towns.

Beyond regional security, the army must also address internal stability, particularly as Lebanon’s economic crisis deepens. The sharp depreciation of the Lebanese lira against the dollar has significantly impacted soldiers’ salaries, placing immense financial strain on both troops and officers.

A first-class Lebanese soldier now earns 24,535,200 lira, with a base salary of 982,000 lira—equivalent to $274, down from $786 before the economic collapse that began in 2019.

This marks a 65% drop in purchasing power, not accounting for further declines caused by inflation and price manipulation, both of which have eroded what little spending power remains.

The monthly cost of living for a Lebanese family outside major cities requires at least $650 to cover basic needs. That figure exceeds $900 for families living in urban suburbs.

To alleviate some of the burden, U.S. and Qatari assistance—distributed in 12 installments, the latest in January 2024—provides $100 per month for each soldier.

On March 9, 2025, the Lebanese army announced it had received the first fuel shipment from Qatar for the year.

In a statement, the army described the donation as part of “Qatar’s commendable initiatives to support the military institution in overcoming current challenges.”

On September 17, 2024, Qatar provided a $15 million grant to fund the army’s fuel supply for three months.

In July 2024, Lebanon’s military also received a $20 million grant from Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani.

The United States remains the army’s largest donor, having provided over $2.5 billion in aid since 2006.

This support has undeniably transformed the Lebanese army from a fragile force into a professional and capable military, as confirmed by official statements from U.S. military leadership.