Will Myanmar Become the New Arena for U.S.–China Competition?
Myanmar, a Southeast Asian nation of 54 million people, has been engulfed in a bloody conflict since the military ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021.
What began as a mass uprising of peaceful protesters against the coup has evolved into a multi-fronted armed resistance, with pro-democracy forces joining forces with ethnic militias that have long battled the central state.
The military junta, which faces international isolation and sanctions, has shown no signs of relenting in its brutal crackdown on dissent.
The turmoil in Myanmar has largely been overlooked by the United States and China, the two superpowers that are locked in a global rivalry over trade, technology, and influence.
Both Washington and Beijing have expressed concern over the situation but have refrained from taking decisive action that could tip the balance of power in the country.
Democracy Dispute
The United States and its allies have backed the pro-democracy movement but have been wary of escalating tensions with China, which shares a long border with Myanmar and has strategic interests in its stability and resources.
China, meanwhile, has maintained a pragmatic stance, preferring to deal with the military regime as a fait accompli but also keeping channels open with the opposition and neighboring countries.
But this cautious approach may be changing. In recent months, China has grown alarmed by what it perceives as a growing alignment of the pro-democracy camp with the United States and its partners, especially after some ethnic armed groups signed a pact with the national unity government to form a federal army.
Beijing has responded by stepping up its support for the junta, providing diplomatic cover, economic aid, and military assistance.
This shift has raised the stakes of Myanmar’s civil war, turning it into a proxy battleground for competing powers, each fearing that inaction would benefit the other.
This development poses a dilemma for other countries in the region, especially those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a bloc that prides itself on its neutrality and consensus.
One of ASEAN’s core principles is to avoid taking sides between the United States and China and to maintain good relations with both.
But Myanmar’s civil war and its internationalization may force them to confront a choice they have long avoided: not only between supporting the military regime or the democratic opposition but also between siding with China or Washington.
As Myanmar’s military junta continues to crack down on pro-democracy protesters and ethnic minorities, a patchwork of resistance groups has carved out pockets of territory along the country’s borders with India, China, and Thailand, defying the regime’s superior firepower and air force.
The opposition forces, which include both civil disobedience activists and armed militias, have managed to hold their ground since mid-2021, when the coup leader, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, admitted that he did not control the entire country.
But they have also failed to break into urban areas, where the junta’s artillery and jets have inflicted heavy casualties.
The stalemate has dragged on for more than two years, with little hope of a peaceful resolution or international intervention.
Cautious Approach
The United States has adopted a cautious and pragmatic approach to the crisis, balancing its support for democracy with its strategic interests in the region.
While condemning the coup and meeting with opposition leaders, Washington imposed sanctions on senior military officials but spared the regime’s main source of revenue: the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, which earns more than $1.5 billion a year and provides the junta with much-needed hard currency.
The United States also refrained from penalizing foreign companies that do business with the regime, such as Thai energy firms and Singaporean banks.
This restraint was partly aimed at placating regional allies and partners, some of whom have maintained ties with the junta.
Thailand, which shares a long border and close economic links with Myanmar, has been supportive of the regime, which it sees as a bulwark against illegal migration and drug trafficking.
Thailand’s own government came to power through a military coup in 2014. Other U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, India, and Japan, have expressed concern about the situation in Myanmar but have been wary of pushing the regime closer to China.
As a result, they have kept channels of communication open with the junta, and in India’s case, even expanded economic and diplomatic relations.
China, too, has faced a dilemma over Myanmar. Before the coup, Beijing had cultivated good relations with the civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who was ousted and detained by the military.
China saw Myanmar as a key partner in its Belt and Road Initiative, a vast infrastructure project that spans across Asia and beyond. China has invested billions of dollars in projects such as pipelines, ports, and railways in Myanmar.
But China also feared that the turmoil in Myanmar would spill over its border, which stretches for about 2,000 kilometers.
China has long been a major arms supplier to the Myanmar military, but it has also supported some of the ethnic armed groups that have fought against the junta for decades.
China has also tolerated illicit arms trade across its border with Myanmar.
Chinese Hesitation
In the aftermath of the coup, China tried to hedge its bets and avoid taking sides. It did not denounce the junta or call for a return to civilian rule, but it also opened a back channel to talk to the opposition National Unity Government and urged the regime not to ban Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy.
And when clashes between the junta and one of the ethnic groups resulted in an accidental bombing of a Chinese border town, China warned Myanmar that it would take “necessary measures” if such an incident happened again.
For two years after the coup that toppled Myanmar’s civilian government, China kept a cautious distance from the generals who seized power.
When China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, visited Myanmar in the summer of 2022, he snubbed the junta leader, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, in a diplomatic slight.
But China has recently changed its approach, throwing its weight behind the military regime as it faces a bloody civil war and international isolation.
Beijing’s shift reflects its growing concern that the United States is trying to expand its influence among Myanmar’s pro-democracy opposition, which sees itself as part of a global struggle between freedom and tyranny.
The complex web of American and Chinese interests in Myanmar had allowed the country to avoid becoming a battleground in the great-power rivalry, at least for a while.
Washington and Beijing even cooperated in September 2021 to block the junta from representing Myanmar at the United Nations.
But two developments in particular alarmed China: The opening of a representative office in Washington by Myanmar’s National Unity Government, a coalition of ousted lawmakers and ethnic minorities that opposes the junta, and the passage of new U.S. legislation on Myanmar earlier this year.
The Burma Act, part of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act, reaffirmed Washington’s goal of ending the coup and provided nonlethal military assistance to opposition forces, mostly in the form of communications equipment.
It did not authorize combat support or impose sanctions on Myanmar’s state-owned oil and gas company. Nor did it result in a significant increase in U.S. aid to the opposition, which remains minimal compared with Washington’s support for Ukraine in its war with Russia.
The office of the National Unity Government in Washington was mainly intended to coordinate lobbying efforts and raise the opposition’s profile, and its effectiveness remains unclear.
But China interpreted both moves as signs of a radical shift in U.S. policy and responded by embracing the junta more openly.
