Why the Battle for Kordofan Matters in Western Sudan's Power Struggle

In the heart of Sudan’s raging conflict, the fires of battle grow fiercer by the day. Yet increasingly, all eyes are turning toward Kordofan—a region where geography meets strategy, and supply lines intertwine with the keys to the capital and other vital territories.

Amid its sprawling plains and rugged mountains—natural defensive ramparts in their own right—Kordofan is fast becoming a decisive battleground, one where half-measures hold no sway. 

Over recent months, it has become clear that control over this province signifies far more than a fleeting tactical victory. It is, in many ways, the gateway to dominance.

According to observers, Kordofan is the gateway to westward expansion—a strategic and political lever capable of exerting pressure on central Sudan, and potentially a launchpad for striking at rebel strongholds in Darfur, the heartland of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and backed by the United Arab Emirates.

It is here, precisely, that the significance of this vast region comes into sharp relief—a frontline in the brutal contest of attrition between Sudan’s armed forces and the RSF militia.

As clashes intensify across South and West Kordofan, and both sides unveil new offensive tactics, the conflict raises pressing questions: Why this province? Why are both the army and the RSF militia locked in such a fierce struggle for control?

Escalation of the Battles

Since May 14, 2025, Sudan’s Kordofan states have witnessed a sharp military escalation between the national army and the RSF militia.

Observers see this development as part of a broader RSF militia strategy—an attempt to stall the army’s advance toward Darfur and prevent it from reinforcing key cities in the restive region.

Particularly in West Kordofan, the fierce clashes are increasingly seen as a potential turning point—one that could redraw the military map and recalibrate the balance of power across western Sudan.

Following a series of gains by the Sudanese Armed Forces in the central regions—most notably in Sennar, Gezira, and Khartoum—army units have begun pushing westward toward Darfur, advancing through the three Kordofan states: North, South, and West.

This westward thrust is seen as a strategic effort to secure the capital and central heartlands, shielding them from the persistent threat posed by the RSF militia.

The army has made significant headway in the southern part of North Kordofan, reclaiming control of the towns of Um Rawaba and Rahad, and breaking the siege on el-Obeid, the state capital.

Yet, despite these advances, the northern areas of the state—including Barah, West Barah, the Hamra, and Sodari—remain firmly in the grip of the RSF militia.

Complex Map of Control

In West Kordofan, control of the terrain is split between the warring factions. The RSF militia hold sway over several key areas, including al-Fulah, Muglad, Abu Zabad, al-Sunut, Ghubaysh, Wad Banda, al-Idia, Kilak, and Lagawa.

The Sudanese army, meanwhile, retains control of several strategic towns—most notably Babanusa, home to the 22nd Infantry Division’s headquarters, as well as al-Khuwei and the oil-rich area of Heglig.

In South Kordofan, the Sudanese Armed Forces maintain control over most of the major towns, including the state capital Kadugli, along with Dilling, Abu Jubeiha, al-Abbasiyya, Tegali, and Kalogi.

The army has also recaptured the town of al-Dahilib, located near the stronghold of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu.

For over three decades, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North has held sway over the southwest of the state—particularly in the localities of al-Buram, Umm Durein, and Heiban, home to the town of Kauda, the group’s de facto administrative capital, where it operates its own civil governance structures.

In the northern part of the same state, the RSf militia are entrenched in the locality of al-Quoz, now the scene of fierce fighting following recent advances by the army just two days earlier.

On May 14, 2025, government forces succeeded in recapturing the town of al-Hamadi, which had been under RSF militia control since the onset of the conflict. 

They are now closing in on al-Dibibat, the last remaining RSF militia stronghold in the state.

The Battle of En-Nahud

According to military sources cited by al-Rakoba on May 18, 2025, the RSF militia view the army’s swift advance as a serious threat—particularly from a special unit known as the “Hunter Mobile,” a joint force comprising highly trained army personnel, Darfur armed movements, and logistical support battalions. 

Equipped with advanced weaponry and comprehensive combat supplies, this unit aims for a direct push into the Darfur region.

In response, the RSF militia has deployed significant reinforcements to the city of en-Nahud—West Kordofan’s provisional capital—where prominent leaders are based, including Huthaifa Abu Nuba, head of the RSF militia Advisory Council, and the forces’ spokesperson, Fatih Qarshi, according to the same sources.

In early May, the RSF militia seized control of en-Nahud, a strategically located city linking Kordofan and Darfur. 

En-Nahud is also an economic hub, home to the country’s largest markets for peanuts and gum arabic, as well as one of western Sudan’s most important livestock trading centers.

The RSF militia then advanced toward al-Khuwei area west of en-Nahud and began pushing toward el-Obeid. 

However, the army successfully repelled the attack, recapturing al-Khuwei and inflicting heavy losses on the RSF militia.

Military sources speaking to Al-Rakoba described the blow to the RSF militia as reminiscent of the defeat they suffered at Jebel Moya in Sennar state in October 2024—a pivotal moment that marked a turning point in the army’s favour in central Sudan and paved the way for the eventual liberation of Sennar and Gezira states.

Meanwhile, Minni Arko Minawi, the governor of the Darfur region, wrote on Facebook that the clashes in al-Khuwei and surrounding areas constitute a “battle of bone-breaking,” asserting that the RSF militia has committed most of its reserves and heavy weaponry to this confrontation.

He explained that the path from Kordofan to al Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, is now open.

In response, the RSF militia claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on the army and its allies, reporting hundreds of casualties and the capture of dozens of vehicles. 

The RSF militia reiterated its determination to continue advancing across Kordofan and Darfur.

A Decisive Battle

“Whoever controls Kordofan effectively holds the keys to supply routes and intervention into Darfur, Khartoum, and even the fringes of southern Libya,” Sudanese politician Dr. Ibrahim Abdel Ati told Al-Estiklal.

He sees the ongoing battles in the state as a decisive turning point in the balance of power—one intrinsically linked to the broader map of control and influence across western and central Sudan.

“The city of en-Nahud serves as the gateway to the west, while al-Khuwei functions as a critical transport hub and logistical stronghold. Whoever controls these towns can command the military depth across Darfur on one side and North Kordofan on the other, while also opening routes toward the desert belt bordering Libya,” Abdel Ati added.

He added that the RSF militia, in their efforts to consolidate their presence in en-Nahud and extend control over al-Khuwei, have mobilized a significant military contingent previously stationed around al Fashir, the capital of North Darfur.

“The Rapid Support Forces militia aimed with these deployments to establish a deep defensive line stretching from al-Khuwei and al-Nahud westwards toward the areas of Brouch, Jebel Hella or Jebel Awliya, and Um Kadada, ultimately reaching Kuma, located east of al Fashir—a site of profound strategic significance in the Darfur conflict,” Abdel Ati said.

However, Abdel Ati believes these manoeuvres have fallen short of the RSF militia’s expectations, explaining that “the successive defeats suffered by these forces, particularly across northern Kordofan and South Darfur, have fragmented their ranks on multiple fronts, opening the door for the Sudanese army to make significant territorial gains.”

In a broader analysis, Abdel Ati explains that the Sudanese army has taken to heart the lesson of losing en-Nahud earlier in the conflict, viewing it as an early warning bell on the dangers of complacency in battlefield management.

“The loss of major cities does not easily fade from strategic memory,” he said, “especially given the harsh experience the army endured at the start of the war, when it lost control over vital centres such as Khartoum and Gezira—moments that marked both a military and morale-breaking setback.”

Abdel Ati says these hard lessons have made the army’s leadership acutely aware that losing ground again would mean forfeiting vital territories that cannot be easily regained.

Conversely, he noted that the RSF militia have also benefited from external military support, which has partially shifted the balance of power.

“The Emirati backing received by Hemeti, whether in the form of drones or ammunition, has revitalized RSF militia operations across multiple fronts and emboldened them to expand their offensives—reaching cities such as Port Sudan and parts of eastern Sudan—in a bid to challenge the symbolic administrative and economic control of the Sudanese state,” he noted.

Abdel Ati adds that these attacks in turn have galvanized the Sudanese army to intensify its recent operations in Kordofan, working to encircle all fronts that could serve as launchpads for counterattacks.

“We are facing an army fully aware that any further slackening risks plunging the country back into collapse,” he said, “while the RSF militia leadership is betting on fracturing the geography and wearing down the army on the battlefield. For both sides, the battle for Kordofan is one of survival and the imposition of will,” Abdel Ati concluded.