Weak Oversight: Why Iran Failed to Uncover Mossad Agents Before the Israeli Aggression

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The Israeli war on Iran since June 13, 2025, has exposed the extensive security breach within the country, revealing a long-standing infiltration by agents embedded over several years. 

These operatives were reportedly able to coordinate simultaneous attacks alongside the Israeli offensive without detection by Iranian Intelligence.

Jalal Mousavi, deputy head of the Iranian Truck Drivers’ Association, confirmed that some of the agents recently apprehended by Tehran had embedded themselves within the truck-driving community as early as three years ago.

“Some Mossad spies joined the freight fleet with forged identities and took advantage of the drivers’ lack of awareness,” said Jalal Mousavi to the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA).

Our drivers are loyal. Their cooperation was not intentional.

He added that the agents gained access by renting trucks or taking jobs as drivers, saying that “traitors” had trained for the operation long in advance.

“This was not something that happened overnight—it’s been ongoing for at least three years,” he said.

Mossad Agents

Truck drivers in Iran have been arrested on charges of working for Israel’s Foreign Intelligence Agency, Mossad.

“Israel” has launched a series of airstrikes across various parts of Iran, resulting in the deaths of senior military and political figures, including the Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Salami, several nuclear scientists, and dozens of civilians.

Some of these strikes were carried out using drones, reportedly launched from within Iran by agents targeting critical human and infrastructure sites, in coordination with the aerial assaults.

Israeli media reported that Mossad had established a drone base near the Iranian capital, Tehran.

Following this, Iranian authorities uncovered a secret three-story workshop suspected of being used by Israeli agents to manufacture and assemble small drones and explosive materials.

Iranian state television broadcast footage of a raid on the workshop in the city of Rey, near Tehran, where a large cache of drone parts and explosives was seized.

“Israel” employed these drones in coordinated attacks alongside its airstrikes on various Iranian targets.

The precise targeting of specific Iranian military commanders during the recent Israeli offensive revealed the presence of active agents operating on the ground, providing exact coordinates for the strikes.

On June 13, 2025, Israeli media released images purportedly showing Mossad operatives assembling offensive weapons systems inside Iran — an unprecedented revelation that lays bare the extent of the security breach.

Iranian security forces succeeded in tracking down some Mossad agents during the conflict, resulting in a firefight on June 18, 2025, in the city of Rey, south of Tehran, involving suspected operatives linked to Israeli Intelligence.

Authorities also announced the arrest of a group accused of conducting espionage activities on behalf of Mossad.

According to Mehr News Agency, “the security operation in Tehran thwarted a planned “terrorist” attack intended to strike densely populated areas of the capital.

Morad Moradi, deputy governor of Bukharistan city in Isfahan province, confirmed that the group was arrested while entering the city.

Speaking to local news agency Tasnim on June 18, Moradi revealed that a large cache of explosives, small drones equipped with targeting systems, advanced weaponry, sophisticated communications gear, and remote control devices were seized during a search of the vehicle the group was traveling in.

He added that the group planned to use this equipment to carry out large-scale suicide attacks in densely populated areas.

Key Weapon

Since the onset of Israeli strikes, Iranian authorities have arrested 28 individuals in Tehran on espionage charges, with one construction worker executed on these grounds in what appeared to be a stark warning to potential collaborators.

The wave of arrests followed revelations that Mossad agents had smuggled weapons into Iran ahead of the unprecedented Israeli offensive, using them to target the country from within.

Suspicion in Tehran has since intensified to such an extent that the Intelligence Ministry has urged citizens to report any suspicious activity, issuing guidelines on how to identify potential collaborators.

In mid-June 2025, the Iranian Intelligence Ministry issued a statement urging citizens to be vigilant against strangers wearing masks or protective glasses, driving small trucks carrying large bags, or filming around military, industrial, or residential areas.

Elsewhere, state-affiliated news agency Nour News—known for its close ties to Iranian security services—published a written notice warning against individuals wearing “masks, hats, and sunglasses, even at night,” as well as those receiving “frequent shipments by post.”

The poster urged citizens to report “unusual sounds inside homes, such as screaming, the noise of metal equipment, continuous knocking, and houses with drawn curtains even during daylight hours.”

In another poster attributed to the police and circulated by official media, landlords who had recently rented out their properties were advised to notify authorities immediately.

In this context, retired Brigadier General Abdullah al-Asaad, head of the Syrian Rasad Center for Strategic Studies, said Iran’s failure to detect Mossad agents trained for this extensive operation years ago “leaves no doubt that Tehran’s recent focus on its foreign proxies and support has created security gaps, enabling Israel to recruit agents through methods unfamiliar in conventional military conflicts within Iran itself.”

“When we consider the assembly and reconfiguration of drones within Iran without detection by security forces, it becomes clear these cells operated like lone wolves and successfully carried out intelligence missions at the critical moment,” Al-Asaad told Al-Estiklal.

“It is possible Israel managed to recruit these agents from Iranian militias that had fought abroad and returned to Iran as operatives after receiving highly specialized and precise training for sensitive missions like those seen following the recent Israeli attack.”

“Iran’s failure to secure its borders beyond official crossings likely facilitated the establishment of an Israeli spy network […] it is clear these operatives have been trained for years, not merely months or days.”

“The presence of a resident Jewish community in Iran may have aided the purchase of land and the establishment of major companies within the country, supporting the facilitation of drone strikes on vital infrastructure and personnel,” al-Asaad added.

“Especially since the developments in the war have shown clear signs of these agents’ ability to relay intelligence and carry out missions even after the successive Israeli attacks began.” 

“This means Israel has used these agents as a key weapon in the new conflict, increasing both the number of targets and the precision of strikes — exposing the fragility of Iran’s security oversight,”  al-Asaad continued.

The series of covert sabotage operations carried out by Mossad deep inside Iran, which led to the destruction of air defence systems and ballistic missile launchers, would not have been possible without the involvement of hundreds of Mossad operatives inside the country, including a specialized unit of Iranian agents working on behalf of Mossad.

In central Iran, Mossad commando units deployed guided weapon systems in open areas near Iranian surface-to-air missile launch sites.

In another area within Iran, Mossad secretly deployed advanced weapon systems and technology concealed in vehicles. 

According to Axios, “When the Israeli attack began, these weapons were launched and destroyed Iranian air defense targets.”

Community Roots

Mossadegh Pour, director of the Center for Arab-Iranian Strategic Studies, argued that “Israel’s” recruitment of agents is rooted in its exploitation of Iran’s growing poverty rates.

Speaking in a televised interview on June 14, 2025, Pour said that “as living conditions in Iran deteriorate, there are individuals whose loyalties are not to the nation—people who are willing to sell themselves. This is precisely what Israel has capitalized on.”

“In recent months, Israel succeeded in recruiting two Iranians who were later arrested. One of them, it was revealed, was lured by a payment of half a million dollars—motivated by the financial incentive to settle personal debts,” Pour said.

Iran’s economy is defined by chronic inflation hovering between 30 and 40 percent, a budget deficit estimated at 20 to 25 percent, persistent unemployment, and a steadily depreciating currency.

The Iranian rial plunged by roughly 12 percent against the euro immediately following the Israeli strikes, while the black-market rate for the U.S. dollar soared past 955,000 rials.

This sharp drop adds to a prolonged downturn since 2024, during which the rial has lost more than 40 percent of its value—cementing its position among the world’s weakest currencies.

The Mossad-led campaign against Iran is hardly a recent phenomenon. For years, the country has been the target of a string of covert operations—many attributed to “Israel”—that have sought to infiltrate and undermine its security apparatus.

One of the most brazen examples came in 2020, when a prominent Iranian nuclear scientist was assassinated with what reports described as a remote-controlled machine gun mounted on a vehicle—an operation widely believed to bear the hallmark of Israeli Intelligence.

That attack followed an earlier high-stakes mission in 2018, when Mossad agents reportedly broke into a secure warehouse in Tehran and extracted more than 100,000 sensitive documents linked to Iran’s secret nuclear program, known as Project AMAD.

In April 2025, Israel Hayom revisited what remains one of Mossad’s most audacious operations: the 2018 theft of “Iran’s nuclear archive”. 

“half a ton of incriminating documentation about Iran's nuclear program,” as described by a source who was exposed to the materials in their entirety.

Upon reviewing the trove, Mossad concluded that the unifying thread running through the files was their connection to Iran’s nuclear program. 

Then-Mossad chief Yossi Cohen is said to his operatives to “prepare to bring the material home”—a mission successfully executed over the following two years.

The breach represented one of the most severe intelligence setbacks for Iran in recent memory, echoing similar infiltration efforts uncovered within Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed group founded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 1982. 

In recent years, the Lebanese movement has also found itself grappling with the presence of hundreds of embedded Israeli agents operating from within.

Since October 2023, “Israel” has escalated its campaign of targeted assassinations, moving beyond mid-level operatives to strike senior figures within Hezbollah’s upper echelon. 

A series of precision attacks—some launched deep into Beirut’s southern suburbs—reportedly targeted and killed top leaders, including former secretary-generals Hassan Nasrallah and Hachem Safieddine.

According to regional sources, nearly 80% of Hezbollah’s senior leadership has been eliminated through direct Israeli assassinations carried out within Lebanon.

In the wake of these killings, Lebanese authorities announced the arrest of several alleged Israeli operatives. 

Those detained have been charged with supplying intelligence and precise coordinates relating to key Hezbollah figures and locations used by the group.

In Gaza, long before the latest Israeli offensive, the Ministry of Interior and National Security systematically worked to dismantle networks of informants collaborating with “Israel.” 

Through sustained security campaigns, many collaborators were persuaded to turn themselves in, often receiving reduced sentences, while others who resisted were arrested.

The Palestinian resistance also played a pivotal role in crippling Israel’s Intelligence-gathering operations within the strip. 

From 2014 through 2023, a series of coordinated security crackdowns effectively dried up the occupation’s local information sources. 

These efforts were bolstered by strong community opposition to informants, with social stigma extending to their families and broader circles—further isolating and weakening such networks.