Understanding the Maghreb's Firm Position on the New Syria

Despite the appointment of the Military Operations Command, which toppled Bashar al-Assad's regime, and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa as Syria's interim president, Maghreb countries remain hesitant to open a new chapter with the country.

North African Arab nations are still reluctant to build ties with the new Syria and move past their previous alignment with the ousted regime, despite the victory of the Syrian people's revolution.

Leading this group are Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco, each with differing ties to Assad’s fallen regime, which was toppled on December 8, 2024, forcing his escape to Russia.

Algeria

Assad’s regime had strong ties with Algeria, which explains why Algiers has refrained from congratulating Syria’s new leadership, unlike most Arab nations.

For years, Algeria opposed Syria’s suspension from the Arab League in 2011 and never withdrew its ambassador from Damascus.

After Assad's fall, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf said Algeria recognizes states, not governments.

During a press conference on December 30, 2024, Attaf reaffirmed Algeria’s stance on Syria, emphasizing three core principles: the country's territorial integrity, an inclusive political solution for all Syrians, and UN supervision over any political dialogue to safeguard Syria’s future.

A week before Assad’s downfall, Attaf had called his counterpart in the former regime, Bassam Sabbagh, expressing Algeria’s solidarity with “Syria in facing terrorist threats to its sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, security, and stability.”

This call came after opposition factions made significant advances across Syria starting November 27, 2024, eventually taking full control of Idlib province and Aleppo, the country's economic hub, expelling Assad’s forces and militias by November 29.

Algeria is currently facing a challenging situation, given its significant role in efforts to reintegrate Assad’s former regime into the Arab League in May 2023.

Despite its cautious approach toward engaging with Syria’s new leadership, Algeria remains involved in discussions about lifting sanctions on the country. Its UN representative, Amar Bendjama, has played a direct role in these talks, with Algeria presiding over a UN Security Council session in January 2025.

Algeria is now reassessing its diplomatic arrangements in Damascus following the departure of its ambassador, Kamel Bouchama, from the Syrian capital on January 9.

In this context, Tunisian political analyst Salah Attia noted that Algeria will not remain outside the new Syrian landscape and is now looking for ways to engage.

“Algeria’s position is tied to regional dynamics, both in the Maghreb and the Arab world. From this perspective, it sees Syria as an integral part of its broader strategy, as Arab relations matter equally to both countries,” he added on January 21.

Algeria, in fact, has a strategic relationship with neighboring Libya, which was the only North African country to send a large delegation to Damascus to meet with the new leadership.

This was evident in the visit of Libya’s Minister of Communications and Political Affairs, Walid Al-Lafi—who is close to Ankara and Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh—along with the head of military intelligence, Mahmoud Hamza, to meet Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus.

In the coming months, Libya is expected to appoint an ambassador to the Syrian capital. On January 4, 2025, a Libyan aircraft carrying 34 tons of aid was sent to Syria from Misrata International Airport.

Tunisia

No different from Algeria, Tunisia has consistently supported Assad’s regime throughout its war on the Syrian people.

On December 5, 2024, the government condemned the Syrian opposition’s efforts to overthrow the regime.

“Tunisia strongly condemns the recent terrorist attacks targeting northern Syria and calls on the international community to support the country in preserving its sovereignty, security, stability, and territorial integrity,” the Tunisian Foreign Ministry stated.

The growing ties between Tunisian President Kais Saied and Assad led to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 2023. However, Tunisian diplomats now insist on maintaining these ties while maneuvering carefully on the diplomatic front.

So far, no new framework for relations has emerged. Tunisian Foreign Minister Mohamed Ali Nafti has yet to hold talks with his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shaibani, and no official visits between the two countries have been scheduled.

One of the key areas of cooperation between Tunisia and Damascus has been the issue of “Tunisian fighters” in Syria.

However, the Tunisian intelligence officer stationed in Damascus since 2011—responsible for identifying these fighters in coordination with Assad’s former security services—retired before 2023, and no replacement has been appointed.

Meanwhile, Syria’s interim leadership has dissolved all security agencies and military units affiliated with the former Assad regime.

A sensitive issue that may hinder the resumption of ties between Tunisia and Syria’s interim leadership is the presence of “Tunisian fighters” within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, though their numbers are only in the dozens.

The interim leadership in Syria has yet to clarify the fate of foreign fighters who were part of the Military Operations Command which played a key role in toppling Assad.

Tunisia remains concerned about instability in northeastern Syria, where large areas are under the control of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Around 900 Tunisians affiliated with ISIS, along with their wives and children, are housed in camps guarded by Kurdish armed groups. Monitoring them has become increasingly difficult due to the lack of communication between Tunisian diplomats and Kurdish factions.

Tunisian journalists argue that the issue of repatriating “Tunisian fighters” from Syria will be a decisive factor in shaping relations with the country’s interim leadership.

Since 2022, Tunisian authorities have prosecuted dozens of politicians, university professors, mosque preachers, and security officials in connection with the so-called “Tunisian Fighter Transfer File,” which investigated the recruitment of Tunisians to fight against Assad’s regime following the Syrian revolution.

On the economic front, Tunisia is exploring the long-term possibility of importing Syrian wheat, but major wheat-producing areas remain in the unstable northeast.

Mauritania

Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani has not signaled any intent to engage with Syria’s new leadership, despite appointing Sidi Ould Doman as Mauritania’s ambassador to Damascus on February 13, 2024.

The Syrian community in Mauritania—comprising hundreds of displaced individuals among the millions forced from their homes by Assad’s regime—celebrated the Syrian revolution’s victory and Assad’s ouster with a large rally in the capital, Nouakchott.

The demonstration, which included dozens of Mauritanians, marked the historic moment with banners and chants condemning Assad’s crimes.

At the semi-official level, however, some Mauritanian voices expressed concern over “the dramatic shift in Syria.

Former Mauritania Foreign Minister Isselkou Ahmed Izid Bih voiced skepticism in a social media post the day after Assad’s fall, writing: “Syria will be divided into Taliban-style emirates, sectarian and ethnic enclaves competing against one another, alongside small, economically thriving Somaliland-like entities on the Mediterranean coast, each under the influence of foreign powers. This division will become entrenched through constitutional sectarianism and factionalism.”

Morocco

Morocco’s presence in Syria’s new political landscape has remained minimal. Rabat has yet to dispatch a diplomatic delegation to Damascus, despite a phone call between Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shaibani, in late December 2024.

The Moroccan embassy, which has been closed for years, has not resumed operations, with only local staff assigned to oversee the premises.

“According to observers, this diplomatic move reflects a shared desire between Rabat and Damascus to overcome past disagreements that strained bilateral relations and to explore new avenues of cooperation,” wrote Moroccan writer Taoufiq Boufertih of Hespress.

“The changes in Syria following Bashar al-Assad’s fall create realistic opportunities to rebuild relations on common ground that serve both nations' interests.”

It is worth mentioning that Morocco, along with Qatar, opposed Assad’s return to the Arab League.

However, in early December—amid the collapse of Assad’s forces against the opposition factions—Morocco set up emergency contact numbers for its citizens in Syria. Meanwhile, its ambassador to Beirut, Mohammad Krin, remains Rabat’s official representative in Damascus.

Still, Morocco appears relatively at ease with Syria’s transition.

Notably, King Mohammed VI hosted the fourth Friends of the Syrian People conference in Marrakech in December 2012. The gathering resulted in increased political, military, and financial support for the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

By providing a platform for Syria’s opposition at this conference, Morocco effectively dealt a major blow to its ties with the Assad regime, especially since the event recognized the opposition coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.

In fact, the King of Morocco was the first Arab leader to visit the Zaatari refugee camp for Syrians in Jordan in 2012.