Polishing Khamenei's Image Amid Internal Struggles and External Pressures

The hardline conservative faction in Iran continues its efforts to "polish the image" of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the eyes of the Iranian public, attempting to cover up the setbacks faced by the regime both domestically and internationally.

Anti-regime slogans, raised throughout months of protests following the death of Iranian woman Mahsa Amini on 13 September 2022 at the hands of the morality police, continue to unsettle the regime's inner circle.

Polishing Khamenei’s Image

These days, it is evident that Khamenei's official representatives in Iran's provinces are playing a prominent role in confronting those who oppose the regime's policies in a country under heavy international sanctions.

In one of the latest remarks, Lotfollah Dezhkam, Khamenei's representative in Fars province, stated, "Today, Khamenei stands as the representative of Imam Mahdi to prevent us from straying."

Speaking on 24 January 2025, he added, "Some abandon their faith to obtain the citizenship of another country, but to be a Muslim under the banner of Imam Mahdi and his deputy is no small matter."

Shia Twelvers believe in the return of the Mahdi, the twelfth Imam, and the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is regarded as his deputy.

The Supreme Leader holds ultimate authority in Iran, serving as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and determining the direction of foreign policy, which is largely defined by the confrontation with the United States and “Israel.”

The Supreme Leader oversees all three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—and possesses wide-ranging powers, including setting the country's general policies, selecting military leaders and security chiefs, and even removing the president.

The head of Iran’s judiciary is appointed every five years by the Supreme Leader.

The leader also has the final say on foreign policy matters, including nuclear negotiations with the United States.

In this context, the role of Khamenei's representatives in Iran's provinces emerges as crucial in reinforcing the "pillars of the Islamic Republic" against the threats posed by domestic opposition and "enemies abroad."

The religious elite, known as the "clerics," attempt to project a softer rhetoric to address growing internal economic crises and the mounting anger among Iranians over the social and political restrictions imposed by the regime.

Dezhkam's comments align with the broader phenomenon of flattery towards the Iranian Supreme Leader, a trend that has intensified in the country.

Since the 2018 protests, there has been an increase in incidents of Khamenei’s portraits being torn down or burned in various cities and provinces, with these acts becoming more frequent after the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini.

On 4 October 2024, Dezhkam stated, "If the Supreme Leader gives the order, the people are ready to throw all Israeli soldiers into the Red Sea."

"This revolution is like Noah’s Ark, managed and preserved by Khamenei on behalf of the absent Imam Mahdi," Dezhkam noted.

Internal Concerns

In this context, Iranian affairs writer Ammar Jalo suggests that "the official discourse surrounding Khamenei stems from his religious status and the position of the Supreme Leader, which emerged after the 1979 Iranian Revolution."

This is an acknowledgment that his authority represents the Imam Mahdi’s oversight of both public and private affairs until his reappearance, according to Shia tradition.

Jalo told Al-Estiklal, "As a result, Iran has institutionalized and legislated all matters of the political system based on the rhetoric repeated by the Supreme Leader’s representatives in public sessions and seminaries."

"Those beneath the Supreme Leader, such as individuals referred to as Ayatollah and Hujjat al-Islam in Iran, often circulate stories of Khamenei’s meetings with the awaited Mahdi, claiming that he provides guidance on public affairs, and even what could be called the 'sanctioning of figures,'" he noted.

Jalo added, "For example, Khamenei excluded his relationship with former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad based on the Supreme Leader's role as a representative of the Mahdi in both public and private matters, including the collection of Khums (a religious tax) and resolving disputes between parties."

A religious figure close to the Iranian regime, Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, stated in May 2016 during a conference held in Qom that "one of the reasons for the Supreme Leader's success is his constant communication with the Imam Zaman at the Jamkaran Mosque."

The term "Imam Zaman" is used by Shia Muslims to refer to the "awaited Mahdi" who is believed to reappear at the end of times.

The "Jamkaran Mosque," mentioned by the Iranian cleric, is located in Qom and is considered sacred by the Iranian regime, as it was reportedly ordered to be built by the Mahdi himself.

The Iranian constitution grants "absolute authority" to the Supreme Leader, with obedience to him seen as "mandatory," similar to the obedience expected to the Mahdi.

Jalo explained that "promoting such rhetoric about Khamenei at this time is tied to the Iranian regime's concerns over increased emigration, particularly of skilled professionals, and the growing economic discontent and decline in birth rates in Iran."

In September 2024, the Iranian Population Research Institute reported that the average age of marriage for women had reached 24, and for men, approximately 28, in 2023. It also noted a 6% annual decline in marriage rates in Iran since 2011.

In that same month, Khamenei, in his first meeting with newly appointed government officials after Masoud Bezhkishan's presidential victory, urged the health minister to adopt policies encouraging population growth and higher birth rates in the country, which has a population of around 86 million.

To encourage births, the government has launched a campaign featuring posters across the country, one of which depicts parents with their four children under the roof of their home, bearing the slogan "Children, the Pulse of Our Lives."

Amidst mounting economic crises and a lack of adequate welfare over the past decades, Iranian society has entered a phase of "mass emigration."

The Iranian Center for Strategic Studies, based on a poll, warned that Iranian society is entering a "mass emigration" phase, highlighting serious issues in human capital investment.

In a report released on 3 August 2024, the center stated, "We are now at the peak of the 'desire and decision' to emigrate, particularly among skilled workers and those with capital."

The study found that groups such as "doctors and nurses" and "students and graduates" cited economic problems caused by inflation as the primary factors influencing their desire to emigrate.

Sensitive Battles

The phenomenon of excessive praise for Khamenei dominates the supporters of the Velayat-e Faqih system, an ideology that emerged in Iran after the fall of the Shah’s regime in February 1979.

Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi, known for his close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, previously issued a fatwa declaring critics of Velayat-e Faqih as "polytheists."

Yazdi, one of the most prominent supporters of the conservative faction who passed away in 2021, promoted the belief that the Supreme Leader was merely the deputy of the "awaited Mahdi" and held all of the Mahdi's powers, as well as those of the infallible prophet.

He had stated that the people “must simply obey him and follow his orders, without the right to object or even consult or participate in decisions."

This extreme reverence for the Supreme Leader led Misbah Yazdi to once bow and kiss Khamenei’s shoe during a notable visit to the Leader's home.

Such a "sacralized" view of Khamenei faces criticism within Iran, where citizens demand solutions to their problems and an end to their marginalization.

On January 13, 2023, Abdolhamid Ismaeelzahi, the Sunni Friday prayer leader in Zahedan, mocked Khamenei’s remarks about the role of religious praise singers in "sensitive battles."

Ismaeelzahi stated that the country’s problems cannot be solved by praise and sermons, and that experts and intellectuals must be consulted instead.

It is striking that those who represent Iran's Supreme Leader do not hesitate to fiercely defend the country's foreign policies through grandiose slogans.

With Donald Trump's return to the presidency of the United States, discussions have emerged about the potential reimplementation of his "maximum pressure" strategy against Iran, which would be even more stringent than during his first term (2017-2021) when he withdrew from the nuclear deal and imposed harsh sanctions on Tehran.

In this context, Lotfollah Dezhkam, Khamenei's representative, lashed out at the United States after Trump’s re-election.

He stated, “God willing, we will turn the White House into a Hosseiniyeh, and let the U.S. presidents who fear not God be certain that this promise will be fulfilled.”

Dezhkam added on January 10, 2025, “Trump will die as (former president Jimmy) Carter did, and he will take with him to the grave his wish to harm the Iranian regime.”

When the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which Iran had supported for over a decade in its crackdown on the Syrian revolution, finally collapsed, Khamenei's representative in Ardabil, Hassan Ameli, claimed that “the circulated images of Syrian prisons are fabricated using artificial intelligence or taken from detention centers in other countries.”

This statement was an attempt to deny the atrocities and conditions in al-Assad's prisons, which fell on December 8, 2024.

Ameli further stated on December 12, “Hypocrites are making videos of brutality using artificial intelligence, then spreading them inside Iran.”

Khamenei commented in early January 2025 on the situation in Syria, “Some believe and may even promote that with the recent events in the region, the blood spilled in defense of the shrine of Lady Zaynab has been wasted; this is a grave mistake.”

He continued, “This big mistake was made by those individuals—the blood has not been wasted […] victory in Syria will come soon.”

In response to Khamenei's remarks, the opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) stated, “Continuing his futile efforts to overcome his regime's predicament in Syria, the Supreme Leader of the Iranian regime made public comments in response to increasing criticism and mockery over the Iranian regime’s failure in Syria.”

The MEK noted that Khamenei’s statements come after “wasting tens of billions of dollars and losing thousands of members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria.”