Kurdistan Elections: Navigating the Governance Landscape Amid Opposition's Rise

After nearly two years of delays, originally set for 2022, the results of the Kurdistan Region Parliament elections in Iraq have revealed a familiar outcome: the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has emerged victorious, capturing 40 percent of the votes.

In a close second was the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which received 20 percent of the votes. Both parties share influence, but disputes and divisions persist, preventing either from achieving a majority.

Meanwhile, opposition forces, notably the New Generation Movement and the Kurdistan Islamic Union, made significant gains, winning 15 and 7 seats respectively, accounting for nearly a quarter of the 100-member parliament.

This indicates that the elections could reshape the power dynamics between the dominant ruling duo that has held sway over Kurdistan since gaining autonomy in 1991, despite the growing rifts between them.

However, the reduction in seats for the two main parties is evident, as they are increasingly held responsible for the deteriorating economic conditions following Baghdad's suspension of oil exports from Kurdistan and the prevalence of corruption.

How Impactful Is the Change?

While the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by the Barzani family, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, headed by the Talabani clan, continue to dominate the political landscape, a significant change in the elections was not anticipated.

However, Kurdish analysts believe the results have somewhat diminished their influence. According to a statement from the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), the ruling party (Kurdistan Democratic Party) won the majority of seats, securing 39 out of 100 in the elections held on October 20, 2024, losing six seats compared to the 2018 results.

In the outgoing parliament, this party held a relative majority with 45 seats and had formed alliances with representatives elected under a quota system designated for the Christian and Turkmen minorities, meaning it has lost six seats in the 2024 elections.

The results for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which came in second, were also weak, as it gained 23 seats in parliament, an increase of just two from the 21 it held before.

Meanwhile, the New Generation Movement, which competes with the Patriotic Union in its stronghold of Sulaymaniyah, placed third and won 15 seats, up from 8 in the previous parliament.

The Kurdistan Islamic Union (linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) secured fourth place with 7 seats, up from 5 in the 2018 elections. This result marks a significant improvement, as the party finished sixth in the previous electoral cycle.

The Movement for Change (Gorran Movement) suffered a defeat, receiving only about 11,000 votes and achieving just one seat, down from 12 in the 2018 elections.

The Kurdistan Justice Group, an opposition faction, lost 4 out of its 7 seats from the previous parliament.

It ranked sixth after the National Stance Movement led by former Movement for Change MP Ali Hama Saleh, which won 4 seats.

The People's Front secured 2 seats, while the Kurdistan Alliance gained 1 seat.

The final voter turnout for the Kurdistan Parliament elections was 72 percent, according to the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC).

A total of 14 parties and political movements, along with independent candidates, participated in this electoral cycle in KRI.

Upcoming Crises

The results indicate no major shifts are expected in KRI's political landscape. Neither of the two main parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), secured a majority allowing one to form a government without an agreement with the other party or other political groups.

The focus may shift to a potential alliance between the Kurdistan Democratic Union and its rival, the PUK, led by Pafel Talabani, which secured 23 seats.

However, the most notable change in the upcoming parliament's seat distribution is the New Generation Movement's gain of 15 seats, doubling its representation from the previous parliamentary session.

Islamists, represented by the Kurdistan Islamic Union (7 seats), have seen a rise in popularity, which raises the possibility of their participation in the government, although they are expected to take on the role of leading the parliamentary opposition in the coming term.

The Islamists are reluctant to join the next government, frustrated with the ruling parties, and keen to distance themselves from the two dominant factions.

The bigger issue lies between the two main parties (KDP and PUK), which are facing a political struggle and a legal crisis following the elections, as reported by Kurdiu on October 23, 2024.

The crisis revolves around the process of electing the President of KRI, which remains a topic of debate. There is contention over whether the election should be decided by a simple majority or a two-thirds majority, especially given the absence of a specific constitution for KRI to govern this process.

The KDP insists on filling positions by simple majority, proposing that the presidency and premiership go to its party while assigning the parliamentary presidency to the PUK. 

The latter opposes this plan and has threatened to escalate the issue to the Iraqi Federal Court.

“What applies to the presidency of the republic also applies to the presidency of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The president requires a two-thirds majority, complicating the matter and delaying the formation of the government,” legal expert Bakr Hama Siddiq told Kurdiu.

The same website also quoted legal expert Rebin Ahmed, who argued that “with no constitution in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Article 17 of the law governing the presidency calls for election by a majority of members but doesn’t specify whether this majority should be simple or absolute.”

“In the previous term, Kurdistan’s President was elected by a simple majority. Since KRI lacks a constitution, it currently operates under the presidency law, with hopes that the next parliament will enact a constitution to address these legal ambiguities,” he added.

Currently, the KDP controls both the presidency and the premiership, considering these positions vital and within its rights. The PUK has threatened to change this balance of power following the elections.

Both ruling Kurdish parties share influence in the KRI's cities: the KDP governs Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK controls Sulaymaniyah and Halabja.

The two parties also share influence over most security and economic positions. The KDP operates the Asayish (internal security) and has its own Peshmerga forces, similar to the PUK.

Experts on Kurdish politics expect that forming the new government could be a lengthy process, likely taking several months, due to ongoing disputes between the two main parties and the influence of regional and international factors.

This has prompted the United States, France, and Britain, who supported Kurdistan's separation from Iraq, to encourage the victorious Kurdish factions to expedite the formation of a new government to promote stability.

A Loss for Iran?

The recent elections highlighted the failure of Shia parties and those close to Baghdad or Tehran to effect significant change, leading analysts to consider this an electoral loss for their supporters.

The elections took place during a sensitive period of heightened regional tensions, fueled by Israeli aggression and fears in Kurdistan of spillover into Iraq, following similar impacts on Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Gaza.

Kurdish leaders aimed to distance KRI from the conflict while expressing substantial popular sympathy for the Palestinian cause, which contrasts with the positions of their pro-Western and Israeli-affiliated rulers.

Reports suggest that pro-Iran parties in Baghdad backed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). However, this support did not prevent the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) from advancing and securing a majority, a result observers see as a setback for Tehran and Iraq’s Shia factions.

Analysts noted that Iran and Shia parties in Baghdad aimed to enhance or consolidate their influence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, particularly in light of current developments across the Middle East. However, election results indicated Tehran's failure to achieve this goal.

The Kurdish electorate chose the secular KDP, which aligns more closely with the West, and is capable of balancing the KRI's interests with those of Iran and its affiliated parties and militias in Baghdad.

Had the PUK won, it would have effectively placed KRI under Iranian influence and strengthened the central government, which has already diminished Kurdistan's powers, such as oil exports and revenue management, as reported by the Emirati newspaper Alarab on October 25, 2024.

Previously, authorities in Sulaymaniyah, controlled by the PUK, forced opposition Kurdish party members and their affiliates to vacate all their premises in southern Sulaymaniyah and disarm.

In the ongoing rivalry between the two parties, the PUK initiated the closure of all branches of the Hesabi project in Sulaymaniyah on October 25, 2024, in a provocative move aimed at regaining what it lost in the elections.

The Hesabi project is vital for the KDP's electoral strategy, as it aims to establish a financial system in KRI that is independent of the increasingly Shia and Iranian-influenced central government in Baghdad.

Observers see the PUK’s actions as a strategic move, positioning the party for upcoming government formation negotiations while also solidifying its role as a major force in Kurdistan’s political landscape, according to Alarab.

Economic Change

Iraqi and Kurdish analysts note that the KDP’s loss of six seats compared to the 2018 elections, along with gains by opposition parties like the New Generation Movement and the Kurdistan Islamic Union, reflects a “Kurdish appetite” for change.

They attribute the decline in Kurdish conditions in recent years, such as delayed salaries, lack of electricity, corruption, and economic downturns, as contributing factors.

“Despite its oil wealth, the Kurdish region faces significant economic issues, including delayed payment of salaries to civil servants, fluctuating oil prices, and budget cuts from Baghdad,” the Associated Press (AP) has learned on October 21, 2024.

Kurdish citizens express deep dissatisfaction with the economic decline and lack of opportunities, often blaming political leaders for mismanagement. Many voters, particularly among the youth, are calling for reforms to address these issues.

Corruption remains a central issue in the elections. Over the years, the regional government has faced accusations of nepotism and a lack of transparency.

“Many voters [..] have lost hope for reforms and are also skeptical of opposition parties’ ability to make changes, given the longstanding hold the two major parties have over the political landscape,” as per AP.

In certain areas, current elections are significantly affected by security concerns, since sleeper cells are still active in areas that are disputed between the regional and central governments.

Anxiety heightened as the regional parliamentary elections occurred amid an economic crisis exacerbated by the suspension of oil exports through Turkiye, a crucial revenue source for KRI.

Turkiye halted oil flows through the Kurdistan pipeline in March 2023 after an international chamber of commerce ruling mandated Ankara to pay $1.5 billion to Baghdad for unauthorized exports by the regional government.

The elections unfolded amidst ongoing disputes between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the federal government in Iraq.

“The Kurdish Regional Government [KRG] blames its misfortunes on concerted efforts by Shia forces to shrink Kurdish autonomy,” said the Atlantic Council.

In February 2022, KRG rejected a Federal Court decision mandating the transfer of its oil to the central government in Baghdad, arguing that it was “unconstitutional.”