For the First Time: Why Did Sisi Decide to Get Rid of His Partners in the Coup?

In a striking and unprecedented move, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has abruptly dismissed 11 high-ranking military and security advisers, including two former interior ministers, prominent military leaders, and close confidants, without offering any explanation.

This decision, which marks the first such mass removal since Sisi took office in 2014, was reported by the independent outlet Mada Masr.

The sudden ousting has stirred speculation and uncertainty, as Sisi has typically kept key figures from the military and security apparatus—many of whom were his partners in the 2013 coup—in advisory roles after their official dismissals, a practice seen as both an honorific gesture and a means of managing potential discontent.

Deep Ties

The order signifies a dramatic break with his long-standing approach. This new decree, referenced as decision No. 292 of 2024, effectively removes almost all remaining individuals who were involved in the 2013 coup from the political scene, whether they were still serving in formal roles or acting as presidential advisers.

Only two key figures—former Minister of Defense Mohamed Zaki and former Chief of Staff Osama Askar—have been spared, appointed as presidential advisors on defense and military affairs, respectively.

The mass dismissal raises questions about Sisi’s motivations and his apparent determination to purge the old guard from his administration.

Notably, the dismissals include individuals with deep personal and professional ties to Sisi.

Among them is Major General Ahmed Gamal El-Din, a former Minister of Interior under President Mohamed Morsi.

Though he served for just three months before being ousted in the wake of the Al-Ittihadiya Palace protests, Gamal El-Din remained a close figure in Egypt's security apparatus. After the 2013 coup, Interim President Adly Mansour appointed him as an internal security adviser, and Sisi followed suit, appointing him as a key adviser on security in 2014.

Another significant figure removed is Major General Magdy Abdel Ghaffar, who Sisi had appointed Minister of Interior in 2015.

A former director of the National Security Agency, Abdel Ghaffar played a pivotal role in Sisi’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.

Despite his removal as Minister of Interior in 2018, Sisi kept him on as a presidential adviser until now, underscoring the importance of his role in maintaining the regime's security architecture.

Also swept aside is Lieutenant General Mohab Mamish, a former head of the Suez Canal Authority, who was appointed Sisi’s adviser for canal and seaport projects after his dismissal from the authority in 2018. Once seen as one of Sisi’s closest allies, Mamish’s fate may have been sealed after he publicly criticized a presidentially backed draft law establishing the Suez Canal Authority Fund in late 2022, a move that put him at odds with his former patron.

Their abrupt dismissal from advisory roles marks a striking departure from the president's past reliance on his military network and inner circle, leading to widespread speculation about the motives behind this sweeping purge.

Some analysts suggest it may signal a shift in the balance of power within the regime, as Sisi seeks to consolidate authority and distance himself from the figures who once formed the backbone of his rise to power.

The move also raises concerns about the trajectory of Egypt’s political landscape under Sisi’s rule.

His decision to cast aside longtime allies, many of whom played crucial roles in the 2013 military coup that brought him to power, suggests a recalibration of the president's inner circle—one that could have far-reaching implications for Egypt’s political and security future.

Gradual Removal

Since seizing power in the military coup of July 2013, Sisi has embarked on a methodical campaign to gradually remove his partners in his coup, a strategy marked by a steady rotation and reshuffling of top military and leadership positions.

This ongoing process has focused particularly on members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the key group that backed him in overthrowing former President Mohamed Morsi.

Over the past decade, Sisi has systematically ousted more than a dozen military council members, including many who played pivotal roles in securing his rise to power.

One of the most significant moves in this campaign was the dismissal of Lieutenant General Sedki Sobhi, Sisi’s first partner in the 2013 coup and then-Minister of Defense, in June 2018.

Sobhi's removal marked a major shift within SCAF, with Lieutenant General Mohamed Zaki, commander of the Republican Guard during Morsi’s presidency, stepping in to fill the role of defense minister.

Zaki's appointment signaled the beginning of a broader reshuffling of Egypt’s military leadership, as Sisi moved to consolidate power and surround himself with figures whose loyalty lay squarely with him.

“The scale and consistency of this purge are notable. Over ten years, Sisi has taken decisive steps to eliminate key military figures who were part of the coup and had significant influence within the military hierarchy before and during the power grab,” political researcher Basel Reda said.

“The reasons behind this systematic removal of his former allies remain a point of speculation,” he added. “Sisi’s willingness to take this calculated risk—despite the potential dangers of sidelining figures with substantial power and experience—suggests a deep concern for consolidating his grip on power, minimizing internal threats, and ensuring absolute loyalty from those who remain in positions of influence within the military establishment.”

As the purge continues, questions persist about the long-term impact of Sisi’s strategy.

His removal of these key figures may help secure his dominance, but it also raises the potential for tensions within the armed forces, as the president seeks to reshape Egypt’s military leadership into a structure more directly answerable to him.

The move reflects a broader trend in Sisi’s governance—one of ensuring that no rival power center remains unchecked, even among those who once helped him to the apex of Egypt’s political and military hierarchy.

Fear of Challenge

According to Reda, the motivation for these purges lies in Sisi’s deep-rooted fear of the very figures who once stood beside him.

The senior military and police leaders he removed knew every detail of the events of June 30, 2013, and July 3 of the same year, when Mohamed Morsi was ousted and Egypt’s political order was upended.

These leaders were not just witnesses but co-architects of the coup, privy to the inner workings of the regime’s plan to suppress opposition, including Islamist groups and other political dissidents.

Their intimate knowledge of the regime's past crimes and its current vulnerabilities made them a unique threat to Sisi's hold on power.

The continued presence of these individuals in leadership roles, with their detailed understanding of the coup and its aftermath, created the risk of rival power centers emerging.

Such factions could potentially challenge Sisi if their interests ever diverged from his.

“This fear is heightened by Sisi’s precarious political position: he lacks strong political or popular support that could protect him from internal dissent, particularly from those with firsthand knowledge of the regime’s inner workings,” Reda noted.

“His reliance on his own judgment, and dismissal of the voices around him, further isolates him, heightening the risk of betrayal from within,” he mentioned.

As Egypt grapples with widespread popular discontent, economic stagnation, and growing dissatisfaction with Sisi’s leadership, the president’s sense of insecurity seems to be deepening.

Reda says that against this backdrop, Sisi appears to be losing confidence in everyone around him. His ongoing purges are a reflection of this mounting anxiety.

He has increasingly turned to lesser-known figures or those who have long been outside the military hierarchy, relying on their personal loyalty to him rather than their expertise or experience.

This strategy, designed to preempt the rise of new power centers, may be an effort to shore up his position, even if the risk of an internal challenge appears minimal due to the tight security apparatus Sisi controls.

Sisi’s moves reveal a leader in a constant state of apprehension about what the future holds.

Despite his public proclamations of strength and confidence, his actions suggest a leader haunted by the potential for dissent within his own ranks.

Year after year, he has distanced himself from those who once stood beside him, eliminating anyone who might threaten his grip on power.

In doing so, Sisi seems determined to inaugurate a new phase of rule—one where he stands alone, without partners or witnesses to the past, and without anyone who might one day use their knowledge to challenge his authority.