After al-Kikli’s Death: Is Western Libya Headed for More Chaos?

On the heavy afternoon of May 12, 2025, in Libya’s capital, Tripoli, within the walls of a heavily armed military building, the sound of bombardment echoed briefly.

Just minutes of clashes were enough to end the life of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli better known as Gheniwa, head of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) and until recently one of the most powerful warlords in western Libya.

At that moment, al-Kikli’s killing was not merely a settling of scores among armed groups but marked the start of a new phase, a clear sign of the fragile balance of power in Tripoli breaking down.

Amid the smoke of explosions, a complex map of military forces emerges: the  Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DACOT) at Mitiga Airport, the 444 Brigade in the southern capital, the Public Security Service in western Tripoli, and a network of local battalions surrounding the scene.

Each faction digs in its influence on the ground like trenches in a looming battle. Power dynamics shift suddenly with the death of a leader or the rise of a faction, as if the capital itself is waiting for a massive explosion.

Amid the chaos, questions pile up: Who truly controls Tripoli amid these rival militias? How have guns redrawn the map of control in western Libya? And what fate awaits the capital under the sound of gunfire?

Regarding al-Kikli’s killing

Despite their close ties, Libya’s Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh did not hesitate to publicly praise al-Kikli’s death as news spread.

On X, Dbeibeh sent his “greetings to the Ministries of Interior and Defense and all members of the army and police,” applauding what he called a “major achievement in restoring security and enforcing state authority in the capital.”

He affirmed that the operation was meant to reinforce the principle that “there is no place in Libya except for state institutions, and no authority except for the law,” implicitly signaling the end of al-Kikli’s role and his armed groups.

Several Libyan reports revealed that the operation was not spontaneous but part of a carefully planned strategy devised by Dbeibeh in coordination with armed groups from Misrata.

Heavy-weapon convoys were brought in from Misrata, Aaz-Zawiyah, and Zintan two days before the incident, coordinated with Interior Minister Imad al-Trabelsi.

Information also indicated that al-Kikli’s killing inside al-Takbali camp was the spark for a broader assault aimed at seizing his headquarters and forces’ weapons as part of a coordinated security operation.

Meanwhile, the Misrata Revolutionaries Brigades issued a statement on May 9, giving al-Kikli’s forces, known as the Abu Salim militia, 72 hours to hand over Saif al-Kikli (Abdul Ghani al-Kikli’s brother) to justice.

They condemned what they described as acts of killing, intimidation, and the violation of state institutions threatening the security of the entire western region.

After days of escalation, Dbeibeh’s Defense Ministry announced the success of the operation in fully controlling the strategic Abu Salim area in the capital.

In contrast, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya expressed “deep concern” over the deteriorating security situation in Tripoli.

With heavy fighting intensifying in densely populated neighborhoods, it called on all parties to immediately cease hostilities, restore calm, and protect civilians.

Tripoli Boils Over

Barely hours after al-Kikli’s killing, chaos erupted in Tripoli as brutal clashes escalated between the 444th Combat Brigade loyal to Dbeibeh’s government and the Special Deterrence Force (SDF) led by Abdul Raouf Kara.

The fighting broke out after Dbeibeh issued a decision to dissolve the Deterrence Force, aiming to expand his government forces’ control at the expense of the SDF.

This sparked a fierce street war that disrupted flights, schools, work in several government offices, and triggered regional and international warnings about the worsening situation.

Libyan media reported on May 14 that days of ongoing clashes had so far left 58 dead—including six civilians—and at least 93 injured, with residential neighborhoods suffering severe damage.

Although the Defense Ministry of the Government of National Unity announced a ceasefire agreement around the Gharyan–Janzour axis and assigned the 52nd Brigade to secure the Janzour gate, fighting continued across most of Tripoli’s districts.

Meanwhile, armed groups from az-Zawiyah launched an attack to support the Deterrence Force, besieging  al-Takbali camp, headquarters of the 444th Brigade, triggering back-and-forth battles that enabled the SDF to retake some bases with popular support in areas like Souq al-Jum’aa, where roads were blocked to back the Deterrence Force.

At the same time, the Deterrence Force seized the Libyan Intelligence headquarters, while the 444th Brigade withdrew from Andalus district following heavy fighting in Souk al-Thulatha island and Omar al-Mukhtar street.

The deteriorating security situation caused further serious consequences: the Judicial Police announced the escape of many prisoners from al-Jadida prison, including suspects of serious crimes, warning of an impending security disaster.

The National Oil Corporation and Zueitina Oil Company were forced to suspend operations in Tripoli, instructing employees to leave only for urgent needs.

Simultaneously, the Tripoli Municipality Council declared a suspension of studies and work due to “exceptional circumstances,” as the city center turned into an open battlefield.

Amid the chaos, the Government of National Unity did not comment on reports that the attack on the Deterrence Force was directly ordered by Dbeibeh as part of his efforts to reshape the political scene by eliminating powerful armed factions threatening the capital’s security and stability.

Militia Map

Tripoli is controlled by several semi-official armed groups that are nominally linked to the Ministries of Interior and Defense.

However, these groups maintain a high degree of independence and influence, making the security situation fragile and prone to erupting at any moment.

The most prominent is the Special Deterrence Force led by Abdul Raouf Kara. This Salafi-founded faction, established in 2013, dominates Mitiga Air Base, Mitiga Prison, and several key sites in central Tripoli, with influence extending to Tarhunah, Zliten, and al-Khums.

Officially under the Presidential Council and executing the Attorney General’s orders, the SDF faces international accusations of human rights abuses and human trafficking.

Alongside it is the Stability Support Apparatus, formerly led by Abdul Ghani al-Kikli until his death.

This group emerged from the Abu Salim Brigade in 2012 and controlled large neighborhoods such as Abu Salim, al-Hadba, and central Tripoli, with extensions toward az-Zawiyah, Sirte, and al-Ajaylat.

Despite its official legalization in 2021, the killing of its leader led to its fragmentation and intensified clashes with other forces, especially the 444th Combat Brigade.

The 444th Brigade, commanded by Colonel Mahmoud Hamza, a defector from the Deterrence Force, originated from the 20/20 Brigade and is among the most disciplined factions aligned with the current government.

It is based in Yarmouk Camp and controls southern and southwestern Tripoli districts like Ain Zara, Salah al-Din, and Qasr Bin Ghashir.

The brigade operates under the Defense Ministry of the Government of National Unity and played a key role in resisting Khalifa Haftar’s forces during the 2019–2020 offensive.

In addition to these forces, the Public Security Service, led by Major Imad al-Trabelsi, operates security checkpoints and stems from remnants of the Sa'iqa (or Thunderbolt Battalion) of Zintan.

Though officially under the Interior Ministry, it wields significant influence over the coastal road, az-Zawiyah, and Janzour areas.

Also, the 111 Brigade, led by Abdulsalam al-Zoubi, forms Tripoli’s southern defense line. It became prominent during its resistance to Osama al-Juwaili’s attempt to bring Fathi Bashagha’s government into the capital in 2022 and is allied with forces supporting Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh.

Around these major groups, loyal armed factions operate, such as the Rahba al-Dor Brigade in Tajoura allied with the 444 Brigade, and the Janzour Knights Brigade affiliated with the Stability Support Apparatus, along with other local groups sharing control over smaller areas in the capital.

This control map reflects Tripoli’s fragile security reality, dominated by power struggles and positioning rather than ideological alignments.

Thus, any slight disruption in the balance of power, like the killing of al-Kikli, is enough to ignite widespread armed clashes threatening the city’s entire stability.

Firepower’s Leverage

Libyan journalist Omar al-Hassi says Dbeibeh’s government, like its predecessors that came to power in Tripoli, remains almost entirely dependent on certain armed groups spread across the capital and its surroundings.

This is without succeeding in building real military or police institutions capable of enforcing state authority with full loyalty to the nation alone.

“Successive governments in Tripoli have traded lasting stability for the militias' firepower,” he told Al-Estiklal.

“This ongoing pattern simply means that any new government will remain dependent on the armed groups that guarantee its survival, rather than on a base of popular or institutional legitimacy.”

“The repeated civil wars in Libya have eroded what remained of the already divided state institutions,” al-Hassi added.

The journalist stressed that ongoing internal fighting has pushed the state-building project to the margins and opened the door wide to illusions of individual control by certain cities and tribes.

He also highlighted the deep societal division, with an unofficial classification emerging between “victorious cities and tribes” and others considered “defeated.” This division even affects the distribution of ministerial portfolios and sovereign positions, where temporary tribal interests outweigh permanent national interests.

Al-Hassi warned that this chronic imbalance in Libya’s internal scene has allowed external parties to dominate national decision-making, repeating that “Libya’s fate is now hostage to foreign wills.”

He noted that some militia leaders have made secret deals with Haftar, who lurks around Tripoli day and night, continuing attempts to infiltrate the capital militarily or politically by supporting certain armed factions with money or weapons in exchange for loyalty.

Al-Hassi said recent years have seen the rise of figures lacking any real political experience or qualifications to hold positions of power.

“Dbeibeh’s government, which took power amid great hopes of restructuring the Libyan house, failed to build a social base or capitalize on the atmosphere of unity, despite spending billions.”

The record of open cases with the Attorney General clearly reveals the extent of failures and mismanagement of public resources, according to the journalist.

Al-Hassi concluded by emphasizing that “Libya’s main problem today lies primarily in the absence of conscious national leadership capable of envisioning the future.”

He believes the ongoing crises, especially the armed factions issue, without a real change in governance mentality, represent the biggest challenge to any future solution.

“The findings of the UN mission’s advisory committee, which called for the formation of a new government, reflect the severe failure of the current government and the urgent need for a different vision to save the country east and west,” al-Hassi said.