Will Nouri Al-Maliki Return as Prime Minister of the Next Iraqi Government?

No sooner than two weeks had passed since the leader of the Sadrist Movement, Muqtada Al-Sadr, announced his withdrawal from participating in the Iraqi elections, when the State of Law Coalition led by Nouri Al-Maliki announced its quest to achieve a parliamentary majority and head the next government.

During a television speech on July 15, 2021, Al-Sadr announced his withdrawal from the elections in order to “preserve what is left of the the state, and save the homeland that the corrupt have burned and are still burning,” stressing: “I inform you that I will not participate in these elections, because our homeland is more important than all that.”

The talk of the State of Law Coalition, which is considered an opponent of the Sadrist Movement, about Al-Maliki’s return to power, raised several questions about the data he relied on to announce his candidacy again for prime minister, and his chances of success in assuming a third term, after he headed two governments in 2006 to 2014.

The absence of the Sadrist Movement from the elections, especially since it wanted to obtain the prime ministership for the first time since 2003, seems to be a great opportunity for the State of Law Coalition to talk about its quest for a parliamentary majority, and Al-Maliki assuming the presidency of the next government.

The other matter that was read by Iraqi media, is what was revealed on July 29, 2021, about the conclusion of reconciliation between former Prime Ministers Nouri Al-Maliki and Haider Al-Abadi, in a meeting held at the latter’s house for the coordination council of Shiite forces, and another meeting that they both attended.

Disagreements arose between Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi against the background of the latter’s assumption of the position of prime minister in Iraq, succeeding the first in 2014, which was reflected in the Shiite Islamic Dawa Party led by them two.

Al-Maliki holds the position of Secretary-General and Al-Abadi is the head of its political body.

During the last parliamentary elections in May 2018, the two parties decided to enter two separate lists, after which Al-Abadi announced his official withdrawal from the leadership of the Islamic Dawa Party and his non-participation in the internal elections that took place in June 2019.

In February 2021, Al-Maliki demonstrated his ambition to rule Iraq again despite the sharp decline in his popularity due to his rule, as the Iraqi state witnessed a significant decline at various economic, social and security levels, wasting hundreds of billions of oil revenues, and ending with the disaster of ISIS control over a third of the area of ​​the country in 2014.

Al-Maliki reintroduced himself as a “friend” of U.S. President Joe Biden, as he stated in February 2021, offering his mediation between Tehran and Washington over differences over the nuclear agreement and severe economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States.

Not far from this early promoting process, Al-Maliki said during a television interview in February 2021 that he is qualified to assume the position of prime minister again and that if he is assigned to the position by the political forces and parliament, he “will not back down from the assignment in the most difficult circumstances to help Iraq.”

Commenting on the possibility of Al-Maliki becoming prime minister of the next government, Iraqi political sources—who asked not to be identified—said in an interview with Al-Estiklal: “Al-Maliki’s name began to echo within political forces for re-assuming the position of prime minister with an Iranian will, especially with the arrival of Ibrahim Raisi to the presidency of Iran.”

The sources stated that “there are political readings stating that the parliamentary elections may be postponed to June 2022, with the dismissal of [current Prime Minister] Mustafa Al-Kadhimi from his position, and the nomination of Nouri Al-Maliki as prime minister.”

They indicated that “the forces loyal to Iran are seeking to remove Al-Kadhimi from his position before the elections.”

At the same time, Al-Maliki is very keen to participate in the upcoming elections, despite announcing that he will not run for the first time since 2003.00

He said on Twitter on July 28, 2021: “The elections will take place as scheduled on October 10, 2021.”

Al-Maliki added: “The position of the forces that announced their non-participation is respectable, but it is their own and should not be imposed on the opinion of the majority interacting with the early elections on their specified date. Early elections are a reference and popular demand, and the government must create security conditions for their success.”

Two days later, Al-Maliki said in another tweet: “All forces are working hard towards the next parliament to be a partner in managing the state. We congratulate all those who decided to run in the elections, and we wish them to achieve the results they seek, and we invite them to an honorable election based on competition and cooperation towards providing service to the citizens and contributing to the process of building the state and restoring its prestige.”

On the same matter, spokesman for the State of Law Coalition, Baha Nouri, said during a television interview on July 19, 2021: “The political coalition led by Nouri Al-Maliki will achieve a parliamentary majority, and we will come first over all political forces, within the data we have.”

On the other hand, Issam Hussein, a member of the Sadrist Movement, said during a television interview on July 29, 2021: “The Movement may return to participate in the elections to prevent the old guard from coming to power again, those who led the government from 2006 to 2014, whose consequences we are witnessing today.”

Hussein explained that “many Shiite political forces were objecting to the election law, and demanded to postpone the parliamentary elections, but after the announcement of the withdrawal of the Sadrist Movement, they began to demand that it be held, because their chances increased with the Sadrists’ absence from the elections.”

A press report on August 2, 2021 quoted an Iraqi politician—whose identity was not revealed—that “there are two tracks now in terms of dealing with Al-Sadr’s withdrawal from the elections;”

The first is the entry of prominent Iraqi blocs and leaders at the level of the presidencies in order to induce Al-Sadr to reverse his position, especially since the door to withdrawal is already closed.

Therefore, all those who announced their withdrawal did not officially announce the request of the Commission to withdraw participation, because this contradicts the law and instructions, which means that the order to participate in the elections is only suspended.

He added that “the second track almost works in opposition to the first, which is the attempts of forces and parties that can be called ideological opponents, as they belong to the same school of Al-Sadr—but the First and Second Al-Sadr are not the current Muqtada Al-Sadr.”

That is by making calculated attempts to provoke them for early propaganda, or promoting their obtaining of prime ministership, or educating on the return of personalities who have clear animosity with the Sadrists, with the aim of returning to the position of prime minister, such as Nouri Al-Maliki, he said.

The Iraqi politician continued: “These ideological forces or opponents see that the opportunity has become favorable for them to isolate Al-Sadr from his audience as long as he announces the withdrawal, while the Sadrist public belongs to a wider space, which is the Sadrist Movement, that represents a general trend in Iraqi political life.”

Al-Sadr’s decision to boycott the elections came after two horrific fires in two hospitals, one in the capital, Baghdad, and the other in Nasiriyah, southern Iraq, leaving dozens dead and injured.

The decision also came as a result of severe confusion in supplying the population with electric power, which made fingers point directly towards the Sadrist Movement for corruption and neglect in the health and electricity sectors, which it manages mainly within the framework of the quota system in which Iraq is run and according to which the affairs of its state run.