Previously Failed; Why Is Moscow Rushing to Resolve the Battles of the Syrian 'Badia'?

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Russia insists on opening the forefront of battles in the Syrian desert (Badia) against ISIS, whose cells have been stationed in for four years, as all previous military campaigns failed to achieve any significant field progress.

The new military campaign against the Organization in Badia, however, was led by Russia's first man in Syria, Brigadier General Suheil Al-Hassan, commander of the 25th Division.

It is the first time that Al-Hassan’s forces, which receive financial support and economic and military services from Russia, have been summoned to fight battles against ISIS since its elimination in late 2017, on the bank of the Euphrates River, on which the militias and the Syrian regime forces are currently focused.

The sweep campaign aims to secure the main roads passing through Badia, such as the Damascus–Deir ez-Zor road, and the Aleppo–Athriya road.

It seemed that Russia put more weight in this campaign, with its military formations alongside the regime's structural forces, led by the Fifth Corps, the Palestinian Quds Brigade and Ausūd al-Sharqiya (Lions of the East) militias.

 

Unresolved

ISIS cells expanded in the Syrian Badia despite Washington’s announcement of the end of the Organization in Syria in March 2019 following a military operation launched by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with the support of the International Coalition on the areas of its presence in the cities and towns of the Jazira region lines in Deir ez-Zor Governorate on the left bank of the Euphrates River.

The gathering point for these cells was the Badia on the right bank of the Euphrates River (Al-Shamiya), which the Organization has taken as its new base since November 2017, taking advantage of its rugged nature, which is equivalent to about half the area of ​​Syria, after losing control of several neighborhoods of the city of Deir ez-Zor and the cities of Al-Mayadin and Al-Bukamal, and the villages connecting them.

However, the fierceness of the battles between ISIS and the Russian militias has escalated since the beginning of June 2021.

As ISIS intensified its lightning attacks on the columns of the Syrian regime forces and the militias supporting it on four axes connected to the Badia and affiliated to the governorates of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Hama and Homs.

The Al-Sharqiya 24 network has documented the killing of more than 70 militia members, and ISIS captured a number of members since the beginning of June 2021, after the attacks affected their concentration points in the Badia, and the mobile convoys were targeted with explosive devices between the Damascus–Deir ez-Zor road.

This campaign did not achieve any tangible results in terms of curtailing ISIS cells’ expansion in the Syrian Badia, to be added to the previous failed attempts of the Syrian regime with the support of Russian aviation, most notably the large operation in the White Desert area in the Badia in late August 2020.

According to Colonel Khaled Al-Mutlaq, a Syrian analyst who specializes in military and security affairs, “the area extending from eastern Palmyra in Homs to western Deir ez-Zor, reaching south of Raqqa and eastern Hama, has two main forces and a another that penetrates in-between.”

In a statement to Al-Estiklal, the colonel identified these forces as: “ISIS cells and some of the National Liberation Army or the Popular Resistance who are resisting the occupation of the Russians and Iranians in this region, while the third party is the Iranian militias that are fighting the Russian forces using the Organization's methods.”

The military expert pointed out that “Russia’s effective air force does not resolve the battle on the ground,” noting that “pushing the so-called ‘Tiger,’ Suheil Al-Hassan, whose forces are involved in the elements of settlements and reconciliations in the battles of the Syrian Badia, is due to two things:

“Firstly, after an attack against the Russian forces and their militias represented by the Fifth Corps, it became clear that Iran was behind it through the Revolutionary Guards, who carried out the operation in the guise of the Islamic State, and therefore Moscow is trying to limit Tehran’s ploys to fight it in Syria and pressure it for political reasons.

“Secondly, to limit the operations of the Islamic State in the region and prevent it from reaching the oil and gas wells located in the desert,” according to the colonel.

The security affairs specialist attributed the difficulty of curbing the Organization's operations to “the ruggedness of the Syrian desert, which is similar to the areas of Tora Bora in Afghanistan, as it contains caves that can contain 20 cars, in addition to fortifications prepared and rearranged by the Organization since it controlled Palmyra in 2017.”

Investing the ‘Tiger’

Several reasons lie behind Russia's return to investing Suheil Al-Hassan in the battles of the Syrian Badia, who left in late 2017, after his militias were involved in the battles to eliminate ISIS on the right bank of the Euphrates River, extending from Deir ez-Zor through Al-Mayadin to Al-Bukamal.

This was demonstrated by the Syrian analyst, Maan Al-Sharif, by saying that “the attribution of the military campaign against the Syrian Badia against ISIS to Suheil Al-Hassan is related to his constant promotion through the media that he is the unbeatable leader.”

And he added in a statement to Al-Estiklal: “But the truth is that it depends on the scorched-earth policy, and this is what the facts witnessed in the battles assigned to him by Russia, whether in Deir ez-Zor in 2017, eastern Ghouta in 2018, or in the countryside of Hama and Idlib in 2020.”

Russia's interest in the personality of Suheil Al-Hassan prompted it to sort out a special protection for him from the Wagner Group forces, accompanying him in the battles and on his movements.

Al-Hassan was the only officer who attended with the head of the regime, Bashar Al-Assad, when he was brought to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Hmeimim base in Latakia in December 2017.

Suheil Al-Hassan is a brigadier general in the Syrian regime's Air Force Intelligence Department, nicknamed “The Tiger.” He was born in 1970 and hails from the village of Beit Ghana in Latakia countryside.

Famous for ordering brutal attacks on civilians, he is Russia's number one man in Syria and is affiliated with it and relies on it in its pivotal military operations.

According to the Pro Justice organization, which seeks to achieve the principle of accountability and prevent impunity for war criminals and human rights violators in the Middle East and Syria, Al-Hassan “enjoys hateful sectarianism and was commissioned to break up peaceful demonstrations in some neighborhoods of the capital, Damascus and its countryside.”

 

Safe Oil Environment

Cleaning the Syrian Badia of ISIS cells is of economic importance to Russia, given that Russian and local companies have signed long-term contracts with the Syrian regime to invest in oil and gas fields in Deir ez-Zor and Homs.

The most recent of which is the handing over of the Al-Taym and Al-Ward oil fields to the Qaterji militia on February 26, 2021 by the Russian forces, under their control in Deir ez-Zor, for investment for a period of 5 years.

It seems that the tactic of protecting the oil convoys of the Qatirji Company, coming from the areas of the SDF to the areas of the Syrian regime, from ISIS threats by escorting them along with the regime’s helicopters, has become expensive.

Thus, although Russia has guaranteed investment contracts in the field of Syrian oil and gas in its pocket, the protection of transmission lines has become its biggest concern.

Therefore, Russia is seeking to secure a safe environment near those oil wells and the roads leading to them, to start production operations and collect profits from contracts after the end of the war in Syria.

This is what Al-Sharif emphasized that Russia’s completion and expansion of the combing process, which it started about 3 months ago in the Badia, “is linked to Moscow’s desire to secure the gas and oil fields it controls, both the Al-Taym and Al-Ward fields in Deir ez-Zor and the Shaer and Toynan fields, which Moscow seems to have the intention to activate and increase their production.”

Al-Sharif pointed out that “the new operation will not contribute to the dismemberment of the Badia, which has a great logistical source for ISIS, because it extends with the Iraqi border, all the way to the Anbar desert, in which large pockets of the Organization is located.”

The analyst went on to say that “Russia's focus on opening the Badia battles is a message to the international community about the danger of the Islamic State on the Syrian file, with the aim of gaining more procrastination in the political process and drawing attention to the return of the Organization’s activity.”

He indicated that “Russia alone will not be able to eliminate the ISIS groups in the Syrian Badia, due to the lack of direct confrontation areas, as the Organization depends on its movements within wide geographical terrains that enable it to have great ability to maneuver and hide.”

He pointed out that “Russia today is counting on securing the main roads for transporting goods and oil tanks between the governorates; the roads that ISIS has the ability to disrupt from the Badia that connects the governorates of Deir ez-Zor, Homs, Hama and Raqqa.”

Both the United States and Russia share fears of a third resurgence of the Islamic State.

On February 8, 2021, the commander of the U.S. Central Command, General Kenneth McKenzie, warned of this by saying: “ISIS will continue its insurgency, and it will try to renew itself in the Middle East and beyond, and develop its goals,” according to the Al-Hurra website.

On February 16, 2021, the Special Envoy of the Russian President to Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, said that Russia is recording a specific activation process for the sleeper cells of ISIS in the country.

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