Turkish-Qatari Penetration of the Axis of the Counter-Revolution; Limits and Features
Contents
Introduction
First: The difficult penetration in the Saudi square
A. The path of Turkish-Saudi relations
B. The path of Saudi-Qatari relations
Second: Penetrating the Egyptian square
A. Turkish-Egyptian relations
B. Egyptian Qatari Gate
Conclusion
Introduction
The relations of the two regional axes, the Turkish-Qatari axis and its extensions, and the counter-revolution axis (Saudi Arabia Egypt UAE), are witnessing intersections that unscover penetrations, but it varies in size of its negative influence on the counter-revolution axis. Can we talk about two models of influence, which are different in the Saudi path from the Egyptian path?
Can it be said that the Saudi path associated with dual leadership and multi-vision, between King of Saudi Arabia (Salman), and Crown Prince (Mohammed bin Salman), which less useful in this penetration than the Egyptian model, which is witnessing a strong presence of institutions, even if the leadership is working against institutions, under pressure from the Gulf and European supporters?
Does the Egyptian model link with two paths, one of them is trying to build a common interest relationship with the Turkey-Qatar axis, As the other path tries to restore the image of its foreign policy, By portraying Turkey's strategic friendliness as a fear of the Egyptian power?
And how can the Egyptian gain in penetration attempts be greater than the Saudi gain? Has there anything to do with the transformations in global leadership, especially the American in these two paths? The paper in our hands strives to provide a reading in these models.
First: The difficult penetration in the Saudi square
Saudi Arabia has not experienced the trouble in its foreign policy as it is today, there seems to be an understanding on the division of key sovereign roles between King Salman bin Abdul Aziz and his Crown Prince, so that the King of Saudi Arabia takes over the diplomatic framework, while the Crown Prince takes over the defense file, this sovereign division produces the image of division in the kingdom's foreign policy.
In this context, the Yemeni file seems to be the most important sign of this trouble at the moment, Turkish-Saudi relations seem to be wavering because of the division itself, Saudi-Turkish diplomatic relations seem in a quiet walk.
A. The path of Turkish-Saudi relations
Turkish-Saudi relations witnessed a wave of trouble, and relations between the two countries were negatively affected, as a result of being influenced by several regional files such as Syria and Libya, and the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi on Turkish ground, Ankara refused to get caught up in the Saudi Crown Prince's efforts to contain the assassination issue, the Saudi Crown Prince alluded to it at the “Davos in the Desert” Conference which happened in the Saudi Capital in October 2018.
The disagreement in dealing with Turkish power between the Saudi king and his son was clear in the issue of the relationship with Turkey, which had gone on to improve with the G20 summit in Riyadh in November 2020, where there was a telephone conversation between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Saudi king during the contact, they agreed to improve relations between the two countries, nevertheless, the relations between the two countries continue to be strongly tense, by the Crown Prince's influence - without an official decision - in forcing Saudi businessmen and traders to boycott of Turkish goods, and to disrupt the entry procedures for shipments that have already arrived at Saudi border crossings, until food goods are damaged in those shipments, before economic relations improve relatively, where that the boycott decreased before it was rumored to be return again.
Relations between the two countries have improved again - as observers say - against the backdrop of the “Second Yemen War”, this follows the announcement on Twitter of the downing of a Turkish-made spy drone in Yemeni airspace by Houthi military spokesman “Yahya Saree” on Twitter, this led to the implementation of the Turkish-Saudi agreement to improve relations at the "G20 Summit" in Riyadh, coinciding with Saudi companies approval to import “Karayel” aircraft and settle its industry in Turkey.
Observers consider that the Turkish statement about the Houthi attack on oil installations near the Saudi city of Dammam on March 7, 2021, was warmer than other statements, which Turkey has long denounced the attack on Saudi facilities previously, the Turkish Foreign Ministry expressed “grave worry about the attacks which targeted the Saudi Arabia's territory”.
Although Turkish experts have denied reports that turkey's “Bayraktar” drone was involved in the Yemen war, however, what reinforced a sense of optimism about Turkish-Saudi relations was clear in the speech of the Turkish sovereign leaders, phrases such as “a new page” and “whoever walks us one step, we are walk two steps for him”.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu told the Anadolu Agency and Turkish television (TRT) that, “For us, there is no reason why relations with Saudi Arabia should not be improved, if Saudi Arabia takes positive steps, we will meet them too, and the same applies to the UAE”, in conclusion, Mevlut Cavusoglu said his country had not accused the Saudi leadership of being behind the assassination of Khashoggi previously.
Turkey's ambassador to Doha, Mehmet Mustafa Goksu, told “Al-Jazeera-Mubasher”' that he hoped for “good relations between his country and Saudi Arabia as they consider they are important countries in the region and the world”.
Turkish statements were preceded by several indicators, the most prominent of which was what happened in early November 2020 by the king of Saudi Arabia offering condolences to the victims of the earthquake in the Turkish state of Izmir, in addition to announcing assistance to those affected by the earthquake, in addition to a friendly meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which Cavusoglu told Farhan: “The strong partnership between Turkey and Saudi Arabia is not only for the benefit of the two countries, but for the entire region”,
However, the compatibility between the two countries was threatened by two factors, the first is a media flow confirming the continued boycott of Turkish goods by Saudi Arabia, the Turkish imports to Saudi Arabia have fallen at the rate of 95%.
Although the district's results may be dependent on statistics from the fourth quarter of last year, however, another event indicates continued tension, the Kingdom has sent five U.S.-owned F-15s to participate in the Greece exercises, this comes at a time when the Turkish-Greek confrontation is escalating, the United States is increasingly expressing its support for Greece, and a strong difference in its vision for the future of the region in a way that collides with the requirements of Turkish national security, this is of concern to Turkey, which has responded by equipping the S400 system for use, observers have hinted that Saudi F-15 its mission is the spying on Turkey and participating in its containment efforts.
The dispute between the Saudi Crown Prince's policy with his father's policy, may reflect a divide that some have reached by interpreting it to the point of a coup against the authority of King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, this can be inferred from the presence of the Saudi Ambassador within the exercises, and naming a Saudi military attaché in Athens for the first time.
There is a Protocol of Saudi-Greek Military cooperation, Saudi Arabia supports the Greek presence on Crete, on the other hand, the Yemeni-Saudi border today is witnessing the presence of 150 Greek soldiers, accompanied by “Patriot” anti-aircraft missile batteries, this is a step taken by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia in exchange for the King's contacts with Turkey, observers also report that the King of Saudi Arabia has rejected a proposal to supply from Israel's “Stinger” missiles.
However, the recent Saudi change can be interpreted in different directions, the most important is the pressure of the Saudi Crown Prince on Turkey to sell the “Bayraktar” drone to the Saudi Air Force, instead of the “Karayel” drone, which is considered a medium-height and limited in capacity compared to its counterpart “Bayraktar”, which Turkey is reticent about it, in addition there are pressures from the UAE on the Saudi Crown Prince.
Therefore, observers who build their analyses in different paths of dealing with Turkey, between the Crown Prince and his father, they also expect relations to deteriorate if King Salman is absent, King Salman's invitation to Turkey is to complicate the Turkish-Iranian relations, while the Saudi Crown Prince's motivation seems more emotional and less informed about strategic variables.
B. The path of Saudi-Qatari relations
We have mentioned earlier that Saudi-Qatari relations are at a quiet step, although the absence of institutions under the influence of the Saudi Crown Prince makes it difficult to predict the future status of these relations, especially in the event of the absence of the King of Saudi Arabia.
In view of the devising of sovereign functions between the King and the Crown Prince, and by the confirmation of observers that the Royal Palace has taken over the functions of managing the diplomatic file, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud visited Doha in the first week of this month (March 8, 2021), carrying an “verbal message” from the King of Saudi Arabia, this indicates that there are diplomatic arrangements on issues in the region, among them are the files of the dual relations, Libya, Sudan and the Turkish-Saudi relations, moreover, Qatar is one of the pillars of a regional axis that includes Turkey, it is reticent about the steps to provocation the region.
However, the most important dimension is Qatar’s position as a mediator to calming the situation in the region in order to secure regional peace, which was clear in Qatar's hosting of the Russia-Turkey-Qatar meeting, to reduce tensions between Russia and Turkey in northern Syria, to avoid implicating the region in an extended conflict in the event of medium-range missiles entering northern Syria, which could lead to U.S. involvement in a facing with Turkey or Russia, there is a fear of a third world war broke out, everyone is afraid from its consequences.
Second: Penetrating the Egyptian square
Saudi foreign policy also suffers from the dilemma of full agreement between the vision of the king and his Crown Prince, Egypt also suffers from the lack of integration of the political vision under the Gulf pressure with the Egyptian institutional vision, represented by the perspectives of the Egyptian ministries of foreign affairs, defense and public intelligence, some of them have been stopped Turkish-Egyptian clashes in the eastern Mediterranean.
This is in addition to the positions of several Egyptian ministries, which provided a model for calming relations and reciprocity with the institutions of the Turkish state, the most recent was the announcement by the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum of a new round of oil and gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean, which took into consideration the coordinates of the continental shelf, which announced by Ankara in accordance with the 2019 Agreement, which related to the demarcation of the maritime border between Turkey and Libya, and registered by the United Nations in October 2020.
A. Turkish-Egyptian relations:
The orientation of the July 3rd authority is full of the conflict with the visions of Egyptian institutions of national interest, which made some other institutions, including the advisers of the Ministry of Irrigation to confirm their advice to the President, for not signing on the Khartoum Principles Declaration agreement on March 23, 2015, because being a direct threat to Egypt's water interests.
It can be said that it was the efforts of Egyptian institutions that led to raising the chances of Egyptian-Turkish reconciliation, despite the Islamist migration crisis to Turkey and Qatar, on the other hand, the July 3rd authority , under financial pressure from the UAE, is moving to put hostility on this relationship in an attempt to catch the stick from the middle, between satisfying the regional supporters on the one hand, and not to interfere with the state institutions on the other hand, which forced it to pass a media image of the perceptions of the July 3rd authority, as it were minded to resume bilateral contacts, although there is not urgency from Egypt, which revealed by foreign minister Sameh Shoukry's conservative, which turkey demanded actions not words, as turned out from its deep reading, it represents the response of the same messages that the spokesman of the Turkish presidency said, who expressed his country's ready to rapprochement with Egypt, “when it adopts a positive regional agenda”, describing Egypt as “an important country in the region and the Arab world”, they are almost the same expressions as Shoukry used it.
However, a section of the sovereign institutions was keen to verification the concept that Egypt has set 10 conditions for rapprochement with Turkey, in a scene that almost like the scene of the thirteen formal conditions, which was later ignored by all, in order to restore the Gulf-Egyptian siege to normalize relations with Qatar.
The picture of the scene of Egyptian-Turkish relations was very conflicting, despite the great sensitivity and appreciation shown by the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum to the Turkish-Libyan border demarcation agreement, the Egyptian armed forces refrained from participating in the “Eye of the Falcon Exercises”, which brought together Saudi and Greek forces, despite Ankara's confirmation of the resumption of diplomatic contacts with Egypt, after a long-standing communication through the sovereign security services.
Greece was quick to express its concern about the conduct of the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum, then there was a campaign by the Egyptian media to refuse the resumption of negotiations, which led Greek diplomats to confirm that there was no Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement, this was followed by a response from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry to confirm the existence of conditions for rapprochement, but it involved an recognition that negotiations were already, this was indicated by the statements of Turkish officials precisely.
The contradictory signals issued by the Egyptian and Turkish sides are nothing more than formal, on the one hand, Turkey which deliberately to confronts any arrogance emanating from western or major powers, as it did in the face of the U.S. rejection of the Russian S400 deal, as with its impending clash with France in the eastern Mediterranean, in the style of its confrontations with Russia in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, where there has been not threat to Egypt's interests or security, the maximum tension between the two countries related to the July 3 authority, the Turkish president called his Egyptian counterpart a "the coup man", he refused to be lenient towards the Egyptian opposition, which forcibly exiled to Turkey, but it avoided confrontation with Egypt, despite its military confrontations with Russia and France, and respected the Egyptian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, these is a general Turkish trend to not drain Muslim regional powers.
In contrast to this sustainable trend in the Turkish foreign policy, the Egyptian institutional reaction has been entirely reciprocity over the past period, with the abundance of positive indicators from Egyptian state institutions, Turkey has been keen to provide a positive framework for these indicators, to avoid embarrassing these institutions in front of the Egyptian public opinion, which has led to an abundance of the positive Turkish messages.
This has led to an increase in the size of dual trade, investments and the gas imports, these efforts have strengthened the trade partnership between the two countries despite leadership conflicts, trade relations between the two countries have risen to exceed $5 billion for the first time in 2018.
On the one hand, the situation is relatively different depending on the location of the political leadership and institutions, the political leadership has financial supporters (Gulfs and European), they had invested tens of billions of dollars in the July 3 authority, and they want to take advantage of the harvesting of their investments, this which pushes the July 3rd authority to try to balance the Egyptian interests with the demands of regional and European supporters.
In this context, the experience of the head of the July 3rd information authority, after his presidency of the Military Intelligence Service, his son (effectively) headed the General Intelligence Service, and it was keen to make it clear that Turkey is the side wishing for the reconciliation and rapprochement, and that the July 3 authority is the side under pressure for peace, this does not matter much to Turkey as framework of its strategic vision for the future of the region.
This perception leads us to the gains of both sides from compatibility, which can be summarized as follows:
First: Egyptian institutions: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Petroleum and the General Intelligence Service, prefer to conclude a maritime deal with Turkey instead of Greece, because this deal will provide Egypt with a much larger maritime area than the demarcation process with Greece.
Second: The Egyptian military does not want to run a difficult test of its capabilities in front of the Turkish armed forces, which has entered the square of arms-producing countries and outstanding military technology, while Egypt relies on the purchase of weapons.
Third: Egypt does not wants to develop the Biden administration a vision of its siege using Turkey, especially after the July 3rd authority decided to maintain on the authority, by maneuvering with the Russians against the Biden administration's approach, through the Su-35 deal, and hosting the Russian nuclear submarine “Donskoi”.
Fourth: Egypt may be the biggest beneficiary of maximizing the transit trade with Turkey, especially if relations developed between the two countries positively, Egypt is more important to Turkey at this level than Libya with a weak population, or from Algeria with complex calculations, as well as the strength of the Egyptian market, which may compensate for Turkey's broken commercial capital with Saudi Arabia.
Fifth: Saudi Arabia's contravention of the Egyptian interests in its maneuvers with Greece, and the UAE's relationship with Israel, and its strategic implications in the south of the Red Sea, this makes the steps of the Gulf states uncertain of the consequences.
Finally, Turkey has a necessary interest in keeping Egypt away from being hostage to other countries, only it wants to use it as a shield in its battles with Turkey, as the UAE and Greece might do, what is important is to secure the strength of the two Muslim countries, and not to involve Egypt in a cross-Mediterranean confrontation with Turkey, Turkey's failure to carry weight of adding Egypt to the list of confrontations, many observers warn that the possibility of eruption is closer than the possibility of its overcoming.
B. Egyptian-Qatari Gate:
The penetration of the Egyptian sector was not only through the flirtation of interests between Turkey and Egypt, rather, it went beyond secret negotiations between Qatar and Cairo on the Libyan issue, its details began at the Arab League meeting at the level of foreign ministers, which held in Cairo in early March 2021, the Egyptian-Qatari preliminary meeting took place on the sidelines of this meeting, where observers suggested that it was a routine and untidy meeting for its, and he was off the agenda, and that it was limited to determining the paths of Egyptian-Qatari relations after Egypt’s signature, represented by its Foreign Minister on the agreement to normalize the Gulf-Qatari relations, according to observers the meeting included the date of the return of the ambassadors of the two countries by mid-April 2021, and ways to developing the relations between the two countries.
Other observers said that the meeting also included an entry point for secret negotiations, so that Qatar partially withdraws from the western Libyan, and supports the isolation of the forces defending Tripoli from the structure of the Libyan state, in exchange for the UAE's withdrawal from the eastern Libya, with priority given to the presence of the Egyptian interests in the western Libyan country with Qatari support on the one hand, for the benefit of an Egyptian presence that supports the minimum Qatari interests that may be eroded by international support, in favor of a Turkish military presence in Misrata and Al-Watiya, which does not reaches to value of the strategic presence, and the same understanding may also allow for a reassessment of the Qatari interests in the eastern Libya.
Successive visits have not seen a change in the media review, and the developments on the Libyan scene also did not reveal any appearance of this direction on the ground, perhaps with the exception of the U.S.-French rejection of the issue of the development of the Turkish space program on Libyan ground, however, the keys to the development of the balance of power in Libya allow the Egyptian presence to be given a greater expansion in the western Libyan, especially since it is under strong pressures in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, while sending in it a positive signals to Turkey, which means it is pushing for some Turkish concession, this is likely to be a waiver on the Libyan scene.
Conclusion
The success of the Turkey-Qatar axis in a large-scale penetration within the counter-revolution axis, and this axis is witnessing a division in the paths of development in both the UAE and Bahrain from the Egyptian-Saudi path, however, there are two models of influence in which the Saudi path is different from the Egyptian path.
The Saudi path is witnessing a disturbance in visions, resulting from a rational American perception of the destination implemented by King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, which is linked to turkey's attempt to draw a confrontation with Iran through the Yemeni file, in pursuit of Iran's failure to join the Turkish-Pakistani axis, while the Saudi Crown Prince is following an emotional path willing to get closer to the U.S. Western line by working on the plan to contain Turkey, and the two paths seem complementary, but they are opposed in a sole reason, that the two paths present a dilemma for one state that has to choose between either of the paths.
On another path, Egyptian state institutions seem more aware, and more determined to not let the supporters to lead Egypt for a fate similar to that of the Ennahda dam file, this pushed the Egyptian institutions to leave a distance between them and the July 3rd authority, whether by pressures resisting or through the leaks, in order to maintain its vision of the national interest, the elite surrounding of the July 3rd authority seeks to restore its legitimacy through an anti-penetrating to the Turkish-Qatari axis, this may be very successful as a result of one of its regional perceptions within the limits of vision for the President Joe Biden administration's for the future of the situation in the Middle East, it is mainly the file on Libya, however, the features of this path have not yet been fully clarified.
While the success of the Turkish-Qatari axis in this context is linked to a dual role played by Turkey and Qatar, as Turkey moves to prove its strength and regional weight away from the U.S. central player, Qatar operates from within the U.S. vision, taking advantage of its effective diplomacy, this was clear by the Biden administration's choice to host the Doha Conference between the two countries, and to sponsor the reduction of Turkish-Russian tensions, to avoid a regional war in which the United States may be involved in it, to enhance the likelihoods of it becoming a world war, the United States may not be able to control in its path and results.
